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And as the superstructure

As modern men, we proudly proclaim that we have been freed from
the bonds of superstition that have plagued man since antiquity. This
is a fallacy, however, due to the aesthetic refinement of our worship.
For just as the ancient Jews, Egyptians, and Romans worshiped idols made
with human hands, so we worship idols made with human minds. Truly our
culture prizes above all others before it the freedom from metaphysical
tutelage; but, sadly, we have not freed ourselves from any forms of
superstition, but merely have become partakers in them all. We no
longer have a basis to believe anything, so instead we believe nothing,
which is simply a backwards way of believing anything, only we don't
know it. And when a man does not know that he believes something, this
does not prevent him from doing so, nor allow him to stop doing so. He
becomes a slave to his nothingness. He becomes a slave to himself.
Ross Channing Reed
12 July 1982
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CHAPTER 1
ADDICTION: DEFINITIONS AND ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

Introduction

A wise man once told me that I should write about only
that which has got me by the throat.

Without a doubt,

the

phenomenon of addiction and Sartre's notion of love are just
such topics.

So I am writing, so to speak, my way out of a

stranglehold.

Writing under such conditions, you may be sure,

involves both pain and a sense of exigency, with a searing
telos of truth.

What I write about has been and is a matter

of existence for me, and it is for this pressing and weighty
reason that I could do none other than employ phenomenological/existential methodology.
Before giving a general overview of my methodological
commitments operative within this dissertation,

I

feel

it

necessary to give a broad overview of what I seek to accomplish during the course of this work.
my aim is twofold:

In the present chapter,

(1) To introduce the reader to the subject

matter of the dissertation, and (2) To introduce the reader to
the

methodological

underpinnings

course of the dissertation.

employed

throughout

the

In chapter two, I explicate and

analyze Sartre's philosophy of love.

Drawing from the vast
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gamut of his works,
theories of love,

I

show that he develops two distinct

and I

raise the question concerning the

compatibility of these two theories.

I conclude that, given

Sartre's

the

ontology,

no

synthesis

of

two

is

possible.

Furthermore, I conclude that one of Sartre's theories of love
is,

within his own ontological

framework,

an unrealizable

ideal.
In chapter three,
theory of addiction.

I

wish to lay out a

comprehensive

I shall draw upon numerous phenomenolog-

ical/existential texts to accomplish this aim.

Primarily, I

will utilize the writings of Soren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul
Sartre,

but

I

will

also employ in a

tangential

role

the

thoughts of Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, the Marquis de
Sade, Ortega y Gasset, and Friedrich Nietzsche.
latter five

thinkers are necessary for

the

None of the

coherence and

legitimation of my theory of addiction, but serve as additional voices of wisdom, hopefully serving to further illuminate
the recesses of the hidden caverns of a dark problem.
voices of de Beauvoir,

Camus,

Sade,

Ortega,

The

and Nietzsche

shall be contained in the footnotes of the theory of addiction.

These voices embody various intra and inter-paradigma-

tical perspectives on the text, and proffer a meta-level of
discourse.

Since none

of

the seven thinkers

represented

focused on the phenomenon of addiction or offered an analysis
of the issue,

I must develop my own theory,

ontological tools they have provided.

utilizing the

I have as of yet not
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seen any thinker off er a philosophical theory of addiction,
and it is for this reason as well as those stated in the
opening paragraph that I have set before myself this task.
Or, possibly better said, I have attended to the task that has
been set before me.
In chapter four,

I

show that Sartre's remaining

theory of love, given the phenomenological/existential theory
of addiction developed in chapter three, is in fact a theory
of addiction.

I wish to do this by way of addressing and

critiquing Sartre's notions of "conversion," "authenticity,"
and the "phenomenological reduction."

In the Sartrean world,

I demonstrate, all love is but a species of covert addiction.
The Sartrean cosmos, peopled with naught but bad dreams, is
found to be a loveless one indeed.

Part One
Section A
A "Subjective" "Definition" of Addiction

1

1

The following "subjective" "definition" of addiction is
written in the first person and therefore may require patience
and vigilance on the part of the reader. This "definition" is
necessary to balance the subsequently appearing "objective"
"definition" of addiction, which may appear as a wholly
different phenomenon. Nevertheless, so as not to minimize the
terrible suffering of the addict, the "subjective" "definition" of addiction must of necessity be contained herein.
Therefore, I ask of the reader a magnanimous spirit in the
reading of the text. A "subjective" "definition" of addiction
is necessary to describe the addict's phenomenological field,
therefore the essential appearance of this section in the
text.
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This slimy feeling is always with me, I can't shake it.
Like sweating to the bone on a hot day, feeling the salt dry
on your pasty body, and being unable to take a shower.
the feeling never goes away.
drowned in a

Except maybe a little, when I'm

sea of unremitting unreality,

venom of my own imagination.

And

choking on the

Oh, believe me, it's lonely in

here.
I don't look like a sick man.
sickness.

Tan,

But that's part of the

toned flesh can disguise countless lethal

diseases, and one can die from a coronary on the day that he
feels the best.

I'm choking alright, and my spirit is bent.

I'd cry forever if I

ever really felt anything real.

falsehood is the order of the day.

So

I even seek to discharge

my trumped up emotions into obviously false scenarios.

So I

frequent the movies and imbibe almost any form of art whenever
I can.

Sure I'm screwed, but what can you do?

A cosmic rape scene?
I shake a lot.
always,

Who to blame?

Twentieth century Promethianism?
But it's mostly inside.

and always inside.

Actually, almost

But I do make a lot of stupid

mistakes - you know, where I almost hit pedestrians when I'm
driving and crap like that.
I just can't lay it down.

It's the anxiety that does it.
I hurt people all the time, but I

never think I really want to.
Sometimes I like to be really tired, to the bone, because
then, sometimes, I don't feel the pain.
during these times,

I reflect on the pain

so it never really leaves me.

It just
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stands back enough so that I can see it.
I get this rage inside.
getting screwed?
the cosmos.

Like, when am I going to stop

It's metaphysical, this rage.

I scream at

I can't really look anybody in the eye.

It's·

just not right to be seen this way.
I eat standing up a lot.
throat.

It never tastes good.

The food kind of sticks in my
I tend towards lighter foods.

Heavier foods make me feel like I'm simply sinking further
into the abyss.

I'm sure that life means something because I

couldn't feel this bad if it didn't.
I

have is in the pain.

But the only real belief

The rest is just fancy metaphor,

skillfully constructed poison.

Oh,

I know there's a hell.

I've been living there for years.
How can one escape from a metaphysical prison?
would even constitute escape?

Maybe if I went deeper into it

I wouldn't care enough to feel the pain anymore.
doesn't

lead

questions.
the pain.

to answers,

What

only questions.

But the pain

More and more

And I have no more time for questions. Because of
It's a son of a bitch dog's world.

I don't get no kick from anything no more, unless you
mean kick in the ass.
it simply is not.

Pleasure for me now is not an illusion;

Through the valley of the shadow of death

I walk, but, unfortunately, I do not die.

I do not know what

death is, and I

fear that suicide would be insufficient to

bring it about.

I eat cereal with milk, but only a little

cereal, and only a little milk.

Too much existence, too much
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existence.

I long to take up less space.

Space itself haunts

me as the distance between what I am and what I am.
don't feel like anything.
dreams.

Stuff that

But I

I really used to have hopes and

sounded nice,

that had body.

Now I

exemplify the very negation of that disgusting positivity.
I concoct my own universe, a playground of dissimilitude.
The bitter draught of reality has already been swallowed; now
is but the time to minimize its effects.
have become inseparable.
thank God!

Me and my illusions

I can no longer tell them apart,

But I know too much to give them up and so be

tossed upon the rocks of real reflectivity.

I hate existence.

But I am beyond cynicism, so I hate that too.
systematically stripped me of my humanity,
flays a walleyed, cold fish.

The pain has

as a

fisherman

Reality must be accepted - even

if it involves for its acceptance a necessary injection of
illusion.

Confusion is my friend, for in it I wallow in the

slimy pool of inactivity.

I feel a kinship with all humankind

because I know and understand the lowest of their wretched
deeds.

The pain has made brothers of us all.

Don't question my motives, for motives are a thing that
only make sense to you.

Or, alas, perhaps they no longer make

sense to you either.

Fine.

understanding here.

Don't expect consistency or

You' re lucky if you can get a

cheap

motel.
Believe me,
guilty.

these addictions

no

longer make me

I felt guilty before any of this.

feel

It's more like the
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guilt drives me to it.

The crevice in my being - the fault,

if you will - I didn't bring about.
point and that was it.
me.

I just noticed it at some

I don't fault myself - my self faulted

I sleep on a bed of knotty pine.

But I haven't got a

mattress.
All buildings are too enclosed for me.
to breathe in them.
tightness in my chest.
to crack soon.

I just can't seem

I never can breathe right.
It never leaves me.

It's this

I know I'll have

But I don't see how it can be any worse than

this.
I

tried counseling.

skirts the issue.

for me.

lot of it.

But it all

When you' re drowning you don't want to know

the composition of water.
anything.

Quite a

You don't really want to know

Knowledge itself has become a matter of suspicion
Knowledge is but a kind of power, and I have no more

power, so I have ceased to know anything.

But I have seen it

all slip away, so I am privileged to know that I am deprived.
Counselors all work from a cognitive or affective base
anyhow, and since I have nothing more to know and nothing more
to feel,

it all passes me by.

the unacceptable?

Besides, how does one accept

Believe the unbelievable?

Desire what one

does not desire?
Love is foreign to me, lost in a Portuguese nun of futile
passion.

One should not call me hopeless.

enough to say that I have ceased to hope.

It is descriptive
All my strength

bleeds from me in a vain attempt to expel existence from me,
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and love is simply an immersion therein.

Besides, why bury

two heads in a pillow of blood, when you can sweat and stifle
more silently on your own?

Real communication seems to imply

truth and a modicum of self, and since I am in possession of
neither I have nothing to say.
Drugs don't cover the sickness up, be they legal or no.
Just one more thing to pay for, and one more thing to choke
on.

And believe me,

remember.

Drugs don't cause the problem, and they sure as

hell don't cure it.
of

I've paid in more ways than I care to

blackness.

At best, they're a grimy mirage in a sea

But who would

turn away

from a

light

falsehood, if all around there appeared qnly the dark?

of
Men

have been known to drink urine from time to time.
Nothing feels right anymore.
less-wrongness.
what I want.

There are only degrees of

And since nothing feels right, I don't know

Or is it that I don't want anything?

knew what I wanted, something would feel right?

Ambi-valence

is the pathos-de-jour, the insufferable suffering.
know what I want.

I don't know who I am.

that this isn't me.
life force,

Or if I

I don't

All that I know is

I'm in the grip of an alien power, the

if you will,

dashing itself upon the rocks of

Gehenna.
If I really faced my own pain, I think it would kill me.
So my life is a carefully constructed series of ruses designed
to deflect away from myself the pain that I know I have.
dam the river of tears .

I

To

never cry for anything except
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myself.

Or, better put, the loss of myself.

me, because I truly have nothing to lose.
what I might do.

Don't mess with
Even I don't know

Generally, all I ever manage to do is to

attempt to resist the irresistible - a dismal failure.

I end

up trying to anchor myself in something I can get a hold on a little firewater, a dame, speed on the highway.

It doesn't

really matter what it is

- it's what it does.

Or what I

pretend it's going to do.

But it never does any of this and

ends up pounding like a flashing neon on the underbelly of a
wrecked Edsel.

I

don't have time for your questions;

bored enough already.
you.

But

it's

Don't get me wrong.

all

a

joke

to me,

I

I'm

I'd love to love

can't

get

into

it.

Detachment is the order of the day, and I observe even the
spectators.
own funeral.

I doubt that it would be beyond me to witness my
Actually, it wasn't.

If I could actually make a choice, I'd be free.

But this

piss ant twilight dragged down crapper of a life feels no such
freedom.

Choice appears vacuous if there ain't a damn thing

that looks good.

It ain't nothin' free, but a smorgasbord of

inedible vermin.

The griffon vulture or the rock badger?

I'll have two of each!

There's no choice when the voluminous

spread sports only fare that sickens the palate.
to me about a change of taste.
a different table.

I'd probably have to move to

And I'm frail from all these years of

struggle, and my eyesight is poor.
shiver in winter.

Don't talk

Besides, even the Eskimos
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I don't feel any gray area here.
or you're not.

Either you're screwed

I mean, do you have to wait till it's over to

know what happened?

Amidst the sweat and the stench, do you

really question if it's a rape?
it's nailed me to the tree.
know I'm just a pawn?
attacker, acceptance,
trying to get

I didn't consent to this, and

Can't you take one look at me and

Don't babble to me about love for my
and the meaningless like.

this bastard off me.

Can I

I'm still

help it

if

I

bludgeon myself in the process?
I don't see what I see anymore.
don't know what I know anymore.
feel what I feel anymore.

That's the point.

That's the point.

what I live anymore. That's the point.
anymore.

That's the point.

That's the point.

I

I don't

I don't live

I don't do what I do

I don't say what I say anymore.

There is no point.
I see the clock but I don't feel the time.
ending nursery rhyme.

Clickety- clack,

ain't no way to get off the track.

It's a never

up and back,

Though dreams are gone and

night has come, the train will take another run.
When I get scared I go back to the stake.
from the toss of the flow,

there

Up yours.

It rescues me

and I have nowhere else to go.

Twixt anxious thought and deep depression, through the stake
my tensions lessen.

Never fear if light is dark, back again

I know I'll hark.
The hell with emotions.
Yeah, right.

Lies, damn lies.

Positivity?

Yank my heart out and eat it for dinner.

Throw
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it up and make stew.
the croissants.

Feed me the leftovers.

Blow me with a lead pipe.

rather never feel again than feel this bad.
I'm a trinitarian.
stake.

And don't forget
I'd definitely
No contest.

I believe in pain, death, and the

You couldn't fit a pipe cleaner through my window of

opportunity, unless you consider the chance for self-dismemberment a gift.
a

My calling is to curdle blood.

pitchfork and a

touch of

lime.

They say the

delusional, but that's only when it works.
time it's bloodletting as usual.
also to you.

Bastards.

Okay,

The rest of the

Peace be unto you.

As for me,

When I'm at my best.

And

I believe in the stake.

Or my worst.

if you swallow paint thinner,

Induce vomiting?

stake's

How can you have peace if you don't

even believe in peace?
Sometimes.

I do it with

Right.

Well,

You tell me.

what do you do?

it's the same damn nasty

business if you've swallowed too much unpalatable reality.
You need to vomit it up.

You need the stake.

sion, you feel lighter, freer.
feel different feelings.

You think different thoughts,

Know the truth.

longer feel like yourself.

Sing songs.

Because I like them.

avoid

knowing

pleasant.
dentist.

when

I

You no

And it's a good thing too.

Why do I believe these lies I tell myself?
you?

After expul-

Why, I ask

I like them better than what I

employ

them.

Not

to

say

they' re

I like them in the same way I like going to the
The moron.

My teeth'll be fine when the mercury

finally seeps into my brain and kills me.

And to think I paid
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for this.

Yes, I paid for this.

How the hell can I
myself as truth?

come to believe the feces I

Well, I had reasons for doing so.

feed

How do

these reasons override what I heretofore believed to be true?
Simple, really.
true.

Before, I believed what seemed to me to be

Now, I've got reasons to believe otherwise, and these

reasons

be

they bogus

or no

always

seem somehow to

override the previous beliefs, you know, the ones that were
believable simply because they seemed to be true.

But now I

am the king of seeming, and in particular, seeming to be true.
I

mean,

who

can fight

with

gathering them by the score!

reasons?

I

have no problem

How can one's experience hold up

in the face of reasons perpetuated expressly for its denial?
Cognition jettisons experience once again.

Or should I say,

the experience of cognition I find more serviceable than flat
experience itself, that naive stuff predicated on who knows
what.

With the mind I can definitely step back from life.

Now everything revolves around the metaphysics of the stake.
Luckily.
Am

I afraid of existence?

actually experience it.

Damn right, insofar as I ever

You would be too if your ass got

roasted on the coals of life day after day after day.
hell with it.

Give me liberty or give me death?

The

Right.

Liberty's blown a gasket somewhere along the Jersey turnpike,
got ramrodded by a couple of semis.
scares the crap out of me too.

Make no mistake, death

But it's got that strange
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allure.

I've seen the sun rise and fall on this side, and the

stars vanish with the moon in the blackness of the night.

I

await another sphere, where, just maybe (who the hell knows?),
crying would be no more.
know anything.

But don't ask me questions.

I don't

Here in my world I'm God and the Devil in my

own heaven and hell
the stake exists.

(for I have left the earth!)

And I

- and only

(blessed be he!) am the author of the

stake.

Section B
An "Objective" "Definition" of Addiction

Addiction is a pathological (suffering) condition of the
human being

which transpires when the project of the human

being is nonsynchronous/incompatible with the being of that
human being.
well

as

a

Addiction can be characterized as a form of as
result

of

self-betrayal.

The

addicted self's

attempt to "fuse" with being is the result of its inability to
fuse with itself, that is, become itself, process itself, live
itself.

Addiction involves the experience of alienation from

oneself and the seeming inability to in any way rectify this
situation.

Addiction, then, develops and is anchored in the

dolorous experience of missing oneself.
Addiction involves a sacrifice of the real in that the
addicted "self" seeks to construct for itself an imaginary
self so as to disguise from itself the ongoing loss of itself.
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The imaginary self (universal) is chosen in lieu of the real
self (particular) .
lar self -

Since the self can only become a particu-

its self - the self is lost in the project to

become its imaginary self.

In this way, the addict achieves

a respite from self-knowledge.
Addiction involves freedom's

This

self-entanglement.

occurs as a result of the attempt to avoid one's own anxiety,
a

feat

accomplished

only at

the

cost

of

self-avoidance.

Anxiety is the thread by which, if followed,
come to constitute itself.

the self could

Thus the refusal to face one's own

anxiety casts one in the morass of the addictive process.
Addiction involves not only the loss of self, but the
experience of guilt, both of which are experienced as a loss
of freedom.
guilt.

Freedom negation is the origin of ontological

The addict experiences both bondage and culpability,

the feeling of being shackled to and by oneself.
said, by the self that is not.

Or, better

Addiction is a nonreflective

project in opposition to the "weaker" reflective will,

the

latter being merely a tributary of the former.
The addicted self seeks to constitute itself through the
"object" of addiction.

Since the self is infinite in nature

(since freedom is infinite and the self is freedom) , it cannot
be constituted through that which is finite
addiction) .

Therefore,

contradictory

effort

through the not-self

of

addiction
a

self

is

seeking

(the object of

expressed

in

the

self- constitution

(object of addiction).

The Creator-
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Ground of the self is the only legitimate object of the self's
infinitude (freedom), because only the Creator-Ground itself
exhibits the essential infinitude necessary to function as an
object of the self's infinitude.

Even though I am freedom, it

is possible for me to be less than myself - if I

chose to

attempt to constitute myself through that which is inconunensurate with my being (the finite) .

Addiction

involves

a

disrelationship in one's inmost being, and this disrelationship expresses a self-relation of despair.
because

it

lacks

necessary,

ground for selfhood.

free

being as

A self despairs
a

constitutive

Addiction is expunged from that self

that dispenses with its own despair as a result of developing
a relation with its own ground.
The addict's lebenswelt becomes magical as a result of
impure reflectivity,
substantial being.

2

which seeks for the self an essence or

Since the self has no essence or substan-

tial being, the deceptive gaze of impure reflection sets the
self (addict) up for a pathological relation to its environment.

In this

warped condition,

addiction is

seen as

a

function of the essence of the self, rather than a project of

2

" Pure
reflection" , for Sartre, is the result of a
katharsis consciousness effects on itself, which allows for
the presence of the reflective consciousness to the consciousness reflected on. "Impure" or "accessory" reflection occurs
whenever consciousness focuses itself on its own "psychic
states". Since consciousness is never comprised of a state or
states, impure reflection always involves some measure of
self-deception. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness,
trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, n.d.),
633.
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the self.

Addiction is an impotent attempt to circumvent the

essential nonessence of the self.
Addiction is an habitual way of being emotional.

It is

the process of "objectifying" one's own affectivity in the
object of addiction.

Consciousness itself is symbolized in

the object of addiction and its relation to the addict.

The

object of addiction is thus imbued with certain magical powers
(as

a

function

nothing

of

other than

addict's self.

impure

reflectivity)

rejected and split

that
off

are

in

facets

of

fact
the

These facets of the self gain a degree of

mastery and power over the addict they could in no way possess
if they were acknowledged and psychically reintegrated via
purifying reflectivity.

This the addict seeks to prevent, for

the self would then be faced with the very absence of itself.
Addiction is a phenomenon of belief in that the addict
believes

(through

reflectivity)

that

the
his

emotional
or

her

consciousness
freedom

has

in

of

impure

fact

been

circumscribed through its relation to the object of addiction.
Being-addicted is a species of impure reflection taking itself
as pure reflection, an error possible only subsequent to the
addict' s project to-be-addicted, a self-evasive maneuver.
addict,

then,

believes that he or she is engaging in pure

reflection when in fact
reflection.

The

he or she

is

engaging in impure

The self becomes handmaiden to its own project

and, swept up in the current, is finally drowned.
of consciousness is the project to-be-addicted.

The omega
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Addiction is a function of the imagination through the
utilization of self-induced hypnagogic imagery.
intentional

(nonthetic,

It is an

at one with consciousness)

project

contrary to the (thetic, conscious) will.

Hynagogic images

are

involve

a

way

of

modifications

being

they

the

reflectivity, emotional consciousness, and belief.

The dream

itself.

heretofore

all

- · impure

hypnagogic

attention

and

detailed

of

of

conscious,

consciousness

is

created

by

consciousness

Consciousness can no longer take a point of view on

itself - it believes its own dream - and the representation of
the (addictive) object is conflated with the object itself.
The addict relates to himself or herself in an imaginary way,
by way of imaginary constructions.
Addiction is the attempted suppression of the nausea of
being through self-derealization, focusing on the imaginary
(hypnagogic) object which is transcendent but not external to
consciousness.

Why nausea?

less, superfluous.

Because being "appears" meaning-

Addiction, then,

is an attempt to avoid

the ex;perience of the meaninglessness of existence,

or an

attempt to surmount it by becoming essential being, being with
an essence, necessary being.
Addiction

is

a

flight from freedom.

sedimented and successful

pattern of

To flee freedom is to flee the self,

thus addiction involves one in self-derealization, but this
derealization is a project of the real self (freedom).

Thus,

in the addictive process the self is bent on its own self-
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effacement.
Addiction,

furthermore,

(mauvaise foi,

is a

self-deception).

phenomenon of bad faith

It is an attempt to evade

one's own being and substitute for that being another being.
But one can either be addicted or be oneself,
involve the other's negation.

since both

Addiction is the project of the

(self-) extinguishment of one's own freedom (self), and so is
not

compatible with a

Since

the will

lucid attempt at self-constitution.

(reflectivity)

is an epiphenomenon of

the

project (nonreflectivity, that which is at one with consciousness),

the

addict

remains

as

such

unless

a

reflective

katharsis reveals to the addict his or her project.

But the

self in bad faith evades such a reflective revelation, since
untruth

about

the

self

(through

imaginary

consciousness,

emotional consciousness, and the subsequent faulty belief) is
a necessary prerequisite for the project to-be-addicted.
The

flight

from

phenomenon exhibits a

oneself
basic

operative
fear

of

in

the

addictive

the human condition.

Since human life is grounded in freedom (is being-free), the
freedom negation of addiction is a
project towards one's own death

denial

of

life and a

(global freedom negation).

Angst (ontological anxiety, dis-ease) propels the addict away
from him or herself into the addictive object that helps the
addict prepare for his or her own death (negate his/her self).
Freedom is the source of value for human being and thus
must be preserved.

In the project of addiction, freedom is
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engulfed in the goal of self-extinguishment.

Therefore, the

project of addiction is not a valid, free project, since all
projects are valid only insofar as they are a movement toward
freedom.

Freedom-denying projects must be denied, therefore,

addiction is seen as an illegitimate and self-destructive
project

of

the human being.

This

is

revealed through a

deconstruction of the epistemology of self-consciousness.

Section C
Addiction and Love

This dissertation seeks to illuminate Sartre's theory of
love and show that it is actually a theory of addiction, given
the phenomenological theory of addiction found herein.
this is the case,

Since

the dissertation in no way seeks to or

claims to deal with a

theory of love proper,

restricts itself to the topic of addiction.

but instead

After delineating

a theory of addiction, I seek to show that Sartre's theory of
love is actually a theory of addiction.

Therefore, either (A)

All love is addictive, or (B) Sartre's use of the term "love"
is unwarranted.
What

I

fundamental

would like
approaches

to suggest
or projects

is

that

there are

to being human:

two

( 1)

A

movement toward freedom, toward more fully appropriating one's
freedom, and (2) A movement away from freedom, toward being,
in which one's freedom is squandered, evaded, and discharged
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fruitlessly in endeavors that
human.

trap one and make one less

Furthermore, I would like to suggest that (1) is being

in love, for one must be free to love and one must love to be
free - the relation is reflexive, and mastery of one's being
and its relation to the world can only come through love and
in love.

Contrariwise,

situation

(2)

is

a

situation of

addiction, a living process in which human being seeks to grip
its own freedom in a self-mutilating attempt to divest itself
of its own transcendence.
My final claim is simply that loving and addiction as
modes of being are mutually exclusive.

One cannot be in love

with oneself, with another, with anything,
time seek to sever one's own freedom,
indeed is a projection into freedom.

for

and at the same
love involves,

The continuum of love

and addiction is wholly straight: as one move towards one, one
moves away from the other.

For both are possessions in which

one's being reaches out to embrace the object of its encapsulation, with either a wave of joy or derision, as the case may
be.
It could be that Sartre never meant to confuse love and
addiction.

It could be that he knew that his theory of "love"

was just another trick of the light, another coy subterfuge,
another hopeless hoping, another birthday party of one.

It is

my contention that Sartre knew full well the loveless world he
painted,

the

dimly

lit

cavern

of

painstakingly and starkly portrayed.

existence

that

he

so

What this all amounts to
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saying is that Sartre knew his use of the term "love" was
unwarranted, and that, finally, his world was a world without
love.

Who would want to be "in love" in Sartre's world?

One

more searing pain to the psyche, one more potent blow to the
frame.
The larger question that yet remains, one that is well
beyond the scope of this work, is that concerning whether or
not love exists in any world,

or is all

"love, " finally,

nothing more than a covert form of addiction?

The answer, it

seems to me, hinges in the main on the ontological question
concerning whether we ever really can move toward freedom,
whether we ever really can dance freely among the beings of
life.

This question, I believe, is not beyond the scope of

any adequate theory of addiction, but in fact lies within its
very core.

For if we cannot dance, then we cannot love.

are the addict, for the addict is the danceless soul.

We
Many

questions we could raise, but these would serve only to raise
still more.

The question is coming to know oneself.

And this

task cannot be surmounted through the reading or writing of
any philosophical work.

This task, on the contrary, involves

flight from philosophical obstruction to the close self that
is often so far, far away.

It is here alone that we will find

the secret key.

Part Two
Ontological Underpinnings Operative in the Theory of
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Addiction

At the outset,

I shall lay bare the major ontological

underpinnings operative in the theory of addiction.
somewhat uneasy,
tions, "

since

I feel

I must admit, utilizing the term "assump-

all

that

follows

is

thought

by

Sartre

or

Kierkegaard (or both) to be philosophically grounded through
the employment of existential/phenomenological methodology.
Certainly,

one

could debate what

philosophical grounding.

constitutes

"legitimate"

I am only pointing out the fact that

these men have in fact done copious amounts of philosophical
footwork with a view to grounding the following ontological
claims, footwork far beyond the scope of this present work.
The

reader

is

encouraged

to

consult

any

number

of

the

voluminous primary sources which follow in both the footnotes
and bibliography for an extensive defense of these claims.
These claims, certainly, can in no way be grounded in "reason"
alone, for existential/phenomenological methodology employs a
far

wider

scope

of

possible

ways

of

knowing

than

traditional Cartesian and Post-Cartesian rationalism.

does
With

these considerations in mind, I proceed to utilize the terms
"assumption" or "presupposition" with quotation marks.
The first ontological "presupposition" operative within
the phenomenological theory of addiction is the notion of a
"self" - in particular,
self is

the notion of a

"real self."

This

"comprised" of freedom and is infinite in nature,
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since freedom is infinite (another ontological "presupposition" to which we shall attend shortly).

We see the notion of

"self" operative throughout the theory because one can choose
not to be a self,

and we see the notion of a

"real self"

operative in the phenomenon of one choosing to be other than
himself or herself.
The

second

ontological

"presupposition,"

referred to in our mention of the first,
"freedom."
said

to

mentioned.

one

already

is the notion of

The self is said to be free, in fact, the self is

be

comprised

solely

of

freedom,

as

previously

The nature of freedom is such that it can become

tangled in itself, and, so to speak, abort itself.

The nature

of freedom is such that it can do no other than project itself
toward some transcendent goal.
than

this

projection,

even

In fact it is nothing other
if

this

project

attempted suppression of freedom itself.
anything, because it has no essence.

entails

the

Freedom cannot be

This is the same thing

as saying that it is in constant flux, or that it is always a
pro-ject.
The third ontological "presupposition" at work in the
theory of addiction is the notion of anxiety, coupled with its
closely related concept, guilt.

Anxiety is a function of the

apprehension or experience of one's own freedom and so can in
no way be expunged from the self.
"essential nature" of the self.
about

It is an aspect of the

Anxiety speaks to the self

its self and so is a meaningful ontological

event.
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The sixth and closely related ontological "presupposition" is the notion of self-deception (mauvaise foi or bad
faith in Sartre) .

The nature of consciousness is such that it

can deceive itself about itself and its own relation to what
it believes to be true.
has

the

capacity

to

This being the case, consciousness

partition

itself,

so

to

speak,

and

simultaneously believe in two contradictory states of affairs.
The

possibility

of

self-deception

is

essential

for

the

construction of my theory of addiction.
The

seventh

and

final

ontological

"presupposition"

operative in the theory of addiction is one which piggybacks
upon many of the preceding presuppositions, and this is the
dyadic notion of the "will" and the "project."
the

reflective discharge

of

one's

consciousness ostensibly aims.
tinction,

freedom,

The "will" is
that at which

The "project," in contradis-

is "at one" with consciousness and so involves a

nonreflective discharge of
direction in

which

freedom.

It

is

the vector or

the self thrusts its being in the world.

The will is no more than a tributary of the project, since the
former must always negotiate within the originary thrust of
the latter.

This dyadic scheme, balanced within the notions

of the nature of freedom, the self, and consciousness, is yet
another necessary component in the construction of a viable
existential theory of addiction.
Concerning questions surrounding the metaphysics of the
existence and role of a "God" in the theory of addiction, I
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would like to point out that:

(A)

A "God-concept"

is not

necessary for the theory of addiction, and (B) A "God- concept"
is necessary for the theory about the nonaddicted self.

Otto

Rank has stated that "For only by living in close union with
a god-ideal that has been erected outside of one's own ego is
one able to live at all."
toward freedom,

3

If we define living as a movement

and the ego as the existential self,

then

Rank's view encapsulates quite well the ontological position
of a "God-concept" within the present work.

3

0tto Rank, Modern Education: A Critique of Its Fundamental Ideas, trans. Mabel E. Maxon (New York: Agathon Press,
1968), 142.

CHAPTER 2
SARTREAN THEORIES OF LOVE

Introduction

In Sartre's autobiography, The Words, (written in 1963),
he states that "for the last ten years or so I've been a man
who's been waking up.
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to be taken seriously?

What can Sartre mean by this?

Is it

I think Sartre invests it with very

specific meaning, and that he was quite serious when he made
the claim.

The whole tenor of the work is quite serious, and

seems to ref le ct a certain sense of loss and deep sadness
associated with his pre-waking state.

1

.

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Words, trans. Bernard Frechtman
(Greenwich, CT: Fawcett, 1964), 158. R. D. Laing picked up on
this in his 1969 work entitled The Politics of the Family (New
York: Vintage, 1972) .
Laing' s notion of a "transpersonal
system of collusion" is very certainly influenced by Sartre,
and exhibits an elucidation of the social dimensions of bad
faith (mauvaise foi). That is, Laing's transpersonal system
of collusion is operative in a case where persons in bad faith
agree in bad faith to a certain interpretation of "reality"
which is based on self-deception "forgotten" as such. This
conceptual nomenclature is of import when elucidating both the
psychological and sociological dimensions of addiction as well
as love in Sartre.
33

34

In Sartre's work on ethics,

2

Cahiers pour une morale ,

published only after his death in 1983, he made a number of
comments which bear directly on the question of
relations with others.

concrete

Early in that work, he stated that

Being and Nothingness was an "ontology before conversion. "

3

The vast majority of commentators on Sartre view Being and
Nothingness

as

the

text

in

which

Sartre

treats

relations with others, including that of love.
hold

a

consistent

question of love?

position

throughout

his

concrete

Does Sartre
works

on

the

Or does he alter his position irremediably

such that his ontology as presented in Being and Nothingness
is

no

longer viable and must

somehow be

reconstructed?

Should we accept the ontology posed in Being and Nothingness
as necessary or as contingent?

What is the nature of this so-

called "conversion" that Sartre did no more than hint at in
his works published during his lifetime?
In stating that Being and Nothingness is "ontology before
conversion," is Sartre indicating to us some other, superior
ontology, or really, is he indicating any alternative ontology
whatsoever?

Certainly to speak about an alternative ontology

is not necessarily to develop one.

Saying that you wish you

could work out another ontology is just that - a wish, rather
than a worked out philosophical position.

2

Sartre also tells

Jean-Paul Sartre, Cahiers pour une morale
Gallimard, 1983). Hereafter referred to as Cahiers.
3

Cahiers, 13.

(Paris:
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us in Cahiers that the "pursuit of Being is hell."

4

If this

pursuit is necessarily connected with the ontology of Being
and Nothingness, the question then becomes "Can one get out of
hell?"

Put differently: Within a Sartrean perspective, can we

come up with a different ontology such that persons could
dispense with the pursuit of Being, or is this pursuit forever
indelibly impressed upon the being of Sartrean man?
In a late interview, Sartre states that " .... beginning
with Saint Genet I changed my position a bit, and now see more
positivity in love."

5

Does this "shift in position" necessi-

tate a change in ontology?

If Sartre has merely changed his

position "a bit," is the "conversion" nevertheless somehow
necessary?

Or is there simply one coherent Sartrean theory of

love

cuts

that

across

ontological

distinctions?

These

questions - as well as many others - crowded my mind as I
sought to carefully distill and delineate a "Sartrean" theory
of love.

I have concluded that there is not one, but two

distinct Sartrean theories of love.

I have also concluded

that these two theories are mutually exclusive.

In chapter

four the reader will be presented with an exhaustive analysis
and critique of Sartrean texts in support of this claim.

The

theories in no way intersect, but are necessarily antithetical

4
5

Cahiers, 42.

"An Interview with Jean-Paul Sartre," found in Jean-Paul
Sartre : Contemporary Approaches to His Philosophy·, ed. by
Hugh J. Silverman and Frederick A. Elliston (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1980), 13.
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to one another.
conversion"

The pivot between the two is the "radical

(or simply "conversion") that Sartre refers to

sporadically in his works.
In Being and Nothingness (1943), Sartre writes a haunting
footnote after detailing the necessary failure of all human
relationships:

"These

considerations

do

not

exclude

possibility of an ethics of deliverance and salvation.

the
But

this can be achieved only after a radical conversion which we
cannot

discuss

here."

6

"radical conversion" here?

Why couldn' t

Sartre discuss

the

How have we any way of knowing?

7

Am I making an illicit linkage between ontology, ethics, and

concrete human relations - in particular,

love?

Sartre himself makes the connection as illicit.

Only if
For this

footnote clearly indicates their necessary interconnection in
• d 8
.
S artre I s min

Some commentators, for example Thomas Busch, hold that
Being and Nothingness is a partial ontology, and that Sartre

6

Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans Hazel E.
Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 412.
7

The discussion, possibly, would have been out of place
if Being and Nothingness was deliberately relegated to the
discussion of accessory rather than pure reflection, the
former being the level at which, for Sartre, "psychic objects"
are constituted. See Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego,
trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York:
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, n.d.), in particular, 64ff.
8

Sartre never supplied the ontological groundwork
necessary for the possibility of other modes of human selfconsciousness.
Therefore, for Sartre, all existing modes
entail the same aforementioned result: the "failure" of all
human relationships.
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"reserves

his

treatment

separate study."

9

of

authentic human

relations

for

If this is in fact the case, to relegate

Sartre's theory of love to Being and Nothingness would be even in Sartre's mind - to deal with love relations between
inauthentic human beings.

Of course, one possibility is that,

for Sartre, this is all there are, or can be.
only one possibility,
Therefore,

because

of

and I
the

intend to treat
aforementioned

But this is
it as

such.

difficulties

in

culling a single theory of love from Sartre's multifarious
writings,

I

have decided to break this chapter into three

separate parts,

as follows:

(1)

The view of love found in

Being and Nothingness and supporting writings: the generally
accepted view. (2) Conversion and authenticity: An alternative
view of love, and (3) The synthesis: Conunonalities between the
first and second positions.

Central to this chapter will be

the question concerning whether such a fusion is possible, or
whether,

given the conunonalities,
.

support a coh erent synt h esis.

we find them too few to

10

At the crux of the alternative notion of love in Sartre
is his notion of
conversion?

"conversion. "

What,

for Sartre,

is the

I believe it includes the following:

9

Thomas W. Busch, "Sartre's Use of the Reduction: Being
and Nothingness Reconsidered, " found in Jean- Paul Sartre:
Contemporary Approaches to His Philosophy, 26.
10

Again, since I conclude in the present chapter that the
relation between the two views of love cannot be one of
synthesis, I shall explicate the alternate relations in
chapter four.
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(1) The process by which consciousness moves from the level of
impure or accessory reflection to the level of pure reflection.

In accessory or

impure

reflection,

consciousness

attempts to objectify or reify itself so as to be able to
apprehend itself as some "thing."

In this type of reflection,

consciousness is clouded and misled by its erroneous apprehension of the "substantive" nature of its self, conflating free
being

(pour-soi)

with nonfree being

(en-soi).

As long as

consciousness apprehends itself as something other than free
being, it has still not left the plane of accessory or impure
reflection and therefore has not experienced the conversion.
Reflective consciousness, contrariwise, experiences itself as
a power and not as a substance.

11

11

s artrean onto 1 ogy seems in
·
no way to ru 1 e out t h e
possibility of an "inverse conversion" wherein consciousness
moves from pure to impure reflection.
But Sartre does not
deal with this possibility as a kind of conversion, but rather
as a degradation of consciousness that consciousness effects
on itself [See Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions: Outline of a
Theory, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1948), 77-91].
The reason that pure reflective
consciousness is "better" than impure reflective consciousness
is that in the move from the latter to the former, psychic
objects, products of consciousness itself, are expelled from
consciousness. This process of expulsion allows consciousness
to more fully realize its being-in- the-world, rather than
remain mired in a world generated, at least in part, by
itself. As consciousness becomes purified during conversion,
it at the same time realizes more fully the extent of its own
freedom. The question concerning how consciousness moves from
one "form" to another (pure to impure or vice versa) is a
difficult one. Sartre maintains only that the movement either
way must necessarily be a free project of the for-itself. But
if one remains on the pure/impure reflective planes and one's
project is at one with consciousness (nonreflective), the
shift in projects remains inexplicable.
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(2) The process by which consciousness becomes aware of the
extent of its own freedom.

This comes subsequent to the turn

to reflective consciousness and is a function of the expulsion
of psychic objects (constituted through impure or accessory
reflection,

the "substantification" of consciousness)

from

consciousness.
(3) The process by which consciousness flushes itself of its
own bad faith.

Reflective consciousness is in good faith to

the extent that it is aware of its own bad faith, but this is
not synonymous with the expurgation of bad faith from the
entirety of consciousness,
•

conversion.
(4)

a process realized only in the

12

The process by which consciousness

realizes

its own

ontological reality, viz. that it is the project to be "God"
(legitimated being, necessary being, the fusion of free and
essential being) .

The question of

import at this point

involves whether this project recognized as such allows the
for-itself a wider swath of freedom than it had prior to this
realization of its "essential" nature.

This question is of

concern also for our analysis of Sartre's theory of love as
well as for a phenomenological theory of addiction.
Conversion is the ontological process whereby the fori tself repudiates its own God-project.

12

That is to say, the

Since consciousness in bad faith contains both the truth
and the lie (thus, bad faith), such consciousness is always
aware on the reflective and/or nonreflective level(s) of its
own dissimilitude.
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converted for-itself no longer pursues being, it no longer
seeks to necessitate its own existence.

Conversion, if it is

possible in a Sartrean world, involves a shift in consciousness, volition, and praxis for the for-itself.

In terms of

consciousness, a reflective katharsis in which consciousness
is purged of all self-deceptive residue resultant from impure
and nonreflective consciousness must occur.
must "know" itself for what it is.

The for-itself

In terms of volition, the

converted for-itself must be willing to cease from engaging
itself as a project to ground its own being, in whatever form
this project may take.

In terms of praxis, the for-itself, in

fact, must cease from engaging itself in this same cooptive
effort to "acquire" being.

The converted individual is one

who can hang in the balance between being and nothingness, one
who can navigate the narrow strait between seeking an essence
and negating the freedom that one is.

13

What is the connection between the notions of conversion
and love in Sartre?

This is a question that must be broached

as I proceed to explicate and critique Sartre's notions of
love.

If the conversion is a necessary precondition for

authenticity in Sartre, how, in fact, does one bring about
this seemingly elusive ontological phenomenon?

Authentic

human being has reflectively faced its freedom, has eradicated
its own bad faith, and has dispensed with the project to be

13

Sartre's notion of "conversion" will be addressed at
greater length in chapter four.

41

God.

In a characteristically Sartrean way, that is to say,

with connections that are far from clear, Sartre seems to link
his notions of conversion, authenticity, and play.

To play

means to create, to seek freedom rather than being as an end.
One either seeks freedom or one seeks being.
or one does not.

One either plays

The playing for-itself utilizes the freedom

that it is to be free, rather than seeking to be in any other
mode.
Could the conversion involve "play?"

What would this

mean?

Even in the pages of Being and Nothingness we find

Sartre

stating

that

"The

first

principle

of

play

is man

himself; through it he escapes his natural nature."
is this "natural nature" to which Sartre refers?

14

What

Isn't it the

case for Sartre that the for-itself has no nature but to be
free,

to be a project,

to be a point of view on being,

nothingness gliding over the surface of being?
this

"escape"

entail?

I

a

What could

would like to submit

that

this

escape, if it is possible, allows for authentic woman to be
born from the very ashes of her inauthenticity.

This authen-

ticity would involve some type of pure reflection rather than
merely accessory reflection.

But this would most likely be

only the beginning.

In explaining this "escape" through play,

Sartre

saying

continues,

that

"This

particular

type

of

project, which has freedom for its foundation and its goal,
deserves special study.
14

It is radically different from all

•
Being
and Not h'ingness, 581.
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others

in that

being. "

it aims at a

radically different

type of

15

Don't
foundation?

all

Sartrean

projects

have

freedom

as

their

If so, the issue must lie with freedom as the

goal of the project.

The "escape" involves freedom as its

goal, whereas the "natural nature" somehow does otherwise.

16

The escape involves play. Sartre makes clear here that this
radically different type of being - the aim of play - is not
dealt with in Being and Nothingness.

Indeed, play releases

another kind of human being not found within the pages of
Being and Nothingness.

The most pressing of questions,

I

believe, is whether such a different type of being is actually
possible in a Sartrean world,

17

in addition to the question

15

•
Being
an d Not h.1ngness, 5 8 1.

16

This "otherwise" could be merely the pursuit of being.

17

Why shouldn't just any type of being be possible in a
Sartrean world, since the self is wholly freedom?
If human
beings have no "essence" other than freedom, isn't it reasonable to suppose that all conceivable types of being will be
tried? These are two distinct questions. The for-itself does
try to become what it cannot become, therefore in at least
some cases, it projects itself toward what it can conceive but
not realize.
The for-itself cannot become in-itself or initself-for-itself, since the move to the former would involve
the cessation of selfhood, freedom, and consciousness, and the
move to the latter, for Sartre, is an unrealizable ideal.
Why? Because it would entail the process whereby a contingent
being created its own necessity (a failure in theory and
fact), and would involve the fusion of two forever distinct
modes of being (a Sartrean supposition upon which rests his
"proof" for the nonexistence of a necessary being, i.e.
"God"). All conceivable modes of being are not possible even
in a Sartrean world.
Ontological parameters invariably
obtain.

43

concerning whether such a being is theoretically possible

18

It is to these questions that we shall eventually turn.

At

•

present, we shall tackle section one: The view in Being and
Nothingness and supporting writings: the generally accepted
view.

Part One
Being and Nothingness and Related Writings:
The Generally Accepted View, or
Sartrean Love Type One

The

generally

accepted

view,

which

is

in

the

main

predicated on Being and Nothingness, is that Sartre views love
as a rotten, insipid, necessary failure, the life of which is
"solitary,
"triple

poor,

nasty,

destructability.

brutish,
11

In

and

short"

Sartre's

19

due

to

autobiography,

its
he

18

If such a different type of being is not possible in the
Sartrean world, if human reality is condemned to repeat,
reflectively or nonreflectively, the quest for the unrealizable goal of being-in-itself, in what sense can it be said
that the Sartrean human being has no nature, especially given
the fact that Sartre tell us that the for-itself has no
essence but to be free?
If this revamped being is not
possible, so much for freedom.
The Sartrean self comes
conceived in its own metaphysical straightjacket, from which
one can ne'er extract himself. In this case, the death of the
for-itself is the beginning of freedom. If freedom, that is,
is to have any beginning at all.
To be freed f ram the
necessity of a specific project is in no way to be freed from
the necessity of having a project.
19

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, found in Classics of Western
Philosophy, ed. by Steven Cahn (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett,
1979),
365.
I borrowed this phrase from Hobbes because it
seemed too good to pass up when describing the Sartrean love
relation. Sartrean love does, in fact, seem to occur in the
(a) 11 state of nature. 11

44
recounts that while a youth, he "found the human heart insipid
and hollow, except in books.

1120

This was, of course, by his

own accounting, before Sartre began to "wake up."
gy,

In Intima-

one of Sartre's short stories, Lulu exclaims "God how

.
rotten 1 ove is
...

..21

Lola,

in Sartre's novel The Age of

Reason, is tormented in her relationship with
because she loved him. "

22

Boris "simply

In the same novel, Sartre tells us

of the love that Mathieu has for Ivich: ... "He realized that
he loved Ivich, and was not surprised.

Love was not something

to be felt, not a particular emotion, nor yet a particular
shade of feeling, it was much more like a lowering curse on
the horizon, a precursor of disaster.

1123

In Sartre's 1951

play entitled The Devil and the Good Lord, the main character,
Goetz, says simply,
love." 24

"Good night, we must kill the thing we

It seems, on this model, that it would be best to

greet love with howls of execration.

20

25

The Words, 35.

21

Jean-Paul Sartre, Intimacy, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New
York: Berkley, 1962), 9.
22

•

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Age of Reason, trans. Eric Sutton
(New York: Vintage, 1973), 29.
23

The Age of Reason, 330.

24

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Devil and the Good Lord and Two
Other Plays, trans. Kitty Black (New York: Vintage, 1962), 26.
25

Here I borrow the last five words from Albert Camus'
The Stranger, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Vintage, 1954),
154. The stranger welcomed such execration, and viewed love as
a mythic illusion. The parallels with the Sartrean for-itself
are only' too striking.

45

Finally, in Kean, another of Sartre's plays, we witness
another prototype of Sartrean loving.

Kean speaks of his love

for Elena: "I love her and I want to destroy her.

That is how

we actors behave [which is equivalent to every Sartrean foritself] .

Do you not think I have dreamed of heaping honors on

the woman I love?

But since that is denied me, I accept the

risk of dishonor for her.

If I must destroy myself, and her

with me,

I accept; at least,

1 1. f e.

Love, in reality, involves the pain and derogation

of

1126

. 27
b rand 1ng ,

otherwise.

although

I shall have marked her for

forever

unrealized

hopes

may

be

And unrealized hopes are the universal story of

this version of Sartrean love.
Why is this the case?

To address this question, we shall

turn to some Sartrean ontology.

Sartre tells us in his early

work, The Transcendence of the Ego, that "consciousness cannot
conceive of a consciousness other than itself."u

This is

due to the very conditions under which the for-itself comes to
be,

for the first

ekstasis of the for-itself

involves a

fissure which is precisely the negation of everything.

29

It

is nothing except this negation; without this negation it is
nothing - not even the for-itself.

26

The Devil and the Good Lord and Two Other Plays, 190.

27

An attempt at ontological mutilation or cooptation,
which, in certain cases, may well amount to the same thing.
28

The Transcendence of the Ego, 96.

29

Being and Nothingness, 298, 299.

46
Being-for-others, the third ekstasis of the for-itself,
is a contingent reality and not an ontological structure of
the for-itself.

30

In Being and Nothingness, Sartre tells us

that only through my being objectified by the Other can I come
to be aware of his or her subjectivity. 31

Since this is the

case, there can be no true intersubjectivity, because one is
always an object before the Other's subjectivity - or one
objectifies the Other while becoming a subject for oneself.
Either way, for Sartre, Mitsein can be only psychological and
not ontological, as two subjects cannot be in relation with
one another.

32

30

•
Being
and Not h.ingness, 282 .

31

•
Being
and Not h.ingness, 256 .

32

Being and Nothingness, 424. Why doesn't Sartre believe
in the possibility of intersubjectivity?
This is a good
question, and one with no clear cut answer. Sartre's disallowance of mitsein seems to stem wholly from his ontological
commitments laid down in Being and Nothingness, namely, that
I only become aware of the subjectivity of the Other as the
Other objectifies me. Sartre apparently thinks it makes no
sense to say that I become aware of the subjectivity of the
Other when he apprehends me as a subject. Such an experience
must have been beyond Sartre's phenomenological purview.
Sartre has already admitted that I can "know" the subjectivity
of the Other as such, and that I can "know" my own subjectivity, but I can't know both at the same time. For Sartre, the
question becomes one of temporality rather than logic - both
my subjectivity and the subjectivity of the Other are available to me, but only sequentially. Sartre disallows Mitsein
based on a kind of ontological/perceptual ruling out, but does
this ground hold? Isn't it akin to Hume's argument in his The
Treatise of Human Nature concerning the nature of the self as
a bundle of sense perceptions? [David Hume, The Treatise of
Human Nature, ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose (London: Longmans,
Green, and Co., 1886), 533-543)]. Hume could only make this
claim regarding the "perception" of his own "self," arid was in
no position to safely and legitimately universalize the claim.
(continued ... )

47

The original relation of the for-itself to the Other is
an "internal negation" - that is to say, originarily,
constituted as not being the Other.

33

defined as the self which is not myself.

The Other,

I am

then,

is

Negation, then, is

seen as the "constitutive structure of the being-of-oth34
ers."
Because this is the case, the for-itself, as such,
cannot be known by the Other.

35

That

is

to say that my

consciousness, that is, my freedom, can never be experienced
by the Other; it will always be the Other which is not-me.
Nevertheless, even though contingently, my being-for-others is
36
a structure of my being-for-myself.
(Therefore, the
possibility of shame before oneself) .
The Other, then, is for Sartre reduced to a "regulative
concept":

"[S]ince a relation between consciousnesses is by

nature unthinkable,

[and]

the concept of the Other cannot

32

( ... continued)
Sartre claims that I "know" the subjectivity of the Other only
when he objectifies me, but how is it that an object knows a
subject?
What sense does it make to say that an "object"
knows anything? Wouldn't it make more sense to say that only
a subject can know a subject as such? In terms of epistemology, Sartre does seem far too Cartesian here, without sufficient warrant.
33 .
Being and Nothingness~ 232.
34 .
Being and Nothingness, 232.
3sB eing
.
and Nothingness, 238.
36 .
Being and Nothingness, 238.

48
•
•
constitute
our experience.

Th e Other appears to me as a

1137

subject, but only at the expense of my subjectivity for me.
Because this is the case, there are only two alternatives in
interpersonal relationships: either I transcend the Other, or
I allow myself to be transcended by her.

In the former case,

I apprehend myself as subject and the Other as object.
latter

case,

I

subject.

Since

concludes

that

am

objectified before

these are
all

rooted in conflict.

the

presence

the only possibilities,

relations

between

In the
of

a

Sartre

consciousnesses

are

38

"My original fall is the existence of the Other," says
Sartre, because it is only in the presence of a subject, a
freedom, that I can become objectified and experience limits
on my uni verse

(freedom) .

39

When the Other looks at me -

that is, when I apprehend the Other as a subject, I perceive
myself in a situation in which my transcendence is transcended .

40

This inherent limitation in the presence of the Other

is the ground of the conflict noted in all concrete relations.
Finally,

Sartre

concludes,

concerning my knowledge

37

of

my

Being and Nothingness, 227.. Granted, the Other as foritself in its totality does not and cannot constitute my
experience, but is a relation between consciousnesses, even
within a Sartrean paradigm, really "unthinkable?" An unwarranted thesis? How does the latter necessarily follow from
the former?
38

B eing
'
and Not h'ingness, 429.

39

cf. Being and Nothingness, 263.

40

B eing
'
an d Not h'ingness, 263.
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being-for-others, that is, how I appear to the consciousness
of the Other, with the following: "Total opacity, ignorance:
this is nothing but a description of our being-in-the-midst41
of-the-world-for-Others."
When I am perceived by the
Other, my consciousness of this perception is a "fall, " an
"alienation,"
42
freedom.

and

involves

a

necessary limitation

of

my

Confronting the consciousness of the Other gives birth to
what Sartre calls "the circle. 1143 This circle is comprised
of the "two primitive attitudes" available when

I

confront the

consciousness of the Other, both mentioned previously.

Put

differently, these attitudes entail that I either (A) transcend

the

Other's

transcendence,

or

(B)

incorporate

Other's transcendence as transcendence within myself.

the

Since

these are the only two possibilities, Sartre says that "I am at the very root of my being - the project of assimilating
44
and making an object of the Other."
The circle is forever
closed.

To curtail one approach is necessarily to engage in

the other.

Either/or - but not in the Kierkegaardian sense.

Since I am either a transcendence-transcending or a transcendence-transcended in relation to the Other, unity with that
Other is unrealizable in fact and theory, for the fusion of
41B eing
.
and Nothingness, 267.
42B eing
.
and Nothingness, 275.
43

.
Being and Nothingness, 363.
44 .
Being and Nothingness, 263.
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transcendences would eradicate the otherness (not-me-ness) of
the Other.
ble.

45

Therefore such a fusion is absolutely impossi-

The attempt at such a fusion is precisely the unrealiz-

able ideal of love.

46

I am guilty

before the Other,

says

Sartre; my original sin is the fact that I am de trop before
him or her.

47

Such guilt is inexpungable because the circle

cannot be broken and is the ground for such guilt.

I

am

superfluous before the Other, and my freedom constitutes for
the Other a threat.

Thus I am forever guilty, indicted and

condemned without recourse.
Why do I seek to assimilate the Other?
the goal of the project?

That is, what is

Sartre says that the goal is to take

the Other's point of view on myself, and thereby make myself
_g.
b

48

Thus all concrete relations with others can be seen as

variations on the theme of the quest for being.

The melody

may change, the chord progression may be altered with fantastic virtuosity; nevertheless, the ground bass remains forever
a reverberating quest for being.

If I could somehow take the

Other's point of view on myself, and be, I would be in-itselffor-itself,

45

freely grounded being, being with an essence, a

B eing
'
an d Not h'ingness, 365, 366.

46

Being and Nothingness, 366.
The impossibility of the
realization of the ideal of love is a manifestation of the
impossibility of the unity of the for-itself and the initself.
47
48

•
.
Being
and Nothingness,
410.
•

•

Being and Nothingness, 365.
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nature. I would be God (noncontingent).
tions,

for Sartre,

are

which is [an absent] God.

All concrete rela-

"haunted" by this
49

"absolute being"

Since conflict is the basis of being-for-others, both the
for-itself and the Other (another for-itself) are in constant
struggle

to

enslave

one another.

It

is

a

simultaneous,

symbiotic attempt on the part of both parties to free themselves,

while capturing the Other.

project

of

t he

recovery

perpetual and perennial,
illusion.

of

50

.

And since

my b eing, "

51

the

"I am the

struggle

is

"ceasing" only under a bad faith

The unrealizable ideal of love, as noted previous-

ly, is the fusion of freedoms that are the selves of the two
lovers.

But Sartre says that love is a "contradictory effort

to surmount the factual negation while preserving the internal
one."

52

That is,

I

seek ontological union with the Other,

when such a union would mean precisely my death - since my
original birth meant my not-being the Other.

Underlying love.

then. would be the project of the death of the self gua self.
Love,

for Sartre,

is inherently deceptive because the

lover necessarily deceives the beloved.
beloved perceives the lover as a
object he pretended to be)

This is because the

subject

(and not as the

as soon as the lover's love is

49B eing
.
and Nothingness, 365.
50

Being and Nothingness, 364.

•

51

Being and Nothingness, 364.

52

Being and Nothingness, 376.

•

•

Underlining mine:

52

reciprocated.

I recognize the lover as being different than

he or she appeared to be as soon as I myself love.

Thus the

birth of love is the death (of the very possibility) of love.
Thus the birth of consciousness is the death of love.
•

says that " ... to love is to want to be loved. "

53

Sartre
Yet the

production of this very love is the demise of the same, for it
is in the same movement that the beloved becomes the lover
that he or she subj ectif ies the Other.

The lover, every time,

objectifies herself in the process of subj ectifying the Other.
This is the movement of love in Sartre.

The problem of the

destruction of love inherent in the roots of love itself is

53

Being and Nothingness, 376.
Sartre seems to propose
this as a kind of partial definition.
It seems, at first
glance, to be a thoroughly passive characterization of love,
especially for such a philosopher of action as Sartre, until
one accounts for the praxis involved in the project of
attempting to lure the Other into the snare of one's own
"objectivity" that is a necessary aspect of "making" oneself
be loved. No passivity is evidenced on either the part of the
lover or the beloved, for each must actively deceive himself
and the Other in order to produce and perpetuate the precarious illusion that constitutes the Sartrean love relation.
Sartre never proposes a scenario in which the lover and the
beloved could/would actively work together to produce a
relation that might in some sense evade the insecurity and
weakness of individual contingency.
This refers us back to
Sartre's fundamental arguments against Mitsein.
For in the
Sartrean world, "being-with" is always "merely" psychological
or illusory.
It is never a real ontological phenomenon.
"Being-against" is the only "real" ontological relation. Why
couldn't lovers attempt to build a relationship upon the
psychological experience of Mitsein alone? This they try to
do,
but
the
metastable
project
nevertheless
disguises (temporarily) its own underlying ontological unreality and
impossibility.
If consciousness were always reflectively
aware of its own ontological reality and limits, the project
of love would become nothing more than anachronous.
Full
lucidity does not enhance but instead diffuses and destroys
the very basis for the Sisyphean struggle.

53

without solution,

says Sartre.

Sartre claims that I alone

cannot ever succeed in taking the Other's point of view on
myself, which is to say that I can never successfully objectify myself.

If I could, there would be no need to coopt the

being of the Other for this very purpose.

In attempting to

become an object for myself, I attempt a reflective dissociation from myself, which is the same as saying that I try to
take the Other's point of view on myself.
comprises for Sartre the "second ekstasis.
attempt surely to fail?

Such reflectivity
1154

Why is such an

Because, as Sartre says,

11

•••

simply

because I am my own mediator between Me and Me, all objectivi,

I 55

ty d 1sappears. '

That is,

I cannot dissociate myself from

myself. The me reflected on is not the same as the me reflecting,

nevertheless,

the

former

is

what

I

consider

to

be

in Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason,

in

"myself," as constituted through impure reflection.
Later,
Book

I,

Chapter

III,

Part

I

("Scarcity and

the Mode

of

Production"), Sartre states that the freedom of the Other is
an "alien force," "de trop.
to suppress

the

11

freedom of

The goal of such a relation is
the Other

-

or,

better said,

control/utilize it for one's own purposes (not necessarily a
reflective

endeavor).

56

This

is

quite

akin

to

concrete

~B eing
'
an d Not h'1ngness, 298 , 299 .
55

56

•
Being
an d Not h'1ngness, 274.

Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, trans.
Alan Sheridan-Smith (London: Verso, 1982), 122-152. Original( continued ... )

54
relations with others as exemplified in Being and Nothingness,
including the love relation.
chapters I and II,

57

In the same work, in Book II,

Sartre speaks of group dynamics.

consider the dyad to be a

group,

If we

or even if we consider

Sartre's comments to have broader extension,

this work may

also show parallels to Sartre's view on love as developed in
this section of the present work.

Sartre says in this portion

of the Critique that all internal conduct of individuals in
pledged groups (and possibly, equally true of love relations)
are powered by terror itself.

Is this, possibly, the ground

of the terrible pursuit of being, that unceasing self-flagellating endeavor that may be here said to be the central and
primordial bane of humankind?
For Sartrean love of
deception are essential.
pointed this out.

this

type,

deception and self-

A number of writers on Sartre have

I shall mention but a few.

Sander Lee, in

his article entitled "The Failure of Love and Desire in the
Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre" states that " ... both love and
sexual desire are doomed to failure because they are,

for

Sartre, analogous to emotional realms necessarily entered in
'bad faith.'

1158

Here

Lee makes

a

connection between bad

56

( • • • continued)
ly published as Critigue de la raison dialectique (Paris:
Gallimard, 1960). Hereafter referred to as the Critique.

57c
58

•
•
ritique,
345-444.

Sander Lee, "The Failure of Love and Desire in the
Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre," Philosophy Research Archives
XI ( March 1986): 513. Underlining mine.

55
faith and the failure of love.
been translated by some,

Bad faith (mauvaise foi) has

among them,

Walter Kaufmann,

as

"self-deception," and it is important to highlight the selfdeceptive essence of bad faith.~

Nevertheless, the "faith"

of bad faith should also be kept securely in mind.

Linda

Bell, in her recent book entitled Sartre's Ethics of Authenticity, maintains that love and desire, for Sartre, are both
projects in bad faith and remain as such unless a "radical
conversion" from such bad faith obtains. 60

Iris Murdoch, in

her work entitled Sartre. Romantic Rationalist, states that
Sartrean love is "a battle between two hypnotists in a closed
room."

61

Here,

the telically deceptive aspect of love is

highlighted, that is, deception as a goal.
Sartre himself also speaks directly to the question of
deception and

self-deception.

If

love,

for

Sartre,

is

reducible to the project of making oneself be loved, what does
this entail?

The beloved becomes the lover, says Sartre, when

the beloved "projects being loved.

1162

What does this mean?

For one, it means that the beloved experiences the lover as a
subject, for how is it possible to experience the love of an
59

For Kaufmann' s rendering of mauvaise f oi, see Walter
Kaufmann, Existentialism From Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York:
New American, 1975), 299-328.
60

Linda Bell, Sartre's Ethics of Authenticity (Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 1989), 81, 83.
61

Iris Murdoch, Sartre, Romantic Rationalist (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1953), 65.
62

Being and Nothingness, 374.
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object?

When this occurs, the beloved experiences himself as

object.

I become an object for myself only when I experience

my being-for-others.

My self as being-for-others, as object,

cannot love because it (I) is (am) a transcendence-transcended.

Thus my "fall" is the existence of the Other, even if

that Other is the lover,

apprehended as such.

To project

being loved, and therefore, for Sartre, to give birth to my
own love is the same as

to announce the death of my own

subjectivity for myself.

Therefore,

through

Other as

experiencing

the

in becoming the lover
subject

and myself

as

object, I engage in the same deceptive practice as that of the
Other when he initiated the project of making himself be
loved.

63

At least, this is the way Sartre tells the story in

Being and Nothingness.

Sartre states in Being and Nothing-

ness that love is an "illusion, " a

"game of mirrors."

To

awake from this illusion is to apprehend the evanescent nature
of

love as

it

dissipates

before

one's

reflective gaze.

Sartre concludes that love is in essence a deception which is
relativized by others outside the love dyad, and that love
contains its own internal instability in that either partner
can "wake up" to the reality of the illusion at any time.
As this is the case,
category of

I would ascribe to Sartrean love the

"metastability"

- which is precisely Sartre's

~cf. Being and Nothingness, 376.
64
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•
Being
an d Not h'1ngness, 377.

57
description of the ontological structure of bad faith con•

sc1ousness.

65

Sartre concludes that the project of love is useless
because one can ultimately never lose himself in his own
objectivity,

or his being-for-others.

66

This

is

the case

because if one apprehends oneself in one's objectivity, this
very apprehension

is

nothing

of (by) a subject, i.e. oneself.

other

than

the

apprehension

Thus the only absolute loss

of subjectivity would involve the death of the for-itself.
This could be said to be the implicit ideal of this type of
Sartrean love.
In Literature and Existentialism (1947), Sartre writes
that

"To speak is to act;

longer quite

the same;

anything which one names is no

it has lost

its

•

. 67

innocence."

In

relating this passage to love, I would like to turn it on its
head:

to act

language.
for

is to speak,

since for Sartre,

the body is

The body that seeks to become a fascinating object

the Other so as

to freely capture her freedom veils

65

In what sense is the Sartrean type one love relation
metastable?
It is less stable than some modes of being which means it is more precarious - because it depends not
only on deception but self-deception. This is not true of all
Sartrean relations, at least according to Sartre, and if it is
true. then all relations are necessarily in bad faith.
66

cf. Being and Nothingness, 377. A successful attempt
at one's own "objectification," in this sense, would entail
the witnessing of the cessation of one's own subjectivity, an
obvious impossibility.
.
.
. l'ism, trans.
ean-Pau 1 Sartre, Literature
and Existent1a
Bernard Frechtrnan (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1980), 22.
67J
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unsuccessfully the fact that this project of self-objectification is the project of a subject.

For Sartre, my original

upsurge in a world where there are others is my originary loss
of innocence.
for-itself,

68

Innocence is the ideal of being-in-itself-

essential being, yet free being.

unrealizable in such a Sartrean world.

Innocence is

As is non-illusive

love.
In another passage

in Literature and Existentialism,

Sartre says that "Once you enter the universe of significations,

there

This,

to me,

is

nothing you

can do

to get

out

of

it.

1169

is reminiscent of the circle in all concrete

relations with others.

We are born in the circle in which

everything is signification, and we cannot opt out of this
.
1 e. 70
circ

We can merely be the project of assimilating or

transcending the freedom of the Other.

Ontologically, we are

trapped within the universe of significations because we have
given birth to this universe ourselves, as well as being born
into it.

Indeed, we are this universe of significations.

ontology is a cage, for we are language.

68

Our

Linguistically, we

This loss of "innocence" could be the result of the fact
that deception (the "lie", "sin") entered the world concurrently with the Other, as did the realization of one's own
self-deception (the lie that one has no "outside," that one is
infinite). More aptly said, when the Other comes to be before
me, I realize that I am not innocent. This realization then
allows for the idealization of innocence, as well as a
possible quest for its recovery.
69

70

L'iterature an d Ex1stent1a
'
' l'ism, 24.

At least, not without conversion.
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can exist for the Other as a subject or as an object.

But

since, as Sartre says, a look cannot be looked at, we cannot
.
t o a sub.Ject.
.
71
re 1 ate as a sub Ject

Deception is inherent in

our project to capture the subjectivity of

the Other as

subjectivity, given that this project is the free project of
a subject attempting to appear as an object.

All attempts at

(self - ) objectification are necessarily deceptive.

Love is but

one variation on these attempts.
In The Devil and the Good Lord, Goetz becomes the revered
and loved leader of the people within the "City of the Sun."
Nevertheless, Goetz expresses his sadness ruefully: "The more
they

love me

the more

I

feel

alone."

72

The

loneliness

stemmed from the fact that Goetz elicited the love of his
constituents through deception, in fact, it appears that he
could do so in no other way.
character in a Sartre play.

Of course,

this is but one

Yet he appears as the main

character, and it appears that Sartre is using him as a foil
to make a strong philosophical point in a poignant way.

In

the same play the following dialogue takes place:
Goetz:

"Hilda, I need to be put on trial. Every day,
every hour, I condemn myself, but I can never
convince myself because I know myself too well
to trust myself ... I need someone to lend me
his eyes."

71

See pp. 252-302 of Being and Nothingness for a complete
characterization of this "look." Intersubjectivity as "myth"
may seem unsatisfactory, yet this is a basic ontological tenet
of Being and Nothingness. The question, of course, is whether
this tenet holds throughout the remainder of Sartre's works.
72

The Devil and the Good Lord and Two Other Plays, 111.
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Hilda:
Goetz:

"Take mine."
,
"You d on I t see me either;
you love me.

1173

Evidenced here again is the concept of love based on illusion,
lack of knowledge.

The lover must necessarily be deceived

about the nature of her beloved.
have

the possibility of

Only those who don't love us

knowing us.

Therefore,

in

this

Sartrean world, to be surrounded by those who love us is to be
abjectly lonely, known and knowable by no one.

For love and

knowledge of the Other are mutually exclusive, while love and
deception are

forever

rooted in the latter.

coupled,

the

former based upon and

Truth is not only not an ideal of

Sartrean love, but is quite certainly excluded from such a
loving world.
In another of Sartre's plays, The Condemned of Altona
(1959), Leni proclaims the following: "The right of love?
insipid you are!

How

I would give my body and soul to the man I

loved, but I would lie to him all my life if it were necessary."

74

And this is precisely what she does in her incestu-

ous love relationship with her brother Franz.
relationship is rooted in falsehood and unreality.

Indeed,

the

It is very

difficult to ascertain who loves whom in Sartre's fiction,
because it is always a matter of capturing someone before they
"wake up" to the reality of the Other.

Such Sartrean love

relationships

precarious,

73

74

are,

to

say

the

least,

quite

The Devi' l and the Good Lord and Two 0ther Pl ays, 136 .

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Condemned of Altona, trans. Sylvia
and George Leeson (New York: Vintage, 1963), 17, 18.
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In a Sartrean love relation,

metastable.

herself to the freedom of the Other, and,
seems

to

be

unavoidable.

the

most

harrowing

position

one must subject
for Sartre,
of

all,

this

albeit

A very stark example of a Sartrean love relation

is evidenced in the same play at a much later juncture in the
dialogue.

I would like to replicate here this much revealing

passage:
Franz:
Johanna:
Franz:

Johanna:
Franz:
Johanna:
Franz:
Johanna:
Franz:

Possibly,

"Is it still possible to love me?"
"Unfortunately, yes."
"I shall never be alone again ... I beg your
pardon, Johanna; it's a little too soon to
corrupt the judge whom I have appointed over
myself."
"I'm not your judge. One doesn't judge those
whom one loves."
"And suppose you stop loving me? Won't that
be a judgement? The final judgement?"
"How could I?"
"BY LEARNING WHO I AM."
"I already know."
"Oh, no!
Not at all!
A day will come just
like any other day. I shall talk about myself
and you will listen.
Then, SUDDENLY, love
will be shattered.
You will look at me with
horror,
and I shall again become ... a
75
crab.
Sartre

has

some

type

of

fascination

with

crustaceans, as evidenced here and even more strikingly in
Nausea.

But this is an aside.

excruciatingly fragile
deception and ignorance.

Love, again,

because it

is seen to be

is based on illusion

-

In this particular case, Franz was

a closet Nazi who had previously engaged in the systematic
torture and extermination of the Jews.

75

In spite of this (or,

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Condemned of Altona,
Caps mine.

134,

135.
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maybe, because of it), I believe Sartre wants to universalize
the scenario and say that Franz's/Johanna's love is no more
fragile

or

based

on

illusion

than

fragility goes with the territory.

anyone

else's.

Such

The lover, whether he be

a torturer or otherwise, is a person who has not faced himself
fully and reflectively, hence he is engaged in the pursuit of
being through the conduit of the Other.

If he loves in a

fashion other than that which involves the pursuit of being,
he is not a Sartrean lover
Sartrean type one love) .

(at least not in the sense of

Love of a different stripe is not

evidenced in this Sartrean world.

76

As underscored previously, love for Sartre involves the
"pursuit of being," the attempt to legitimate oneself, ground
oneself,

make oneself necessary,

become God.

At the beginning of this chapter,

Sartre from Cahiers saying that
hell."

77

give oneself an essence,

the

we quoted

"pursuit of being is

Love as a concrete formulation of this pursuit of

being would therefore be hell.

Love as hell.

Hell as the

perpetual pursuit of the unrealizable ideal.

Ideality as

unreality.

In the love relation, we pursue being by trying to

76

This illustration from a dramatic work of Sartre's alone
is insufficient to warrant a universal claim regarding the
nature of Sartrean love. Nevertheless, coupled with Sartre's
philosophical works as well as other dramatic writings, we may
come to note a conspicuous absence of other forms of love
relations in the Sartrean world.
77

Cahiers, 42.
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appropriate

the

capture is the
d om.

1179

But

Other

as

a

subject.

78

freedom of the Other,

the

lover alienates

her

What
or
own

we

seek

to

"alienated freefreedom

enterprise of becoming an object for the Other.

in

the

So, the lover

alienates her own freedom through the attempt to incorporate
the alienated freedom of the Other.

Thus, this self-contra-

dictory attempt is deemed "hell" by Sartre.
In Sartre's early and extremely interesting work,

The

Psychology of Imagination, he writes the following lines which
I

find applicable

for an analysis

of

love:

"Thus we

can

recognize two distinct selves in us: the imaginary self with
its

tendencies and desires

and the real

human being is defined as freedom,

self.

1180

If

the

if the for-itself has no

essence, what do we mean when we delineate a "real" from an
"imaginary" self?
To begin with, if such a distinction is possible, we can
say that the imaginary self must be the project of the real
self, but not vice versa.

That is, the imaginary self must be

a free project of the for-itself.

This imaginary self,

taken to be the self, would be the for-itself in love.

if
The

illusion of love is the illusion of the imaginary self, which

78

B eing
'
an d Not h'ingness, 375.

79

B eing
'
an d Not h'ingness, 375.
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Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, trans.
anonymous (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel, n.d.), 210.
Originally
published in French as L' lmaginaire: psychologie phenomenologigµe de l'imagination (Paris: Gallimard, 1940).
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is a project of the real self aimed at ontological alteration.
The alterity of the imaginary self seeks to realize
altered ontological condition.

this

Nevertheless, this imaginary

self is metastable in that it could always

"wake up"

(via

purifying reflection) to the freedom of the real self that has
projected the imaginary self.

Without the imaginary self,

Sartre's type one conception of love would not be possible
because the necessary condition of self-deception would not be
realized by the for-itself.

With the notion of the imaginary

self we can make sense out of the deceptive/self-deceptive
nature of love in this sense, yet also understand its ongoing
allure.
In The Age of Reason, Sartre details Mathieu's love for
Ivich: "'But I love you, Ivich ... '
felt his desire revive.
.
f or not h.ing." 81
d esire

He eyed her dubiously, he

That sad and resigned desire was a
This nothing is the freedom of the

Other - the unrealizable goal of love.
freedom of the Other qua freedom.

What is "loved" is the

What is loved is nothing.

I desire what I cannot have (and what is in essence nothing) ,
and I "realize" this in the failed enterprise of love.

If one

desires something other than the freedom of the Other, then
this

is not a

love relation in the type one sense.

The

nothing of alienated freedom is the goal of love.
Why does the lover seek to objectify herself in the love
relation?
81

How does this function in the interest of the

The Age o f Reason, 3 73, 3 74.

Underlining mine.
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lover?

If the lover becomes an object for the beloved, says

Sartre, the lover becomes "unsurpassable," the lover becomes
"the whole world" for the beloved.
is this to the lover?
an object,

I

So what?

Of what benefit

To this, Sartre says that if I become

become "the absdlute limit of freedom...

absolute source of all values ... the absolute value."

82

the
This

means that I function as the ground of being for the Other.
I,

as an object,

derived.
an oracle,

have an essence from which value can be

Thus I serve as an irrefutable guide to the Other,
a functional limit to her freedom.

I

create a

world for the Other because I am in my very being the parameters of that world.

This occurs only as long as I am an

object, and collapses simultaneous with the collapse of my
objectness for the Other.
Therefore,

obviously,

I

as

the

lover

have

a

interest in maintaining my objectivity for the Other.
of course,

vested
This,

collapses as soon as the beloved projects being

loved and apprehends me as subject.

Thus if I

realize my

goal, i.e. loving the Other, I destroy that very realization
in the Other's realization of my realization of that goal.

If

one could control the freedom of the Other, one could possibly
succeed in maintaining for quite a long time this metastable
illusion.

But in any Sartrean world there is certainly one

thing that no one can do - be she the lover or otherwise, and

82

B eing
'
an d Not h'1ngness, 367, 369.
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that is control the freedom of the Other.

Therefore, love is

perpetually precarious.
The lover wants to be perceived by the beloved as an
"absolute choice," casting a

light of

"fatalism" upon the

relationship as it is perceived by the beloved.

83

This is

because, as Sartre says, "the beloved cannot will to love."
Why is this?

84

Simply because if the beloved wills to love - as

the lover has already done - the beloved would in this very
willing seek to make an object of himself for the lover.
so doing,

the beloved would

subjectivity of the Other.
seeks to prevent.

"wake up"

In

immediately to the

And this, above all,

the lover

Therefore, the lover seeks to prevent the

beloved from willfully engaging in the project of loving the
lover.

Thus, for love to be "successful," the beloved cannot

will to love.

The only way the lover can "produce" love in

the beloved is by "seducing" him,
phenomenological

purview

relation to the lover.

the

by inducing within his

experience

of

"fatalism"

in

Thus the "fatedness" of "falling in

love" - beyond choice, beyond reason.
self-enslavement" says Sartre.

85

Love demands "freedom's

Only free beings can love,

but free beings only partially recognized as such.

~cf. Being and Nothingness, 370.
84

•
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full realization of such beingness would crush forever the
endeavor.

S6

The idea of love as "fatalism" can be seen vividly in
Mathieu's relationship with Ivich in The Age Of Reason:

"He

smiled and was conscious of a timid but refreshing sense of
regret,

he looked affectionately at that passionate,

body on which his
beloved freedom. '"

freedom was

87

aground.

In this novel,

'Beloved

frail
Ivich,

love is most certainly

evidenced experientially as the loss of freedom, the mooring
of a ship,

the ending of incessant drifting upon the vast

ocean of freedom,

the horrifying clank of the anchor,

the

inability to set sail again.
This

theme

of

Sartre's Critigue.

"loss

of

freedom"

is

again

noted

in

In Book II, Part II of this work Sartre

holds that the group, which is the product of men and not a
given "essence of men," implies a progressive alienation of
.
SS
f ree d om to necessity.

What does this mean?

If the group

dynamic can be transposed upon the love dyad, we may say that
as the lover exercises her freedom to seduce the beloved, she
discovers the necessity of the alienation of her own freedom
through her objectness in being-for-others.

The realization

of this necessity and its attendant "constriction" of freedom
6

s The context of these comments must be kept firmly in

mind. In this section, I am discussing Sartrean type one love
and no other.
S7

The Age of Reason, 245.

SSC

Underlining mine.
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ritigue,
Book II, Part II, 405-444.
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lead

to the realization of the failure of the project.

Thus

the attempt at group fusion (love fusion) ferrets out for the
lover the necessity that
(self-)alienation of

is inherent in the project,

one's

freedom even as

(self-)enslavement of the Other's freedom.

one seeks

the
the

One must utilize

one's freedom to realize its limits; one must utilize one's
freedom to run up against its necessity, beheld in the freedom
of the Other.

Both the group and the love-dyad characterize

this process.
The type one love relation, for Sartre, has as its goal
"salvation."

"Salvation,"

as

Sartre

utilizes

the

term,

comprises the justification of my existence, the founding of
myself

as

essence.
being:

subject-object,

or

the

creation

for

me

an

It entails the infusation of meaning within my

since

I

am the

"whole world"

for

the beloved,

existence is necessary and no longer contingent.
relation,

of

my

The love

as every other concrete relation with others in

Sartre, is an exemplification of the attempt to overcome the
contingency of one's being.

To overcome such contingency

would be to be; to be would be to be necessary.

Thus I become

"saved" through the Other in the love relation.

Once again,

it is important to note that "salvation" (at least telling the
Sartrean story in the manner in which we have been telling it)
is an unrealizable ideal of the for-itself.

In The Age of

Reason, Sartre narrates Mathieu's potential salvatiop, to be
found in the love of Ivich alone:

"Fear shook him and he

69

turned towards Ivich.

Malicious and aloof as she was, in her

lay his sole salvation.

118

s

In this Sartrean world, there can be no mutual recognition of freedoms in the love relation.
never be equality between lovers.

Therefore, there can

Inequality in this and all

other concrete relations with others is necessarily part of
the ontological framework of the for-itself (at least, before
conversion) . Any prima facie equality between oneself and the
Other in the love relation is merely another facet of the
deception and self-deception inherent in love.so

The experi-

ence of equality or intersubjectivity can be only a psychological apparition, since it can never correspond to ontological
.

rea 1 ity.

Sl

fusion,

Sartre has some things of value in his Critigue. sz

Concerning

the

impossibility

of

ontological

Sartre speaks in this work of the "double failure" of beingin-the-group.

These two kinds of failure may be described as

akin to the failure inherent in the two primitive attitudes
toward the Other as delineated in Being and Nothingness: I
fail to be able to dissolve the group in myself (or, incorporate the Other's transcendence,

or transcend the Other's

transcendence) and I fail to be able to be dissolved in the
group

(or,

lose myself in my objectivity or my being-for-

asThe Age of Reason, 218.

Underlining mine.

so Being
.
and Not h'ingness, 408.
Sl

•
Being
and Not h'ingness, 424.

s2c ritigue,
. .
Book II, Part III, 445-504.
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others).

This double failure,

according to Sartre,

which

manifests the contradiction of ontological unity, is the basis
.
1 unity.
.
93
of practica

Practical unity is seeming but not

being, since it is based on praxis and psychological concerns
alone, masking the hollowness of its diasporatic (fragmented,
perpetually
ontology.

elsewhere,

pursued-pursuing,

transcendent)

In this same section, Sartre goes on to say that

the fact of this discrepancy between being and praxis is the
basis of terror.

It is the praxis of a nonexistent totality,

precisely as the playing at love in this Sartrean world is a
game of mirrors played by this nonexistent totality. 94
In the Critigue we also find other concepts and nomenclature readily transferable to the love relation - the "group in
fusion" is based upon "freedom-terror": the love relationship
is a project of freedom to overcome the terror of contingency.
"Allegiance-terror"
seriality:

can be

seen as

the

struggle against

the devotion seen in the love relation is the

struggle against the very superfluity of one's existence
outside this allegiance-fusion.
is "saved" from seriality.

Within such a "fusion," one

In either case, the allegiance-

terror stems from the fact that my being-ness (as necessity)

93

cf. R. D. Laing and D. G. Cooper, Reason and Violence (New
York: Pantheon, 1964), 158.
Mcf. Reason and Violence, 159.
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can only be granted (surreptitiously) within the confines of
.

t h e re 1 ation.
Love,

95

for

Sartre,

is

forever

a

failure

because

the

factual negation cannot be negated while at the same time
maintaining the two internal negations which comprise the foritselfs (sic) in love.

For each individual can ek-sist only

as ontologically isolated,

forever.

Love,

for Sartre,

is

forever a failure because any attempt to relate to the Other
as object (as the beloved does in the love relation)

refers

one to the subjectivity of the Other,

For we

inexorably.

could at any time apprehend the look of the Other,
glimpse his subjectivity.

and so

All our relations with others are

inconsistent because they are partializations of reality.

The

only fully accurate characterization of the Other would be a
characterization of her as subject and object.
mean,

says Sartre,

that

we would have

This would

to experience

her

freedom in two ways: as transcended by mine, and as transcending mine.
a

Put differently, I would have to experience her as

freedom both capturing mine and captured by mine.

Sartre, this is impossible.

96

For

Therefore, I can never really

know the Other, and I can never experience her as she really
is.
of

All experience is a partialization, a finite experience
the

Other's

freedom,

which

is

infinite.

Any

finite

perspective on the infinite is a partialization, a distortion,
95
96

See the Critigµe,
•

Book II, Chapters I and II.

Being and Nothingness, 408.
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a

. f.
.
97
f a 1 s1 1cat1on.

This is precisely the situation of my

love relation with the Other.
To

conclude

section one,

I

would like

to gloss

two

passages in Sartre's fiction, both taken from The Devil and
the Good Lord.

In this play, Heinrich states simply that "If

God does not exist,
with most fiction,

there is no way of escaping men.

98

As

this can be read in a number of ways.

Given the Sartrean world portrayed in the preceding pages, I
would like to offer an interpretation that intersects with our
discussion of love.

God is absolute A.

Since there can be only one absolute,
exist.
one.

Man is absolute B.
both A and B cannot

Nevertheless, an absolute must exist or we must create

Otherwise, all being is de trop.

Therefore, either A or

B.
For Sartre, since A does not exist, B is the absolute.
Nevertheless,

since B is

de

trop

absolute, but only seeks to be such.
the-absolute.
love type one.

it

is

not

really

the

It is the-project-to-be-

This is the pursuit of being seen in Sartrean
But "man" as such is an abstraction.

individual men and women exist.

Only

Therefore, each individual is

97

Here follows an interesting Nietzschean gloss on this
sentence:
"There is only a perspective seeing, only a
perspective 'knowing'; and the more affects we allow to speak
about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to
observe one thing, the more complete will our 'concept' of
this thing, our 'objectivity,' be." Friedrich Nietzsche, On
The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:
Vintage, 1969), 119.
98

The Devil and the Good Lord, 142.
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a project-to-be-the-absolute.
absolute,

Love, as the project to be the

negates God in its very telos.

And my love,

in

attempting to become the absolute, negates the very love of
the Other, since there can be only one absolute and there can
be no ontological union.
beloved is

This is why the birth of love in the

the death of my love

-

there can be only one

absolute, and two absolutes cannot join to become one.
birth of one entails the death of the other.

The

Thus love is the

phoenix of the death of love; love is the reincarnation of the
death of the project of love.

"If God doesn't exist, there is

no way of escaping men": If there is no uncontestable absolute, each for-itself is the project of becoming the absolute.
There is no escape from men because for men there is no
escape from the project.
is

the

history

of

This is because the history of men

eternal

return:

from

being

to

being,

separated temporarily by {being) consciousness of being.

All

consciousness is the project-of-becoming-being once again,
albeit with the modification of the addition of consciousness.
Such a project, realized, would be the absolute, if it were
attended by consciousness.

The cessation of consciousness

within being is again to reveal the superfluity of being;
consciousness unable to be is also revealed to
nonessential, de trop.
of

If God doesn't exist, there is no way

escaping men because

recovery of his being.
on this project.

itself as

each one

is

the

project

of

the

Love, of course, is but one variation

The pursuit of being is hell.

Love is the

74

pursuit of being.
exist,

the

Therefore, love is hell.

pursuit

of

being

is

If God doesn't

necessary

because

it

is

necessary that there be an absolute, and such an absolute can
only exist if free-and-necessary-being exists.

Therefore, the

indelible pursuit.
The second passage is a conversation between Hilda and
Goetz.

It exemplifies quite well the gloss on the above

passage.
Hilda:

Goetz:
Hilda:
Goetz:

"We shall not go to heaven, Goetz ... Here you
are: a little flesh, worn-out, rough, miserable - a life, a wretched life.
It is this
flesh and this life I love. We can only love
on earth. and against God's will.
"I love only God, and I am no longer on
earth".
"Then you don't love me"?
"No. Nor do you, Hilda, love me 99either. What
you believe to be love is hate.

We can only love on earth and against God's will because if
God exists, there is no need to pursue being - and love is the
pursuit of being.

Either God or love.

unnecessarily because
realized by God.

the

Thus,

goal

of

love

Both would coexist
has

already been

in this Sartrean world,

forever a desperate and clandestine affair.

love

is

"What you believe

to be love is hate" because you can only love at my expense,
through the spilling of my blood, through the sacrifice of my
life (freedom).
to love.

In this Sartrean world, there is no other way

Or is there?

It is to this question that we now

turn in section two.
99

mine.

The Devil and the Good Lord,

125,

126.

Underlining
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Part Two
Conversion and Authenticity:
An Alternative View of Love in Sartre, or
Sartrean Love Type Two

As mentioned in the initial pages of Chapter Two, Sartre
stated that he saw more positivity in love from the time of
Saint Genet onward.

He sets the stage for another type of

love relation as early as 1943 with the footnote in Being and
Nothingness that we noted earlier:

"These considerations do

not exclude the possibility of an ethics of deliverance and
salvation.

But this can be achieved only after a radical

conversion which we cannot discuss here.

11100

We also noted

that Sartre wrote in Cahiers that Being and Nothingness was an
.

onto 1 ogy" b e f ore conversion."

101

Some commentators on Sartre equate pure reflection with
•
102
conversion,
wh ereas ot h ers d o not. 103

•
radical

is

this

[radical]

conversion

that

Sartre speaks

Just what
of?

In

Cahiers Sartre spells this out fairly clearly, at least not in
the manner of an aside (as it appeared in Being and Nothingness) :

100

" ... [T] he

consists

•
Being
and Not h.ingness, 412.

lOlC
102

conversion

of

renouncing

the

Underlining mine.

a h,iers, 13.

For example, see Bell, Sartre's Ethics of Authenticity,

118ff.
103

For example, see Kerry s. Walters, "A Recovery of
Innocence: The Dynamics of Sartrean Radical Conversion",
Auslegung XI, no. 1 (Fall 1984): 358-377.
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category of appropriation ... Sincerity is therefore excluded
because it bears on that which I am.

Authenticity bears on

what I will ... Pure and authentic reflection is a will for that
Wh

. h I
ic

wi. 11 ....

II

104

Some writers hold that the conversion

involves a necessary social dimension, that one "cannot make
.
t h e conversion
a 1 one. " 105

Sartre,
moral."

This is because, in the words of

"Morality isn't possible unless all the world is
106

We can glean from the longer excerpt from Cahiers

that Sartre links conversion and authenticity, and
pursuit of being is not linked with authenticity.

that the

A converted

individual is an authentic individual; an inauthentic individual is not converted.

What then is authenticity for Sartre?

This has been a thorny issue for Sartre scholars for quite a
long time, and it is no wonder.

I shall recount but two

instances of Sartre's explication of the concept.
First, in Cahiers we note a passage that seems to be in
direct opposition to the above passage, that the "authentic
individual cannot through conversion suppress his pursuit of
Being because there would be nothing else [car il n'y aurait
. ] . 107
p 1 us rein

How, then, is the authentic individual dif-

f erent from anyone else?

In an interview with Benny Levy at

the very twilight of Sartre's life,

Sartre tells us that

a h.iers, 495, 496.

104c
105

Bell, Sartre's Ethics of Authenticity, 178.

losea h.iers, 16.
107c

a h.iers, 42.
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authentic individuals "no longer want to be God ... no longer
. 11108
want to b e causa sui.
Is this incompatible with the
preceding claim, or is it just the case that authentic persons
no longer want what they nevertheless must pursue inexorably?109

In this case, the claims would not be incompatible,

but would simply express

in a

poignant way

anguish, and failure of the Sartrean world.
110
certainly far from resolved.

the

nausea,

The question is

One noteworthy difference between the authentic and the
inauthentic individual is that the latter is reflectively
unaware of her causa sui project, whereas the former, in not
wanting to be causa sui, must be at least reflectively aware
of such a project.
the former is not.

Thus the latter is in bad faith, whereas
The type one Sartrean love relation

108
Benny Levy, "The Last Words of Jean-Paul Sartre,"
Dissent (Fall 1980): 397-422.
109
This seems to echo quite well the "lucidity" of Camus'
Sisyphean hero as he "surmounts" his fate through this very
lucidity. Existential conditions have not been altered, they
have merely been consciously rejected: "There is no fate that
cannot be surmounted by scorn."
[Albert Camus, The Myth of
Sisyphus and Other Essays (New York: Vintage, 1955), especially
88-91.]
This attitude of conscious rejection (or,
"metaphysical rebellion" as it is labeled in The Rebel [Albert
Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage,
1956)]) is the very antithesis of the Nietzschean cry of amor
fati, found throughout Nietzsche's works. See, in particular,
Nietzsche's 1888 work entitled Ecce Homo
[ trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1969)].
110
Nevertheless, such a resolution is necessary to give a
fair reckoning of Sartre's philosophy as a whole. No other
issue may harbor more import for a fair rendering of the
Sartrean corpus. I will focus on this specifically in chapter
four.
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exhibits such "unawareness" (otherwise, "waking up" would not
be an issue), but a causa sui project recognized as such would
not fit within the parameters of the Sartrean type one love
relation.

Why is this?

Because if the lover engaged in the

project of making herself be loved with a reflective awareness
of the pursuit of being (and its necessary failure) , then the
illusion of love would be shattered at the very initiation of
the project.

Even if the praxis were the same, the telos

would invariably be different, since the lover can no longer
"believe" in (the project of) love.
is a phenomenon of belief.
loves.

111

Love, like bad faith,

To love is to believe that one

To not-believe that one loves is not-to-love.

The

love relation is a "game of mirrors" because it is a phenomenon of belief (not ontology), just as, for Sartre, if emotion
is a joke, it is a joke we believe in.

112

'
'
'
Re fl ective
awareness o f one I s proJect
is
a necessary
but insufficient condition to make one authentic, since
authenticity must include a volitional component. Even if one
could never, finally, succeed in "being" authentic (since one
can never be anything), the project to flee one's own inauthenticity toward the unrealizable ideal of authenticity would
then constitute authenticity. That is, if one is to speak of
authenticity at all in a Sartrean world. What I want to get
away from is reducing the notion of authenticity to merely a
matter of reflective awareness. If authenticity were merely
a matter of reflective awareness, then the person with the
most self-knowledge would be the most authentic. Knowledge is
a kind of being, but being is not reducible to knowledge.
Authenticity, therefore, is not simply a kind of consciousness.
111

cf. Jean- Paul Sartre, ....T""'h""'e~~E=m~o-t_1=·~o=n=s_:__o~u~t=l=i=·n=·=e-=o=f-~a
Theory, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1948), 61.
112
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Sincerity is ontological and impossible. Authenticity is
volitional and involves reflectivity. 113

Sincerity is unre-

alizable in the Sartrean world, because human being can never
simply be what it is; it always transcends itself.

Sincerity

implies a state of being - and states of being are unrealizable for the for-itself.

Authenticity involves a relationship

to one's own praxis, one from which deception, self-deception,
and claims

of sincerity are expunged. 114

Therefore,

the

1

uI argue in chapters two and (particularly) four that
authenticity, in fact, involves more than this, that ontology,
reflectivity, and volition are involved.
114

Take, for example, two cynical people who have an
affair, each telling the other that s/he is loved, each
knowing that s/he is lying, and each knowing that the other is
also lying.
Three questions crop up: (1) Would this be a
praxis of love from which deception, self-deception, and
claims of sincerity are expunged?
(2) In which case, would
this be an example of authenticity? (3) How is this form of
self-consciousness "better" than bad faith?
In response to the first question:
(A) Cynicism is ruled out by definition in Sartrean type one
love, since this form of love is a phenomenon of belief and
necessarily involves deception and self-deception for its
precarious existence.
(B) Sartrean type two love is based upon honesty and therefore
rules out cynicism.
Therefore, two people who lie about the existence of their
love relation are in fact not lovers at all, but merely
actors.
How is this different from any other Sartrean
relation? It is different simply because it is a matter of
the actor's relation to his own consciousness and the consciousness of the other: All concrete relations with others in
Sartre are phenomena of belief because they are based upon
emotional and imaginary consciousness. The cynical "lovers"
have eliminated the component of belief. (based upon emotional/imaginary consciousness) in their relation, and with it the
risk. It is no longer a "real" love relation, but an "imaginary" one. Sartre has stood the love relation on its head: The
imaginary "love" relation is based upon full lucidity, whereas
the "true" "love" relation is based upon deception and selfdeception.
(continued ... )
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sincere individual is necessarily she who is inauthentic, and
the authentic individual makes no claim to sincerity.
What are some of the characteristics of Sartrean love
which are based upon authentic human being?

Sartre gives us

far from a full blown view, but he has given us some important
guidelines.

It is to these that we shall now turn.

In Cahiers Sartre states simply "That which will define
its [the for-itself 's] love is the concrete sacrifice that it
makes today and not what it intends or what it feels.

11115

Here we can see a volitional notion of love focusing on
sacrifice as the essence of love.

But active willing is seen

as insufficient (if not converted into praxis) , and execution
is necessary.

Therefore, we can see here a conception of love

•
d)
... continue
In response to the second question:
I am sure that Sartre would wish to say that authenticity
involves honesty to all individuals concerned, and since the
cynical "lovers" lie to others concerning the nature of their
relationship, they are not authentic. But it is not clear to
me why these lovers could not be authentic (at least in some
sense) within the Sartrean paradigm, since Sartre seems to
relegate authenticity to the self's relation to itself. At
this point, I will leave this an open question.
In response to the third question:
Given the fact that there are no pre-existent values in the
Sartrean world, the only way we can judge concerning whether
cynical self-consciousness is "better" than bad faith is to
know the project ( s) of the cynics. There seems to me to be no
clear cut sense in which we can say, a priori and in a
universal sense, that cynicism is a "worse" or "better" mode
of consciousness than bad faith. Cynicism and bad faith may,
respectively, have their own brands of positivity - at least
on the Sartrean playground.
·
114 (

115

Ca h'iers, 4 9 4.
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.
as praxis

where,

{ in
.

.
1 ar,
par t icu

. . 1 " praxis
. ) . 116
"sacri. f icia

Else-

it has been said that Sartre sees respect also as

117
. 1 to t h e 1 ove re 1 ation.
.
essentia

In Cahiers, Sartre describes what he would consider to be
"Utopia": " [W] here each treats the other as an end, that is to
say, takes the enterprise of the Other as an end."

118

This,

of course, would be a mutual recognition of freedoms, precisely that which Sartre said was in principle unrealizable under
the

earlier

description

of

love.

"utopian" existence is realizable,

Therefore,

if

such

a

we could say that this

would involve the negation of the unrealizability of love.
Love

if

the above scenario were

realizable

-

would be

realizable and manifested in the very description of
"utopia" noted above.

the

Love would be the mutual recognition

116

How do these feature guarantee authenticity?
If one
reduces the notion of love to praxis, as Sartre does here,
there is no guarantee of authenticity. A person engaging in
such "loving" sacrificial praxis could still exist at the same
time in bad faith and could be, knowingly or unknowingly,
deceiving others. To reduce love to praxis is to say nothing
of the consciousness with which it is attended.
Since
authenticity bespeaks of a certain kind of consciousness, no
claims can be made concerning the relation between authenticity and Sartre's notion of love as "sacrificial praxis."
117

See Bell, 156.
Bell mentions the relation between
Hilda and Goetz in The Devil and the Good Lord which I have
relegated to type one love. She also focuses in Hoederer in
Dirty Hands.
She may be right in saying that Hoederer
exemplifies a love laced with respect if one can swallow the
notion that this type of "respectful" love sees murder as
legitimate and necessary. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Dirty Hands,
found in No Exit and Three Other Plays, trans. Stuart Gilbert
{New York: Vintage, 1955) . I happen to think Bell is mistaken.
118

Ca h iers,
·

s 4.
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among persons that persons are to be regarded categorically as
ends and not as means.

Of course, the question as to whether

such a scenario is possible is still at issue.
In The Age of Reason, Daniel thinks to himself that "One
could only damage oneself through the harm one did to others. "

119

If we could say that deceiving the beloved in the

type one love relation is injurious to the beloved, then the
above thought would bring the self-damaging aspect of this
type of love to the fore (as well as call it into question) .
Conversely,

we might be able to say that the only way to

insure the absence of such self-damage is to refrain from
deceiving the Other

(attempting to coopt his freedom)

treat the freedom of the Other as an end.

and

If my fate is so

inextricably intertwined with that of the Other, then I must
treat his freedom as I treat mine.

But this could only be

possible after conversion, since, ontologically, it is not
possible in the type one relation (because I am the project of
the recovery of my being).

So whether such a possibility is

a possibility hinges on_ whether or not the conversion is
possible.
In The Family Idiot, Sartre states tersely that " ... [M] aternal love is a relation and not a feeling.

11120

Again, we

can see the sentiment expressed by Sartre that love is (should
119
120

The Age of Reason, 111.

Underlining mine.
..

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Family Idiot: Gustave Flaubert.
1821-1857, trans. Carol Cosman (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1981), vol. I, 57.

83

be? normative? descriptive?) a matter of volition, a matter of
praxis.

Why even call such a relation a love relation, unless

due to the fact that one treats the Other as an end, has
respect for his freedom, "loves" him?

If love is

reducible

merely to a social relation, then love is only a special kind
of praxis, nothing more and nothing less.
more that we can here reflectively delineate.

At least nothing
This praxiolog-

ical notion of love, with its inclusion of respect for the
freedom of the Other, can be based only upon authentic human
being.
In "Self-Portrait at Seventy," Sartre relates to us his
belief that transparency, honesty, and truth are essential for
"social harmony."

Such a view gives us further basis for our

construction of a type two Sartrean love relation: "A man's
existence must be entirely visible to his neighbor, whose own
existence must be entirely visible in turn, before true social
harmony can be established. 11121

This type of social harmony

cannot rest on love relations which are "in essence" deceptive
and "in principle" a failure.

A new type of love relation is

called for, a new type of ontology, a conversion in human
being.
The necessity of honesty in the love relation is exemplified in the relation between Marcelle and Mathieu in The Age
of Reason: "When Mathieu had pledged himself to Marcelle ... He

121

Jean-Paul Sartre, Life/Situations, trans. Paul Auster
and Lydia Davis (New York: Pantheon, 1977), 13.
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could not love Marcelle save in complete lucidity ... 'If I lied
to myself,' said he, 'I should have the feeling I was lying to
you as wel 1 . ' "

122

Love here,

in the eyes of Mathieu,

is

based upon transparency, honesty, and truth, and is undergirded with the notion of treating the Other as an end.
not type one Sartrean love.
for.

This is

A new, revamped notion is called

For my freedom is not imperiled before yours, but is

contained within yours.

This is exactly what Sartre says in

Cahiers: "He discovers it [the Other's freedom] at the heart
of his freedom as a free movement accompanying [him] toward
his ends ... [Each] freedom is totally in the other.

11123

Before conversion, my freedom is in the Other in the
sense that I can attempt to "ground" my being through the
utilization of her freedom.

It is in this sense and in this

sense only that my freedom is in the Other (although psychological aberrations may indicate otherwise) .

This is in no

way treating the Other as an end, but as a means to the end of
my own "justification" of being.

But this "being-justified"

(as a project) does not recognize the freedom of the Other as
an end in itself.

It is merely a tool utilized to enhance the

end of my freedom.

Therefore, if my freedom is going to be

"in the Other" in any other way, an ontological alteration is
necessary.

This,

if such a

thing is possible,

conversion.
122

The Age of Reason, 113.

123

Cahiers, 299.

Underlining mine.

would be
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The Age of Reason is noteworthy in that it was written
prior to Sartre's transitional period (the novel appeared in
1945) in which he began to see "more positivity" in love.

I

believe that Sartre characterizes both type one and type two
love in this work.

First, the following passage:

And He [Mathieu] was suddenly seized with the desire to
talk to Marcelle about it: it was to her alone that he
could talk about his life, his fears, his hopes. But he
remembered that he would never see her again, and his
desire, not yet actual or defined, slowly dissolved into
a kind of anguish. He was alonx···'The
truth is that I
12
gave up Marcelle for nothing. '
In the last section, we noted that Mathieu loved Ivich and
believed that in her lay his only possible salvation.

This

love relation, that between Mathieu and Ivich, exemplifies the
type one Sartrean love relation.

Mathieu gave up Marcelle for

nothing, save the freedom of the Other (Ivich), the freedom
that

is

nothing,

salvation

the

illusive

transparency,

sacrifice,

"honesty"

Either/or.

Marcelle for nothing.

(at least as an ideal),

and freedom.

that is the type two relation.

125

would be his

The relationship between Mathieu and

Marcelle is based upon

124

that

if he could capture and incorporate it within

himself qua freedom.

exclusive.

freedom

It is this relation

The relations are mutually

The truth is that Mathieu gave up

125

The Age of Reason, 394, 395. -

In fact, the ideals presented by Mathieu and Marcelle
are just that, for both had been engaged in long term selfdeception in terms of their relation to each other:
Their
"hatred" for one another and wallowing inability to chose
(continued ... )
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The preceding points indicate clearly that for a type two
love relation to be possible, an ontological shift/alteration
is necessary in the for-itself.

Such a possibility is opened

up in the very pages of Being and Nothingness.

This type of

being would have freedom rather than being as its goal. 126
•
d)
... continue
themselves reduced them to effectual muteness before one
another.
They both failed to recognize and accept the
implications of their freedom(s) in the face of the relationship, and it was upon this refusal of recognition that the
relationship endured. Honesty would have led to its rapid and
sordid demise, ,which was exactly what happened as they both
began to progressively face themselves before the backdrop of
the behavior of the other. I think Sartre makes it clear with
this relation that a love based on honesty, transparency,
sacrifice, and freedom was not possible for either Mathieu or
Marcelle. Any such relation was absent throughout the course
of the novel.
Mathieu is seen as free only to engage in
either the covertly self-deceptive/deceptive relation with
Marcelle
or
the
more
expressly
overtly
self-deceptive/deceptive relation with Ivich. Either way, both relations fail to exhibit the "positivity" Sartre is beginning to
accord to the love relation. Here we find the Sartrean world,
once again, loveless and peopled with naught but bad dreams.
125 (

126

How is having freedom for a goal different from having
nothing for a goal, especially since Sartre uses the terms
"freedom" and "nothing" interchangeably?
If freedom is
something different from nothing, Sartre does not explicitly
clarify this. But he certainly implies a difference between
the two throughout the corpus of his work. This difference,
it may seem, is to imply that freedom, no longer nothing, in
fact has an "essence, " that to which we are called to account,
for we are freedom. The way Sartre painstakingly details how
we can be untrue to our own freedom sounds as if we are being
untrue to our own "essence," our own self.
If having freedom for a goal is the same as having
nothing for a goal, how is this different from having no goal?
Since, according to Sartre, we are not free not to have a
project. This project, which is the ontological "goal" of the
for-itself, signifies that "nothing" cannot be the project of
the for-itself, that freedom cannot be aimless, that freedom
cannot aim at nothing, and that freedom is not reducible to
nothing.
Although Sartre uses "freedom" and "nothing"
interchangeably, they do not amount to the same thing within
(continued ... )
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This type of being is the being of play: "The first principle
of play is man himself; through it he escapes his natural
nature."

127

Man's "natural nature" is the pursuit of being;

the shackles chaining man to this pursuit are opened through
Such play can only occur after the for-itself moves

play.

from accessory to pure reflection.
We must again remember the distinction Sartre makes
between accessory and pure reflection.

In accessory reflec-

tion, the for-itself seeks to become a "psychic object" for
itself.

In pure reflection,

the for-itself abandons this

quest for self-objectivity, as it recognizes that it has no
essence other than to be free.

It is the self still caught in

accessory reflection that seeks internal "reasons" for its own
behavior (as a function of a substantive "self").
engaged

in pure

reflection

realizes

instead

The self

that

it

is

responsible for who it is and what it does, therefore taking
responsibility for its own being and praxis.

The self caught

in its own gaze of accessory reflection has not yet expelled
all "contents" from consciousness, but still seeks at least
some motivation for its own praxis in something other than its
126 (

.
'
)
... continued
the body of his philosophy. Therefore, having freedom for a
goal is not the same as having nothing for a goal. Furthermore, having freedom for a goal is not synonymous with having
no goal.
Freedom is the uncoiling of being in the face of
itself, a process enhanced or impeded by the complicit foritself.
127

Being and Nothingness, 581. Any reading of Being and
Nothingness which ascribes to Sartre an ontology which
excludes this possibility is a misreading of the text.

88

own freedom.

Therefore, those engaged in accessory reflection

have not fully exited the realm of bad faith consciousness,
whereas those engaged in pure reflection have.
Sartre makes clear that the essay in phenomenological
ontology which is Being and Nothingness does NOT deal with the
type of being that is the being of play: "This particular type
of project, which has FREEDOM FOR ITS FOUNDATION AND ITS GOAL,
DESERVES A SPECIAL STUDY.
others
being.

in that
11128

I

It is RADICALLY DIFFERENT from ALL

it aims at a

RADICALLY DIFFERENT type

of

find this entire passage highly illuminating,

and recommend that the reader go directly to Sartre's text for
a fuller understanding.

I submit that this radically differ-

ent type of being is that which is aimed at through play, and
that play is only possible through conversion.
necessitates

authenticity,

shift in being.

a

volitional

Conversion

and praxiological

The goal of this project is a

. d o f b eing
.
.
.
b eing
.
.
1 ove. 129
- 1t
1s
1n
d 1. ff erent k 1n

radically
This is

not possible for the unconverted Sartrean woman, for love in
such a world, as we have shown,
game of mirrors .
world?

remains merely an illusive

Can love be any other way in a Sartrean

It is to this question that we turn in Section Three.

Part Three

term.

128

•
Being
and Not h.1ngness, 581.

129

But certainly not in the Sartrean type one sense of the

Caps mine.
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On the Possibility of a Synthesis of
Sartrean Love Types One and Two

Are type one and type two love mutually contradictory or
can there be a

synthesis of the two?

Are there salient

commonalities?

What does Sartre have to say about

these

.
issues,
1. f anyt h.1ng.?130

In Being and Nothingness, Sartre states forcefully and
succinctly that
being. "

131

"I am the project of

the

recovery of my

If this is necessarily and not contingently true

130

Sartrean type one and type two loves seem to represent
two distinct modes of being-in-the-world, and the purpose of
this short section is to illuminate this appearance. It may
be said that, because both types of love represent distinct
modes of being in the world, they are therefore mutually
exclusive a priori.
But this does not seem to follow as a
self-evident truth, since it is theoretically possible that
these "two" "modes" of being are such based only upon a
conceptual confusion, and that they can be reduced to one
another following a more thoroughgoing analysis.
It is the
aim of this section to show that they cannot be reduced to one
another, that these two modes of being are, so to speak,
incommensurable.
Why is it of such great import to demonstrate this? Because it has far-reaching implications for the
theory of addiction, in particular, whether for Sartre a
nonaddicted mode of being is realizable. What I go on to show
in chapter 4, after a more lengthy analysis, is that both
types of love are not alternative human possibilities, but
that type two love in a Sartrean world is an unrealizable
ideal. Both types of love are not grounded in a basic human
reality. In fact, Sartre must positively negate his conception of basic human reality in order to posit his conception
of type two love. Sartre is very tricky on these issues, and
it seems wise at this point to step carefully.
131

Being and Nothingness, 364.
How can this passage be
reconciled with the passage on page 531 of Being and Nothingness, which I cited at the end of part two of the present
chapter? We have (A) The being of play, and (B) The being who
seeks to be God. If we read the above passage as a necessary
truth about the for-itself, then (A) is negated, since the
for-itself cannot simultaneously aim at freedom and being.
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(like the vast majority of Sartre scholars seem to believe),
then changes in volition or changes in praxis will have no
effect on the basic project.

Therefore, one would not be free

to be being, but also would not be free to dispense with the
attempt

at

being being.

Since,

for

Sartre,

the

"law"

of

identity is only contingently true (since it does not apply to
the being of the for-itself), it may well be that the "law" of
the pursuit of being may likewise be only contingently true.
As long as I continue the project of attempting to make myself
be, I continue to attempt to take the Other's point of view on
myself, which means I continue to attempt to be a fascinating
object for the Other so as to capture his subjectivity qua
subjectivity.

As long as my being-for-others is haunted by

the absolute being
.
?132
b eing.

Can I

haunts my being?

("God"),

do I

have to seek to be this

refuse to be that being which perpetually
In Being and Nothingness, unity with the

Other, as we noted, is unrealizable in fact as well as theory,
yet this remains the unrealizable ideal of love.

Is the

These two positions are irreconcilable, unless each is only
contingently true. In chapter 4, I argue that the conversion
is not possible. Therefore, the radically different type of
being achieved through play is unrealizable, since play is
possible only after conversion.
Finally, then, only (B)
remains possible in a Sartrean world.
Sartre was unable,
after all, to reconcile the possibilities of freedom and being
as ends, given his limited ontological understanding of the
for-itself.
132

cf. Being and Nothingness, 365.
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nature of this triple ekstasis which is the for-itself such
that it is free being, but free only to pursue God?

133

At this point we turn back to Cahiers and observe once
again that according to Sartre,
cannot

through

conversion

the

suppress

because there would be nothing else.

"authentic individual
his

134

pursuit

of

being

From Sartre's inter-

views, it appears as if he wishes there were something else,
but this something else fails to appear in the Sartrean world.
Again, is this fact necessarily so?

It is certainly not the

only conceivable state of affairs, and Sartre himself does not
view present reality as ideal (witness Nausea!), yet conception in mente falls far short of existence in re.

Despite the

fact that my being is perpetually haunted by the absolute
being of God, there is no God and I cannot ever become God,
says Sartre.

In Sartre's popular essay, "Existentialism, " he

explicitly states that "Existentialism is nothing else than an
attempt to draw all the consequences of a coherent atheistic
position. "

135

God is functionally indelible in the Sartrean

system, but also nonexistent.

133

'
c f . Being
and Not h'ingness, 298 , 299 .

134c
135

a h.iers, 4 2 .

Underlining mine.

'
'
t ia
' 1 ism
'
Found in
Jean-Pau 1 Sartre, Existen
and Human
Emotions, trans. Hazel Barnes and Bernard Frechtrnan (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1957), 51.
Also, note Sartre's
relevant and interesting discussion of Heidegger's notion of
"forlornness" on pp. 21ff. of this same work.
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Since authenticity bears on what I will and what I do
(volition and praxis) ,

authenticity

overlaps the sphere of ethics.

is

a

category which

Is authenticity possible?

Possibly, we could take the approach of asking whether or not
a Sartrean ethic is possible.

In Saint Genet, Sartre writes

tersely that 11 • • • any ethic is both impossible and neces136
sary. 11
Is this the case with authenticity? Is this the
case with the Sartrean conversion?

How can this be?

Self-

contradictory, this can only occur in the Sartrean world where
contradiction is not an argument against existence, but is, in
some circumstances, a condition for existence.

How else could

it be said that the for-itself is not the opposite of being,
. its
.
. ?137
contra d.1ct1on.
b ut is
In Sartre's discussion of The Devil and the Good Lord, he
states that "First, every love is in opposition to God ... Every
love is in opposition to the absolute because it is itself
absolute ... If God exists,

man does not exist; and if man
exists, God does not exist. 11138 Harkening back to the earli-

er discussion of a passage from this play (see section one),
136
Jean-Paul Sartre, Saint Genet, trans. Bernard Frechtman
(New York: New American Library, 1964), 247. This statement
is a prime example of why Sartre is often so difficult to
decipher.
137Being
.
and Not h.1ngness, 14.
138
Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, eds. The Writings of
Jean-Paul Sartre: Volume 1. A Bibliographical Life, trans
Richard C. McCleary (Evanston, Il: Northwestern University
Press, 1974), 254. Sartre made these comments on 7 June 1951
during an interview with the Paris-Press-L'Intransigeant.

93

we remember that, for Sartre, there can be only one absolute.
If more than one exists, one must take precedence and functionally negate the other(s).
and man exists as freedom.
(become)

For Sartre, God does not exist,
As freedom, man tries to create

the absolute through love (or other concrete rela-

tions with others) .

This attempt

to create the absolute

through love functions as the absolute because it is exclusionary.

The love relation in Sartre is the absolute because

it seeks to do what the absolute would do if the absolute did
in fact exist - ground being, make being necessary, provide
meaning.

Sartre made these comments about the time that he

began

see

to

"more

positivity"

in

love,

indicating

the

overlapping of the type one and type two love projects insofar
as they are both projects toward absolutization - and absolution.
fied"

For my being-guilty will cease if my being is "justithrough being-in-love.

For I

shall execrate my own

being unless it can be "justified" from within or without, or
unless I can give up the project with impunity.
The following dialogue between Goetz and Hilda is the
final excerpt taken from The Devil and the Good Lord.

In it

we can find type one and type two love exemplified, by Goetz
and Hilda, respectively.
Goetz:

Hilda:

"Sleep with you under the eye of God? No, I
don't care for coupling in public. Oh, for a
night deep enough to hide us from his regard .... "
"Love is that deep night; when people love
each other, they become invisible to God ... I
still love you. If you die, I will lie down
beside you and stay there to the very end,
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Goetz:

without eating or drinking; you will rot away
in my embrace, and I will love your carrion
flesh; for you do not love at all, if you do
not love everything."
"Whip me. "139

We can note here again the opposition between love and God.
Both potentially serve the same function.

Hilda is trying to

hide from God through love, whereas Goetz is trying to expunge
his own guilt through the love relation.

Hilda's ideal is

unrealizable in that (A) If God exists, love would be insufficient to "hide" her from His gaze, and (B) Since God does not
exist,

one becomes invisible before nothing,

attempt is superfluous.

that is,

the

Goetz's ideal is unrealizable in

that, since all being is contingent (in love or otherwise), it
is forever unjustified and unjustifiable,
"guilty" (de trop) .

and,

therefore,

140

In "Existentialism," Sartre delineates the parameters of
legitimate choice: "One may choose anything if it is on the
grounds

of

free

involvement.

11141

Type

one love

belief in its own reality - hence the illusion.

involves

The belief is

a tributary from the stream of bad faith consciousness.
faith always involves a
freedom.

Bad

limited recognition of one's own

Therefore, the project of type one love can only be

chosen through a necessarily limited perspective on one's own
139

The Devil and the Good Lord, 133.

'
'
1 y synonymous,
Gui'1 t and superf 1 uity
are not strict
nevertheless, phenomenologically, they may be experienced as
overlapping or equivalent.
140

141

•
• l'
.
Existentia
ism and Human Emotions,
48 .
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freedom, and cannot be chosen on the grounds of free involveType one love is therefore necessarily ruled out.

ment.
We

never

relate

on a

plane

of

equality because

I

142

never

recognize the freedom of the Other as freedom for the Other,
nor does the Other recognize my freedom as such.
Type two Sartrean love is based on transparency, honesty,
truth, sacrifice, freedom, and play.
is

treated as an end.

In such love, the Other

We have said that such a

possible only if the conversion is possible.

love is

If the conver-

sion, for Sartre, is the equivalent of authenticity, then type
two love is not possible because even the authentic individual
cannot opt out o f

. o f Being.
.
U3
t h e pursuit

But in this very

passage, located in Cahiers, Sartre states that the authentic
individual is the converted individual.
quite simply,

144

What this means,

is that type two love is not possible in a

Sartrean world, because even authentic, "converted" individuals are not free not to engage

in the pursuit of Being.

Therefore, Sartre gives us two clearly different views of love
throughout the body of his works.

The first is possible but

142

This is independent of the deception inherent in love,
as the lover tries to appear only as an object for the
beloved, granting a limited perspective which brings forth a
limited range of consciousness of freedom-possibilities for
the beloved - precisely what the lover intends. Type one love
is also ruled out as a legitimate choice on these grounds.
143

In chapter four I shall attempt a new rendition of
Sartrean "authenticity." For now, we shall adhere closely to
Sartre's own proclamation.
144c

a h.iers, 4 2 .
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a failure in principle,

since the possibility rests on the

possibility of an illusion.

The second is an impossible love,

but one that would not be a failure if it were to exist.

So

Sartre has conceptualized quite clearly what non-illusive love
would be 1 ike.

He is also quite aware of the ontological

impossibility of such love.

145

Type one love, then, is that

actually occurring in the Sartrean world.
Type two love is Sartre's ideal.

It is descriptive.

It is normative.

Neverthe-

less, the norm is unrealizable, just as descriptive love aims
at the unrealizable.
Illusive/delusive love is Sartrean love.
essence a deception.
S artre

h as

a

146

It is in

One may do well to question whether

t h eory o f

1 ove

at

all

147

To

conclude

this

section, as well as chapter three, I would like to replicate
a passage from The Family Idiot in which Sartre shows clearly
and eloquently the deceptive, illusive nature of love.
Let the word love be pronounced ... the change is radical.
The emotion, the tenderness, even the sexual excitement
were their own end ... A shift in view: Love becomes the
145

That is, assuming the validity of his presuppositions.

146

The full grounding of this conclusion will have to
await the lengthier analysis of Sartre's phenomenological
apparatus in chapter four.
In that chapter, I explicate and
analyze in more detail Sartre's notions of the phenomenological reduction, conversion, and authenticity. Following upon
the additional insight gained through the analysis appearing
there, it will be all the more evident that Sartrean love can
be only of type one.
147

One may be reminded of Stendhal's famous "theory of
crystallization" in which love is regarded as, in essence, a
deception.
See Jose Ortega y Gasset, On Love, trans. Toby
Talbot (New York: World, 1968), 19-78.

97

end.
The tender emotion, the desire are means to
maintain it in being; that is, to remain faithful to the
vow.
They are proofs ... nourishments for that abstract
flame of love ... For love is nothing but a vow extracted
by society from each member of the couple with the
complicitv
of the other ... One will therefore nourish the
•
14'fl
vampire.
The vow: certainly it is a shackle, a rusty chain for the
being who is only freedom.
itself,

For freedom is faithless except to

it has no continuity except to be infinite,

freedom.

to be

Love's flame is only as abstract as that of freedom.

But freedom's burns brighter and extinguishes that of love
since the ultimate goal is freedom, always freedom.

149

When

the bell tolls I will no longer nourish the vampire of love,
instead I will feed that of freedom.

When the bell tolls I

will be free, for that is all that I am.
trickery, mere subterfuge.
free, but not in love.

The rest is sheer

I am free, but not in love.

I am free.

I am

For freedom and love are

both absolutes, and the one must be sacrificed on the altar of
the other.

I am the forever recurring avatar of freedom.

am ethereal, haunted even by myself.
love.

Freedom.

Yes, I will be free.

I

I live on the blood of
For that is all I am,

for I am nothing.
At this juncture, we shall plunge into chapter three,
wherein I develop an existential theory of addiction.

148
149

It is

The Family Idiot, vol. 1, 783, 784.

That is to say, freedom is the only legitimate grounding or meta-value in the Sartrean paradigm.
Freedom is the
source of all value, and, as such, must be preserved.
The
origin of "anti-value" is the suppression of freedom.
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to this central task that I now turn.

Later, in chapter four,

I shall demonstrate that based upon the existential theory of
addiction advanced in chapter three, Sartre's theory of love
is

in fact

addiction.

not a

theory of love at all,

but a

theory of

CHAPTER 3
AN EXISTENTIAL THEORY OF ADDICTION

Introduction
The Culling of a Theory

Chapter

three

is

divided

into

two

main

parts:

Kierkegaard on addiction, and (II) Sartre on addiction.

(I)
Both

parts will be laced with insights from other thinkers, where
appropriate, the majority of these insights to be contained in
footnotes to the text.

1

The texts of both Kierkegaard and

Sartre shall be, generally speaking, dealt with in a chronological manner.

I make no claim to present a comprehensive

account of their works in relation with developing a theory of
addiction.

I

merely claim to have begun such an arduous

project, plowing the ground, so to speak.

The bulk of Being

and Nothingness is relegated to chapter four, wherein I seek
to view love and addiction conjointly.

The views of both

Kierkegaard and Sartre on addiction I find to be compatible
1

As specified in the introduction to chapter one, the
footnotes in this chapter offer another voice - or, other
voices
in the development of an existential theory of
addiction. These voices often raise issues outside the scope
of this dissertation - issues which are nevertheless worthy of
mention.
It is with this understanding and in this spirit
that the following footnotes are presented.
·
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and complementary.

Connections between the two shall be noted

in both parts one and two.
One major difficulty in extracting a theory of addiction
from the works of Kierkegaard and Sartre
them dealt with the issue specifically.

is that neither of
Furthermore,

the

concept of "addiction" itself is mentioned quite infrequently.
Since it is the case that both leave the region of addiction
ostensibly untouched,

I am left to construct a theory from

their texts in philosophical anthropology and phenomenological
psychology.

I

believe

the

seeds

for

numerous in the writings of both thinkers.

such a

theory

are

The time has come

to lay the groundwork for such a philosophical theory.
format and style I employ may appear unorthodox.

The

Neverthe-

less, there is to be found here a clear and consistent fullblown theory of addiction.

Every effort and therefore every

possible writing style and characterization of addiction are
utilized to foster the reader's understanding of the tragedy
that is addiction.
2

2

"Belief in freedom of the will is a primary error
committed by everything organic."
[Friedrich Nietzsche,
Human. All Too Human, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1987),
22.]
Belief in the
phenomenon of addiction, under this description, would be a
twofold error, involving: (1) The belief that the "will" is
"free," and (2) The belief that somehow this "free will" has
become entangled, disjointed, or in some sense ruptured.
"····[A] brazen wall of fate: we are in prison, we can only
dream ourselves free, not make ourselves free."
[Human. All
Too Human, p. 223.]
Also: "The theory of free will - the
hundred times refuted theory."
[Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond
Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage,
1966) I 25.]
(continued ... )
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The notions of "addiction" and "the addict" operative
throughout this dissertation shall be clarified contextually,
that

is,

their meanings

shall

be

slowly unraveled as

proceed through the various aspects
addiction.

of

we

the phenomenon of

As Ortega said well in his Meditations on Ouixote

and with which I thoroughly concur,

the way to "tell" what

something is is to show what it is, to bring the reader on a
journey.
2

3

Therefore, I ask the reader to have patience as the

continued)
Finally: "The creed of man's free will was only invented to
forge that of grace." [The Marquis de Sade, "Dialogue Between
a Priest and a Dying Man (1782)," trans. by Paul Dinnage,
found in The Existential Imagination, ed. by Frederick Karl
and Leo Hamalian (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett, 1963), 52.]
It must be remembered that I am attempting to construct
a theory of addiction within a Kierkegaardian-Sartrean
paradigm. Certainly, there are other paradigms antithetical to
this project.
However, I do believe it is possible to make
sense of the notion of "addiction" even within the Nietzschean
paradigm, albeit in a different manner.
I shall attempt to
clarify what I mean by this in subsequent references to and
explications of Nietzsche.
Certainly, it would be nothing
short of chimerical to attempt to "legitimate" a theory of
addiction suitable to all paradigms of thought, or to develop
such a theory "free" from all paradigms.
I merely seek to
develop a theory within the strictures of an existential/phenomenological ontological framework, knowing full well
that this approach has limitations when viewed from other
perspectives (I, too, embody some of these perspectives).
Nevertheless, I must choose (or, be) a perspective; I cannot
help but do so, and this is precisely what I have tried to do,
adhering to this choice as closely as possible.
Given this
fact, I cannot hope to "show" that the theory of addiction
contained herein is "true" in some universal sense, or even
that it is a theory of "addiction," also in that same sense.
From a Nietzschean-Spinozistic-Sadean deterministic paradigm,
the very belief in the reality of addiction would be, as I
have outlined earlier in this footnote, delusional.
3

( •••

See Jose Ortega y Gasset, Meditations On Quixote, trans.
Evelyn Rugg and Diego Marin (New York: W.W. Norton~ 1963),
31-52. See also Julian Marias' introduction, 13-26. Existen(continued ... )
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Section A
Addiction is a Function of Missing One's Self

In Either/Or, vol.

1,

Kierkegaard includes a section

entitled "The Immediate Stages of the Erotic or the Musical
Erotic."

In this section he explains three kinds of desiring,

comprised of three stages.

The sensuous merely awakens in

stage one, it is a dolorous desire without a specific object.
Desire is melancholy because it is not specified as
desiring of a particular object.

the

In stage two, desire becomes

specified, it seeks the object of desire without, Kierkegaard
says, "desiring" it.

4

Stage three desire is· exemplif~ed by

desiring the particular absolutely.
desires

5

The addict fallaciously

the object of addiction, while her actual desire

4

Eremita, Victor, (ed.) [Soren Kierkegaard], Either/Or,
vol. 1, trans. David F. Swensen and Lillian Marvin Swensen
(Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1959), 79.
5

The addict "fallaciously desires" in the sense that she
fallaciously believes that the ostensible object of her desire
is in fact that which she desires, which it is not.
The
ostensible object of desire is nothing other than a reflective
symbol or sensate manifestation of an unknown (nonreflective)
object of desire. The addict seeks to circumvent the process
whereby she would come to recognize the three stages of desire
in herself and instead deems by fiat the object of addiction
as her stage three desire. This object is fallacious in the
sense that it is misleading and deceptive, impeding progress
toward the realization of a genuine stage three desire, since
the object functions surreptitiously as the same.
This
confusion about the object of desire is not inherent in desire
itself, but is a self-delusion belonging to the aesthetic mode
of consciousness.
This is the case because the aesthetic
desirer has, as previously mentioned, circumvented the process
whereby she would come to recognize the three stages of desire
in herself. That is, she has impeded the process whereby she
(continued ... )
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remains unknown to her.

Desire for the object of addiction

expresses a stage three desire, which is operative in lieu of
the real object of desire, which is merely dreamt about (stage
one) .

Thus the addict settles for the object of addiction,

hoping to thereby create a stage three desire, when in fact
the addict has not succeeded in leaving the plane of stage one
desire.

The addict's consciousness, as such, is still asleep

to itself.

The addict wants to think herself awake - thus the

object of addiction.

6

But the object is fallacious,

7

since

5

( ••• continued)
would come to realize the meaning of her own desire. Because
this is the case, her desire is "fallacious," meaning that it
fails to realize (cognize) its own end, but instead stops
short and latches upon - something unworthy of itself, that
which becomes the transient object of addiction.
But it is
not specifically the object that creates the addictive
relation, but the way in which the object is desired.
6

Another way to state this would be to say that the
addict wishes to fully constitute her selfhood without meeting
the necessary preconditions for the possibility of selfhood,
i.e. consistently and systematically utilizing her freedom to
become a self.
Addiction is seen (nonreflectively, in the
manner of a dreamer) as a short cut to becoming a self. The
object of addiction, a "thing, " is therefore necessary for the
"constitution" of the self, since the addict treats herself as
if she were a thing, attempting to construct herself thusly
(after the manner of a thing) .
Since the self cannot be
apprehended or constituted as a thing, the entire project of
the addict to constitute herself after the manner of a thing
is, therefore, a failure in principle. The "thingness" of the
object of addiction is important here, for the attempted
internalization of the same gives rise to the dynamic of
attempted self-constitution I am outlining. This is true even
of addictions involving forms of praxis (e.g. sports, war,
music, love, sex, thinking), since all involve attempts at
activity based self-constitution and the bleeding of the self
into the praxis-de-jour.
This form of desiring (aesthetic) is not addictive
because it lacks self-consciousness, but because it is
predicated upon self-deception (Self-consciousness alone lacks
(continued ... )

105
the desirer is still only at stage one.
since

ness

condition.

the
This

addict

is

affective

Thus the lugubrious-

nonreflectively aware
condition may

or may

of

her

not

be

manifested empirically.
Desire, as Sartre says, is a lack of being.

8

It is also

a choice of being, here (in the case of addiction) unrecognized as such.
superfluous.

That is, without desire, choice would appear
Desire is the impulsion to choice, the latter

being a function of the former.

For Sartre, the desire and

its object may equally well be a function of choice.

That is,

inasmuch as the object of desire is a choice, so is the desire
itself, at least in the sense that one chooses to be at all.
For Kierkegaard, however, desires and their objects can
in no sense be merely a function of choice, as the self is not
fully self-constituted, but is co-constituted along with the
6

( ••• continued)
the efficacy to deliver us from addiction) .
In the case of
aesthetic desire, it is not merely a question of being
mistaken in taking a particular object of desire as what is
desired, but a case of misinter.preting the meaning of one's
own desire, and therefore seeking a "fallacious" object.
Although the aesthetic desirer does progress beyond stage one
(dreaming), through stage two (seeking) and stage three
(desiring the particular absolutely) , aesthetic desire remains
forever encapsulated in the dream, and it is within the
context of the dream that the aesthete operates. The meaning
of the desire itself has completely escaped the aesthete
because she has failed to face the structure of her own
consciousness, but instead remains trapped in its mesmerizing
surface. The aesthete dreams when she believes that through
self-deception she can arrive at the truth of her self.

7
8

It is "true" only in the sense of being a subterfuge.

Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E.
Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 87ff.
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Power or Ground

(God) .

9

This distinction in Sartre and

Kierkegaard concerning the concepts of desire and choice
brings with it ramifications concerning the genesis, exodus,
and revelation of addiction.

The basic underlying question in

play in the dialogue between the two thinkers concerns the
nature and extent of human freedom.
"How free are we, really?"
in play

throughout

the

Stated simply, this is:

This underlying question will be

course

of

our discussion of

the

phenomenon of addiction.
The third stage of desire is the synthesis of the first
(dreaming) and the second (seeking): The particular object is
specified and desired absolutely.

10

All

three levels of

desire detailed by Kierkegaard in Either/Or, vol. 1 are levels
of aesthetic desire.
desire of an aesthete.

Aesthetic desire, put simply, is the
The aesthete, for Kierkegaard, is any

individual (not properly called a "self") that does not exist
in ethical and/or religious categories, but instead relegates
"good"

and

"bad"

to

a

personal

calculus

sant/unpleasant or the desirable/undesirable.

of

the

plea-

The aesthete

cannot properly be called a self, says Kierkegaard, because
the aesthete lacks the necessary preconditions for becoming a
self.

Such preconditions involve the voluntary placing of

ethical/religious obligations upon oneself so as to allow for
9

cf. Anti-Climacus [Soren Kierkegaard], The Sickness Unto
Death, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 13, 14.
wEither/Or, vol. 1, 83.
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the inf initization and constitution of the self through its
originary Creator (Power, God).

The aesthete lacks such self-

.
.
constituting
ground.ing. 11

Aesthetic desire,
addiction.

as

such,

creates the condition of

The culmination of aesthetic desire (desiring the

particular absolutely) is addiction.

12

To be a certain kind

11

In order to hold at bay the copious amount of metaphysical baggage entailed by Soren Kierkegaard's notion of the
self, we could reformulate his conception of the Ground
(Power, Creator, God) and its relation to the self, stating
that:
(A) The "Ground" is a psychological construct erected by the
culture/self with a view to producing an integrated/coherent
version of the self, i.e. a self that can narrate its own
existence, and can place such a narration within the framework
of a metanarrative. [cf. Alasdair Macintyre' s After Virtue
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981)]. With
this reformulation, we restrict our "metaphysical" claims to
the nature of the self itself.
(B) As a result of (A), the self places "ethical-religious"
obligations upon itself, allowing for the processes of
infinitization and constitution within itself. These processes occur via the self's relation to itself, not via the self's
relation to the nonself.
An "ethico-religious" obligation
would be that which lifts the self beyond a random succession
of moments into a sphere where reflectivity and the imputation
of meaning can transpire.
It seems clear that no "philosophical" "justification"
for Kierkegaard's theological commitments is possible.
Nevertheless, given a shift in the ontological status of the
commitments, we can reformulate his position to interface our
own phenomenological reality.
12

If desiring the particular absolutely is addiction, is
it then the case that desiring the nonparticular absolutely is
not addiction? This is possibly but not necessarily the case.
This would entail the notion that the object itself is of
import in determining the addictiveness/nonaddictiveness of
the relation. The answer to this question depends upon (A) If
in fact a nonparticular exists, and (B} The nature of that
nonparticular.
Is it conceivable to have an addictive
relation with a (the) nonparticular? Certainly? Why is this?
Because it depends upon the nature of the desirer - not what
is desired. Therefore, if a (the) nonparticular exists, the
(continued ... )
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of desirer is eo ipso to be(come) an addict.

A non-grounded

desirer (i.e. an individual with a truncated relation to the
Ground) can do none other than desire the particular absolutely,

since there is no absolute object of

sire.13

(aesthetic)

de-

This creates the metastable condition of being noted

by Sartre in relation to bad faith.
gaard,

represents

the

power

of

Don Juan, says Kierke.
14
sensuousness incarnate.

Such desire cannot be expressed in words, but only in mu. 15
sic.
The desire is reflectively inexpressible.
Because
the desire (project) is at one with consciousness, it can only
12 ( ... continued)
relation of desire to this being could be either addictive or
nonaddictive. It is the constitution of the self itself which
has decisive bearing upon the addictive/nonaddictive nature of
the relationship.
1311 In the end one loves one's desire and not what is
desired." [Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 93.]
Addicts desire the object of addiction infinitely because they
"love" the desire rather than its object. Thus addiction is
a failure in principle because the infinite desire cannot be
discharged qua infinite desire. Note that such an ontological
condition would obtain regardless of object, since addiction
involves the how rather than the what.
Whatness and the
consequent nonaddictive relation only comes into view subsequent to the conversion.
We could, of course, deny the
possibility of "infinite" desire on the grounds of impossibility or incoherence. This Kierkegaard does not do. I shall
address this issue specifically at a later point in my
argument.
14
Either/Or, vol. 1, 87. Don Juan represents the perfection of aesthetic desire, or, the achievement of wholly
aesthetic desire. For the aesthete, such a scenario is an
unrealizable ideal.
Therefore, one must be careful not to
draw parallels in too tight a fashion between Don Juan and the
addict. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to note that both the
former and the latter are unrealizable ideals.
15
Either/Or, vol. 1, 100.
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be nonthetically aware of itself,

and therefore cannot be

consciously aborted as a project.
'
Don Juan's energy is
represented by dread. 16

This is a

psychological condition indicative of a substantial (ontological) condition (despair).

As with Don Juan, the addict becomes

one with the object of addiction through dread, and through
dread cannot separate himself from it.
dealt with as dread,

that

is,

17

The dread must be

in terms

of

the subject's

relation to himself and the Power, as a precondition for the
possibility of a

decathexis

object of addiction.

(release,

unbonding)

from the

Dread (psychological dis-ease) reveals

despair (ontological/psychological dis-ease); it is not itself
'
18
d espair.

faced

Yet ongoing dread precipitates despair,

dread

allows

for

the

possibility

of

just as

nondespair.

Despair, unabrogated, precipitates the cognizance and continuance of addiction.

16

Dread is the thread that can lead to the

Either/Or, vol. 1,

128, 129.

17

Given the backdrop of The Concept Of Anxiety (angest is
translated alternately as "dread" by Walter Lowrie [The
Concept of Dread (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1957) and "anxiety" by Thomte and Anderson; see below) and The
Sickness Unto Death, this dread certainly need not be reflective, but such dread is, of course, not ruled out.
See
Vigilius Haufniensis [Soren Kierkegaard], The Concept of
Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte and Albert B. Anderson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), and Anti-Climacus
[Soren Kierkegaard] , The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Howard v.
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1983).
18

cf. The Concept of Anxiety, 73-80.
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experience of one's own despair and the cognizance of the
ontological dis-ease that is addiction. 19
"Don Juan is ideality [imagination] over against actuality

[sensation, perception] ...

1120

Likewise,

what the addict

gets out of the object of addiction is not contained in the
object itself, but rather is a function of the imagination.
The same goes for what the addict thinks she gets out of the
object, also a function of the imagination.

As Don Juan is

ideality over against actuality, so is addiction.

19

This passage is in no way meant to suggest that dread
(anxiety) is a function of the aesthetic outlook alone. Dread
signals the experience of the possibility of one's own
freedom, and, as such, is an indelible aspect of the human
being. Since this is the case, dread is, to varying degrees,
present in all spheres of human existence
aesthetic,
ethical, religious, or other (if such exists).
Anxiety and
freedom are co-original.
Given that the human being is
freedom, the psychological manifestation of this realization anxiety - is an ever present possibility.
To say this is also to say that all anxiety is not
indicative of the ontological condition of despair. Only the
self that probes the meaning of its own anxiety can come to
understand whether its anxiety originates from despair, or
whether it does not. The aesthete, rather than seeking this
knowledge, flees her own anxiety, and in this flight loses the
possibility of grasping the meaning of this anxiety.
Furthermore, to say that all persons experience anxiety
is not to say that addiction is inevitable. That individual
who faces her own anxiety with a view to "knowing" its meaning
is not engaged in a self-deceptive flight from self, but
rather, utilizes her own anxiety to grapple with her own selfconstitution. The nonaddicted self, like the addicted self,
is an unrealizable, the teloi of which are, respectively,
either a flight toward freedom, or a flight from freedom.
wEither/Or, vol. 1, 133.
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"An

tragic.

individual does not become happy until he has had the

1121

addicted,

We, as human beings, are ontologically being-asor addicted-being.

That is to say,

we are not

ethically/religiously embodied unless we make the choice (s} to
be so.

Our self-constitution is a function of choice and

involves ethical/religious categories, lest the self fail in
the task of inf initizing itself and thus fail to discharge its
own infinite passion in its relation to the Infinite (God) .
Aesthetic self-constitution is circular and nonsubstantive in
that the self seeks to be-come (come to be) via drawing into
itself (introjecting) the necessary constituents of self-ness,
among them nonsuperfluity, justification.

But in so doing,

the aesthetic self, as such, experiences a surfeit of existence, which it must disgustedly spew forth in a contrary (to
that of self-constitution as detailed heretofore) effort to
mitigate the experience of becoming engulfed in being.
This seesawing between introjection and spewing forth is
an ontological dynamic the aesthetic self cannot help but
participate

in,

as

its

"self"

is

naught but nothingness

gliding over the surface of being.

The ideality of total

freedom involves the negation of the possibility of selfhood,
linked with the ceaseless ontological current of introjection/extrojection.

Being-addicted

(that

ceaseless

and

ambivalent malaise of introjection/extrojection) is a necessary ontological structure, just as are the original fissure
21

Ei ther /Or, vol. 1, 143.
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with being (the birth of the for-itself)

and the reflective

ekstasis (the birth of reflective thought and the "objectivity" of the "self").

When we become conscious of this condi-

tion and its tragedy,

we have acquired the necessary but

insufficient conditions for "happiness."
tions would necessitate the conversion.

Sufficient condi-

22

"The bitterest pain is manifestly remorse, but remorse
has ethical, not aesthetic reality."

23

Realization of one's

condition as being-addicted, with the subsequent perpetuation
of

this

condition,

leads

one

to an ethical pronouncement

regarding oneself, i.e. "I should not be this way."
way, the is-ought gap is bridged.
ethics,

within the unity of a

In this

We move from ontology to

single consciousness.

One

describes this perpetuated condition to oneself as a condition
of guilt.

Once the stage of reflective grief is reached,

consciousness "ethicizes" itself.
of the will

24

Thus ensues the struggle

(reflective) against the project to-be-addicted

(nonreflective) .
Reflective grief, says Kierkegaard,
nent 11

an d

t h us

provi' d e

a

"sense

of

can become "perma-

n umb

' f ."
re 1 ie

25

In

reflective grief, sorrow constantly and unsuccessfully seeks

2211

Happiness 11 as "self-alignment."
in chapter four.

More on "conversion"

nEither/Or, vol. 1, 146.
24

cf. Either/Or, vol. 1, 163-211: "Shadowgraphs."

~Either/Or, vol. 1, 169, 170.
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This

its object.

is certainly

true of the addict,

who

experiences this "object" as necessarily external to herself.
The reflective grief which creates and sustains addiction is
a function of missing one's self.

There is no external way of

rectifying this ontological condition.
Kierkegaard's aesthete expatiates on the character of
Donna Elvira (from the opera "Don Juan") in Either/Or, vol. 1.
He states regarding Elvira's love for Don Juan that "Her love
is even from the beginning a kind of despair; nothing has any
significance for her, either in heaven or on earth, except Don
Juan."

26

Don Juan functions as the object of addiction for

Donna Elvira.
"herself.
despair;

Were she to lose Don Juan,

she would lose

Thus her relation to the object

11

the despair of seeking the

"self"

is rooted in
in the object

(other) and the fear of the possibility of the loss of that
object ("self").
her

own

freedom,

Her "self" is not consciously grounded in
consequently,

condition of despair.

She

is

she

is

not

the

in

an

locus

ontological
of

her own

selfhood; she seeks this selfhood (despairingly) in the object
(other) .
Such

11

selfhood 11 is always open to collapse before the

freedom of the other, or before the reflective apprehension of
one's

project

in

relation

to

the

object

(other) .

Thus

incessant, necessary despair, at least at the nonreflective
level.

When reflectivity is involved, consciousness "ethici-

uEither/Or, vol. 1, 189.

114

zes" itself.

Thus Donna Elvira experiences her own being as

"damned" as a result of her inability to separate herself from
the object of her passion, Don Juan.
disunion

(praxiological);

damned (ontological) .

for her,

She cannot effect the
this is because she is

27

Returning to the aesthete,

we come upon Kierkegaard's

notion of the "unhappiest man."

The unhappiest man, writes

Kierkegaard, cannot love because he is always absent, never
present to himself.

"He cannot love,

for love is in the

present, and he has no present, no future, and no past ... he

27

Donna Elvira desires Don Juan alone.
It may be said,
therefore, that she has "purity of heart," due to the fact
that she desires one thing, and one thing alone. Again, it
must be stated that it is not the what of the desire that
makes the relation addictive, but the how of the desire.
It
is clear that Donna Elvira was willing to sacrifice even her
"true self" for Don Juan - precisely a drive operative in the
addicted relation. She sought herself through Don Juan, thus
attempting to utilize him as a conduit for her own selfconsti tut ion.
This dynamic, which is a component of the
Sartrean love relation, shall be discussed at length in
chapter 4.
Could Donna Elvira be subsumed under Kierkegaard's
aesthetic type? If one can shoulder the position that nothing
in heaven or earth has any significance for Donna Elvira
except Don Juan, and that this could be an ethical/religious
type of existence, then the answer is no. Can she "love" Don
Juan in an apparently ethical/religious way and still not be
ethical or religious? How is it that her relation to her soul
object of desire is ethical or religious? How can we know the
answer to this question, in any case? This question points to
the need for a phenomenology of desire, that which can ferret
out the essential characteristics of each kind of desire.
In any case, it seems to me that the (aesthetic) addiction which characterizes Don Juan is categorically different
from the addiction of Donna Elvira, be the latter aesthetic or
no. Don Juan is addicted to an experience which he produces
via many objects, whereas Donna Elvira is addicted to an
experience which she believes can be produced only through a
single object, Don Juan.
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has no

passion,

not because he is destitute of it,

' 1 taneous 1 y h e h as t h e opposite
'
'
passion.
b ecause simu
unhappiest

man

is

the

aesthete,

says

II

but
The

ZS

Kierkegaard.

The

aesthete as addict is he who attempts to anchor his conflictual passional nature in the object of addiction.

He becomes

"present" to the object to the degree in which he "loses"
himself in it, and such "losing" vitiates his conscious need
for the construction of his own selfhood.
nizes

himself

as

the

29

unhappiest man when

addiction breaks down,

that

is,

becomes

unhappiest man attempts to give himself

He only recogthe project

reflective.
~

nature

of
The

(essence)

through the object of addiction, which would be the same thing
as freedom attempting to freely truncate itself
death,

which

in

fact

would be

the

success

of

(short of
this

very

project).
"There is a sadness in the autumn which entirely correspends to the emotion evoked by the thought of the fulfillment
of

.

I
ones
d esires."

28

30

So spoke the seducer-in Kierkegaard's

Either/Or, vol. 1,

220-224.

29

Addiction as the "unselfing" of man.
"Unegoistic"
morality, for Nietzsche, involves the unselfing of man, it
involves resistance to "natural instincts."
The addict
unselfs himself in discharging the "will to power" (instinct
for freedom) vicariously (surreptitiously) into the surrogate
object (the object of addiction). Power (freedom) is in fact
not discharged but is instead introjected into one's own being
- freedom turned back upon itself, trying to tie its own hands
- making oneself sick.
Thus, the "unhappiest" man.
Cf.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New
York: Vintage, 1969), 292.
30

Either/Or, vol.1, 434.

116

"Diary of the Seducer."

The addict desires to perpetuate his

desire so as to be (surreptitiously) something.

One seeks in

this case to suppress consciousness of one's own freedom so as
to be something

(in bad faith).

Addiction,

then,

as the

project of forever unsatiated desire, would grant the addict
a

continuity

which

desiring) self.

would

function

in

lieu

of

the

(real

Addiction here is seen as the (nonreflective)

perpetual desire to desire perpetually, the desire to immure
oneself

within

one's

own

incessant

desiring,

irresistably so as to have a stage three project.

to

desire

This is a

necessary failure, as freedom is used to constrict rather than
expand the self.
aware of this .

31

The self

(as addict)

is nonreflectively

32

The seducer concludes his diary by telling us that in
aesthetic drugging,

aesthetic self-narcosis

"Everything is

31

"Incessant desiring" issuing in a result that is a
necessary failure involves self-constriction because the
"incessant desire" is the result of a false self that is
constructed by the "real" self to mask the self's ambiguity
and ambivalence. It is a project in bad faith to give oneself
an essence which constricts the self, not the "incessant
desiring" or the "necessary failure," per se, were they able
to come about in other ways. The project to desire incessantly is a project to rein one's own freedom, a project to
forever captivate (capture) the self via the object of desire.
It is, again, not incessant desire itself which constricts the
self, but the project to desire incessantly.
32

0n the distinction between "knowledge of" and "consciousness of" see Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness,
trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library,n.d.),
1-lvi.
Knowledge contains a reflective compon~nt that
"awareness" or "consciousness of" lacks.
"Nonreflective
awareness of" is thus a consciousness of but not a knowledge
of the phenomenon in question.
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symbol;

I myself am a myth about myself."

33

Exactly.

The

object of addiction functions as a symbol for the self-thatis-not; this myth is grounded in and perpetuated by the self
that in its freedom chooses not to be a self, but rather an
addict (mythic self-construct).

Addiction is the project of

symbol-izing the self. rather than creating the self ;Qy being
the self.

34

The object of addiction is the surrogate symbol-

ic self functioning in place of the self I refuse to be.

When

the addict sees this mythology as pathology, the is-ought gap
is bridged and the addict is at a crossroad which signals two

33

34

Either/Or, vol. 1, 439.

Symbol-izing the self is different from creating the
self in that
(A) "Symbol-izing the self" refers to the project whereby I
seek to become a self that I am not, a false self, the addict.
Since I chose not to utilize my freedom to become my self, I
symbol-ize the absent self so as to give the illusion of
selfhood.
The telos of self-symbol-ization is a false
self/false consciousness. The process of self-symbol-ization
is a flight from freedom.
Self-symbol-ization is addictive
because it is a process of masking/entangling one's own
freedom.
(B) Creating the self is the process whereby I utilize my
freedom, within the given parameters of my existence, to
become my self. The telos of self-creation is the self/lucid
consciousness. The process of self-creation is a utilization
of and movement toward freedom.
Self-creation is not an
addictive process, because it involves this utilization
of /flight toward freedom.
Because I am freedom, a movement away from freedom is a
movement away from my self, and a movement toward freedom is
a movement toward myself. My freedom is the only power I have
with which to constitute myself, and, therefore, inso.far as I
move away from my freedom, I drain from myself the power
necessary for self-constitution.
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·
·
1 d'imensions.
·
onto 1 ogica
d isparate

flective)

denial,

of

course,

reality.

Therefore, I

35

In the stage of (nonre-

the mythology

am an addict.

is

functional

I no longer have to

grope for an essence.
The aesthete, for Kierkegaard, lacks selfhood: "He [the
aesthete]

does

not

possess

himself;

trembles before him is he tranquilized.
is to-be-addicted.

only when
1136

the

world

To not-be oneself

One can either discharge freedom to become

a self, or to become an addict.

The polarities of discharge

are oppositional; one cannot simultaneously achieve the status
of addict and self.

The constitution of selfhood involves

sustained reflective ekstatic facing of the self

(freedom) .

The constitution of addiction as a mode of being involves
sustained

aversion

reflective ekstasis.

to

the

imagined

fruits

of

this

very

Self-constitution involves a necessary

journey into self-understanding and awareness.

The journey

into addiction involves the necessary obscuring and blotting
out of the truth about the self.

The journey into addiction

35

"What is the seal of attained freedom [alternate
translation: liberation]? No longer being ashamed in front of
oneself." [Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), 220 (aphorism 275) .]
The addict, as such, is ashamed in front of herself, exhibiting the fact that she has not attained freedom [liberation] ;
nonaddiction appears to her as a necessary prerequisite for
this liberation, the floating of detachment among the "objects" which people her existence.
36

Victor Eremita, (ed.) [Soren Kierkegaard], Either/Or,
vol. 2, trans. Walter Lowrie and Howard A. Johnson (Garden
City, NY: Anchor, 1959), 191.
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is built upon this very blotting out.
journey into truth; addiction is a

Self-constitution is a
journey into falsehood.

One cannot move simultaneously into truth and into falsehood.
The addict makes a bold epistemological claim in the staking
of her ontological condition: "I do not want to know myself."
In fact,

when the addict realizes

(reflectively)

that she

would rather destroy herself than know herself, consciousness
has

reached

itself.

the

level

Consciousness

of

ethical

here

pronouncement

recognizes

destructive nature of its own project.

the

regarding

abysmal

and

It can in no sense

call the project "free" or "good," but only the choice of a
coward who

refuse

to know and be herself.

37

In summary:

addiction involves a movement away from the freedom that one
is, whereas self-constitution involves a utilization of and
movement toward or with this very freedom.
The addict: only when she trembles before the world is
she tranquilized.

Tranquilization is the goal, and it is only

achievable through the narcotic art of addiction.

37

Thereby,

Perhaps we should pity rather than judge the addict who
flees herself because she either knows or fears the poverty of
herself.
Could such an addict's "cure" be some decisive
action on her part? Only if she can overcome the fear of the
nature of herself to the degree that she can cease to flee
herself.
The question thus becomes one concerning how the
addict overcomes her own "self"-fear. I would like to suggest
that self-love is essential for this to transpire, and that
such self-love can be achieved only subsequent to (or concurrent with) the experience of being loved.
The attempt to
demonstrate these contentions is beyond the scope of this
work. Nevertheless, I believe that they are of major import
and cannot be easily sidestepped when focusing on the issue of
the movement from an addicted to a nonaddicted mode of being.
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the anguish of freedom is made nonreflective while the anguish
of addiction is reflectively apprehended.

The addict thus

focuses on the reality of her addiction, rather than on the
fact that she has no self.
Would such an addicted "self" have reason to be melancholic?
gaard,

How could it be otherwise?

Melancholy, for Kierke-

is a meaningful experience.

Melancholy signals the

presence of hysteria of spirit.

38

Why hysteria?

It is due

to the damming up of the spirit (freedom} within oneself, and
the consequent damning of the self.
to regain control

of this spirit out of control,

allowing freedom to take
preferred to
.

not h 1ngness.

39

Addiction is an attempt

itself as

an end.

without

Hysteria is

the anguish entailed by the apprehension of
The disabusing of the self would necessarily

.
1 ve peering
.
1nvo
over t h'is a b yss 40 .
38

Ei ther /Or, vol. 2, 193.

39

And the consequent necessity of freedom.

40

cf.: "Ah, mon cher, for anyone who is alone, without God
and without a master, the weight of days is dreadful. Hence
one must choose a master, God being out of style." [Albert
Camus, The Fall, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Vintage,
1956)

I

133 •]

Freedom is too great a burden to bear. Slavery is preferable.
Since the human person, for Kierkegaard, is a relation, he can
relate to himself in a slavish manner.
But since he is the
relation, there remains only a fear-induced relation of
slavery to oneself, a scenario devoid of a master. Freedom is
not truncated, but only unrealized, and since being is a
function of doing, the addict is not free in fact.
He has
abnegated his own freedom by means of that very freedom, one
of the dizzying possibilities of the infinitude that is
freedom. One can therefore destroy one's own being [freedom]
by means of that very freedom.
This is a form of autocannibalism, and, as Sartre says is true of all vice, involves
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The

Judge

in

aesthetic view of

Either/Or,
life

is

vol.

2,

despair ....

states
41
11

that

The

"Every

despairing

being is capable only of relating to "objects" in an addictive
way - he cannot maintain a proper distance to them, viz. he
cannot even maintain the distance to them that he wants to
maintain.

Here

Kierkegaard

constantly "beyond yourself."
transcendence for Sartre,
necessarily in despair.
unconverted self,

equates
42

despair

with

being

This is the definition of

which is the self.

The self as

This, again, would be the natural,

as opposed to the converted self.

43

The

transcendence that is freedom cannot get beyond itself, yet
also it cannot be contained within the self,
self-possessed.

it cannot be

The slippage of the self; the self runs away

from itself in freedom.
"Doubt

is a despair of thought, despair is a doubt of
.

t h e persona 1 ity."

44

Despair is ontological, not psychologi-

the desire to fail. [see Being and Nothingness, p. 379.)
The paradox expressed in The Fall hinges on the horns of
freedom and guilt.
Jean-Baptiste Clamence finds himself
guilty (by his own reckoning) in a world devoid of any preestablished moral values.
Since there is no God to expiate
this guilt, freedom is seen as the culprit: If one is not
free, she cannot become guilty. Therefore, Clamence preaches
universal guilt and the "salvation" of collective slavery.
The slave can only say yes or no. The freedom of the rebel as
addict. cf. chapter two, part two of the present work.
41

Either/Or, vol. 2, 197.

42

Either/Or, vol. 2, 199.

43

I will develop this claim further in chapter four.

44

• h
Eit
er I Or, vol. 2, 215.
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cal.

45

It is indicative of something other than itself; it

is a meaningful experience,

it is a sign.

" .... [T] he true

point of departure for finding the absolute is not doubt but
despair"

46

because despair is ontological, and knowledge (for

Kierkegaard and Sartre) is not psychological, but rather, a
mode of being.

Despair is the starting point for choosing

oneself, choosing oneself is the starting point for knowing.
The addict is in despair whether she knows this or not, just
like the self that has an improper relation to itself and the
Ground, since the addict is this self.

47

"Every finite despair is a choice of finiteness.

1148

In

addiction, one chooses the finite with infinite passion - a
necessary failure.

One cannot choose finiteness infinitely

without choosing failure.

Why infinite passion?

Because

freedom is infinite and thus must be directed to an object
commensurate

' h
wit

'
lf . 49
itse

In

psychological

terms,

the

infinite passion is directed toward the object of "ultimate

45
46

47
48

49

See The Sickness Unto Death, 25.
Either/Or, vol. 2, 217.
cf. The Sickness Unto Death, 15.
Either/Or, vol. 2, 225.

Addiction is an attempt to finitize the object of
infinite passion in order to control it (a circuitous attempt
at self- control) . It is an attempt to (re) capture s·elfhood,
to become a self by becoming unified with(in) the object of
addiction.
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concern."
of

the

50

Such an object allows for the gathering together

fragments

of

the would-be personality.

But

the

fragmentation remains if the object is inconunensurate with the
passion with which it is attended.

51

Addiction, as can be seen from an analysis of Kierkegaard's Either/Or, vols. 1 and 2, is a function of missing
one's self.

Addiction involves a flight from self towards the

object of addiction, the object of addiction functioning as a
surrogate for the self the addict has failed to be. 52

Fur-

therrnore, the aesthetic desirer is the addict because she does
not meet the necessary preconditions for the possibility of
self-constitution.

The tools necessary for the acquisition of

selfhood have been bartered away for the experience of "unity"
with the object of addiction - an ephemeral, illusory experience.

It is for this reason that I contend that addiction
50

See Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1964), 47.
5111

• • • • [L] ife
is not a product of morality: it wants
deception, it lives on deception." [Friedrich Nietzsche,
Human, All Too Human, 6.]
The addict self-deceptively seeks to ground her being (overcome her contingency) via finitely infinitizing herself,
without being infinitized by the Infinite.
For Kierkegaard
(and I believe him to be correct), this is an impossibility.

52

Addictive "self"-creation is a movement toward being;
real self-creation is a movement toward freedom. At times,
only an acute observer can ascertain the difference. This is,
of course, because the reality of the situation isn't always
reflectively evident even to the addict herself. In nonaddictive self-creation, will and intention move together in union
toward possibilities of freedom, whereas in addictive "self"creation, will may or may not be synchronous with intention.
Intention, in the latter case, however, remains directed
toward being.
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involves the sacrifice of the real. It is to this topic that
we need to turn next, and it shall in fact be the focus of our
inquiry in the next section.

Section B
Addiction Involves the Sacrifice of the Real

Addiction and erotic (aesthetic) love are alike in that
they both have as an ideal the legitimation of being and the
synchronous negation of the real.

Regarding love, Kierkegaard

says it like this: "The idea is the life principle in erotic
love and, if necessary, one must sacrifice life for it and
even erotic love itself. "
(nonthetic)

53

Thus, the project based on the

idea shall decimate the real even beyond the

failure of the project, even beyond the death of love itself.
This destructive and self-destructive behavior is addiction.
Notice that one sacrifices the real for the ideal, yet only
the real does and can exist.

Herein lies

tive/self-destructive dimension.

It is the equivocation of

two noninterchangeable,

the destruc-

forever separate realms.

fuels the fire of ideality.

The real

The burning of one's being.

Addiction, as a flight from the real, involves the addict
in behavior aimed at

self-narcosis.

Since

the pain of

existence is too great to bear, the addict engages in selfanaesthetizing behavior, behavior once sedimented she cannot
53

R epet1t1on,
' '

1 40 .

Underlining mine.
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dispense with, for fear of facing her own pain (that is, her
self). "A person can achieve a sameness [of behavior]," says
Kierkegaard, "that has a far more anaesthetic power than the
most whimsical amusements, and becomes more and more powerful.

"54

empirical

This

inflexibility of behavior is precisely the

manifestation

of

the

addicted, a project of the weak.

nonthetic

project

to-be-

"The weak 11 is a category

that comprises any individual who "cannot" be herself or
himself, any individual who "cannot" face his or her own pain.
This pain is, at least in part, the consequence of failing to
face oneself.

And, the failure to face oneself itself creates

this pain. Therefore, the self-effacement (non-self-facement)
operative in addiction compounds the pain the addict feels as
a consequence of not facing and becoming herself.

54

Yes, as the

Repetition, 179.
cf. also Nietzsche's Genealogy of
Morals, 2nd essay, section 17: 86, 87:
"The instinct for
freedom, forcibly made latent and vented upon itself is the
beginning of the bad conscience."
Addiction can be seen,
utilizing Nietzsche's nomenclature, as the weak man's entertainment: cruelty turned inward, coupled with narcoticization.
Once one accepts (nonreflectively) the premise that one's
instinct for freedom should be made latent, she is complicit
in creating in herself her own bad conscience.
The addict
sees the object of addiction as a way to exercise her "latent"
freedom in an "innocuous" way, but ends up by projecting the
"addiction" as the source (cause) of her bad conscience. If
the addict breaks with the object of addiction, she continues
to experience the bad conscience as a result of her (still)
latent freedom and so seeks a new object for her latent
freedom - which then becomes the new object of addiction - in
order to attempt to truncate the bad conscience and exercise
her freedom.
This circular exercise perpetually results in
failure. The instinct for freedom, for Nietzsche, equals the
"will to power." The "will to power" may be utilized as an
alternate conceptualization when discussing the freedom/addiction paradox.
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pain

increases,

the

likelihood

that

one

will

achieve

a

nonaddicted mode of being decreases.
Following this line of reasoning, one may say that the
addict had no pain prior to the time she refused to face
herself.

The question as to the motivation for addiction then

comes to the fore.

But, for Kierkegaard, all individuals are

born in "untruth"

(

II

'
II )
sin

55

thetically (reflectively)
refusal

to

face

, meaning that they have not yet

faced themselves.

oneself

must

be

a

Therefore,

reflective

the

endeavor,

following upon the heels of the realization of the possibility
of thetic self-knowledge.

The self, therefore, is born into

untruth about itself, meaning that it has no understanding of
its

own nature.

Pain is

an unavoidable

response

to

the

realization that one has heretofore had no understanding of
one's own nature (and the recognition of the consequent poor
choices

this

must

have

Conclusion:

entailed) .

inevitable in the process of waking up to oneself.

Pain

is

Addiction

is a "way out" of this pain by an attempted reversal of this
waking process - a self-induced somnambulism.
"I am completely convinced that he does not know the girl
at all ... she is the girl

- period.

1156

So said Constantin

Constantius, the "writer" of Kierkegaard's Repetition, of a
55

Johannes Climacus
[Soren Kierkegaard],
Concluding
Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments, trans.
David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1968), 186-191.
Hereafter referred to as
the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
56R

•
•
epet1t1on,
1 8 5.
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young man once smitten with erotic love in the pages of the
same work.
a symbol.

The girl is a category, a representation-object,
That is to say, the girl functions for the lover as

the object of addiction functions for the addict.

This is the

case because the relations are identical - they are both cases
of addiction.

The girl is symbol-ized by the young lover

and

thus made valuable as a conduit for the potential recovery of
his being.

Thus the idealizing project that is erotic love is

impelled by the same metaproject as that underlying addiction.
Repetition (renewal) in Kierkegaard is the possibility of
freedom, and involves a transcendent religious movement "by
virtue of the absurd. "
a

(reflective)

experience

of

57

The possibility of freedom becomes

possibility
bondage.

58

only
This

after

the

experience

of

(reflective)
bondage

is

57

Repetition, 305.
In addition to this explication on
page 305(draft), Kierkegaard advances and seeks to legitimate
these claims throughout the entirety of this short volume.
Since it is beyond the scope of this work to replicate
Kierkegaard's arguments here, I suggest that the curious
reader consult Kierkegaard' text (as well as Sartre's texts on
conversion.
See the section in this present work on the
conversion in Sartre) for a more full-bodied comparison.
58

What is the origin of the experience of bondage? Some
of its origins may be delineated as follows:
(A) The fact and realization that one is born into "untruth,"
meaning, effectively, that one's knowledge about oneself is,
to some degree, obscured. Since this is necessarily the case
before one wakes up to the nature of her self
through
sustained reflectivity (reflective ekstasis), insofar as it is
the case, the self is in bondage to its own ignorance of it's
self.
One
misinterprets
one's
own
thoughts/desires/intentions/emotions/behavior - necessarily.
(B) The fact that the nonconverted for-itself seeks being as
its end.
Having the project of the recovery of being as an
underlying intentional telos circumscribes the freedom of the
for-itself, preventing it from unleashing itself to the
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precisely the experience of addiction.
of bondage,

Without the experience

repetition would not even become an issue;

it

would appear superfluous.
The notion of repetition in Kierkegaard has striking
similarities to the notion of conversion in Sartre.

First,

both involve a reflective awareness of one's personal ontological

condition and

existence in tote.
become

issues

one's

ontological

condition vis-a-vis

Secondly, both repetition and conversion

following

the

experience

of

bondage

to

a

metaproject that was heretofore outside the realm of one's
reflective awareness.

Thirdly, both repetition and conversion

involve

reconstitution.

ontological

Finally,

both

are

likewise valuable and necessary when deciphering Kierkegaardian and Sartrean texts on love and addiction.
Addiction is at-one-ment (with the object of addiction)
without atonement (ontological reconstitution) . Repetition is
the true atonement, and is absent from the addictive experience 59 . This means that the addict has sought ontological
reconstitution

(restructuring)

by means of the object of

realization of the full scope of its freedom. The for-itself
is in bondage to the degree that it fails to achieve reflective awareness of its own intentional project to be.
(C) The dread (anxiety) and guilt that surround the perception
of one's own finitude and mortality, as well as the realization that one's self has no substantive essence, is "nothing."
Dread may also arise from the perception of one's own superfluity or contingency, especially as one perceives these in
the face of the Other.
{D) The experience of bondage may also result from engaging in
behavior that one considers to be unethical.
59

. .
3 11, 312.
c f . Repetition,
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addiction in lieu of reconstitution within the self itself in
relation

to

the

Power.

The

object

of

addiction merely

functions as a subterfuge to prevent ontological reconstitution proper, which could occur via the transcendent movement
that is repetition.

Repetition is the process by which the

self is born unto itself, the very process addiction vitiates.
The at-one-ment of addiction, as "nonwilled" union,
accompanied by experiential negativity.
that

"If

freedom

here

[in

Kierkegaard tells us

repetition]

now

obstacle, then it must lie in freedom itself.
that

11

is

1160

discovers

an

This means

nonwilled 11 union is precisely this obstacle - a function

of freedom itself!

Addiction, then, is a project of freedom.

In a draft of the Concept of Anxiety,

Kierkegaard views

habit as including "the . disappearance of self-awareness.

11

61

When habit becomes addiction, it involves a painfully acute,
heightened sense of self-awareness, albeit unwelcomed.
62
t h at h as b ecome ma l'1gnant.

h a b 1' t

Such heightened self-

60

Repetition, 320 (Deleted from margin} .

61

'
'
Repet1t1on,
327.

62

It is

How is habit different from addiction? Are some habits
addictions? Addictions are different from habits in that
(A} Addiction, in contrast to habit, involves painful selfawareness, that from which the addict seeks to flee. Habit,
contrariwise, involves the loss of self-awareness. Habit is
thoroughly nonreflective, whereas addiction is not.
(B} Addiction involves the project to be, whereas habit does
not.
This means, simply, that one cannot tell through
behavior and its frequency alone whether or not addiction is
present. It is the intention and the will of the for-itself
that determine whether habit or addiction (or neither} are
present. Habit is addiction if and only if they are teleologically synonymous, and, if this is the case, the habit is no
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awareness the addict tries to extinguish.

Addiction, again,

is seen as the project of the self to extinguish itself (a
failure in principle, short of suicide, if this is not in fact
also a failure on the same or different grounds).

Indeed, it

is the project to extinguish that very self-awareness that
would lead to the possibility of ontologica1 reconstitution
through the transcendent movement that is repetition.

Section C
Addiction Involves Freedom's Auto-entanglement
and the
Refusal to Face One's Own Anxiety

Anxiety is the trembling of human being as it beholds its
own possibility, as it recognizes its unavoidable and inexorable task of becoming a self, its self.

Lucid awareness of

ourselves and our existential condition brings with it the
experience of anxiety, which the addict tries to circumvent
through her object of addiction.
Addiction is "entangled freedom" where "freedom is not
free in itself but is entangled, not by necessity, but by

longer habit, but is reducible to an addiction.
(C) Is the experience of bondage present? If not, the case in
question is a case of habit alone. The difficulty, it may be
noted, arises when we ask whether bondage must be a reflective
experience.
Bondage may be experienced as a systemic and
amorphous dis-ease, and may not be consciously linked in any
way to the object of addiction.
Therefore, if such a case
transpires, bondage is not reflective.
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1.

t se lf .

1163

Anxiety is entangled freedom, which is neither a

category of necessity nor of freedom.

64

Nothing gives birth

to anxiety, that is, the apprehension of the nothing (freedom)
that we are.
toward being.
an d an

II

Addiction is the flight

from this nothing,

Anxiety involves both a "sympathetic antipathy"

' th e t ic
'
an t ipa
sympa thy II

65
'
'
- as d oes a dd 1ct1on.

ambivalence inherent in the addictive relation:

The

desire and

repulsion, yet all the while being in the grip of an "alien
power."

66

Addiction is an attempt to mask this nothing which

we are - which we have to be - by a "necessary freedom, " which
is, in fact, freedom entangled in itself but unrecognized as
such.

Spirit

anxiety.

63

64
65

66

relates

to

itself

and

its

possibility via

Addiction is the attempt in bad faith to suppress

cf. The Concept of Anxiety, 49.
The Concept of Anxiety, 49.
See The Concept of Anxiety, 42.

The Concept of Anxiety, 235 (from Kierkegaard's Journals).
For an illuminating post-Freudian discussion of
ambivalence within the context of family systems, see Alice
Miller, The Drama of the Gifted Child: The Search for the True
Self, trans. Ruth Ward (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 23-34.
[Originally published as Das Drama des begabten Kindes
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main, 1979) . ] Miller
underscores her belief that "True liberation can only be found
beyond the deep ambivalence of infantile dependence." [pp. 23,
24.]
The addict as such has not as yet proceeded beyond her
fundamental infantile ambivalence in terms of her object
relations with the world.
Therefore, she can iri no way
experience liberation, it being the case that she lives in a
world filled only with alluring webs of entrapment.
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the anxiety of this conditionality,
over the nothing that is our being.

67

to parry our anxiety

68

"Anxiety is the dizziness of freedom.
a project to
is

1169

Addiction is

overcome (suppress) this dizziness.

indicative of one's ontological condition,

Dizziness

blotted out

(relegated to the nonreflective) from the addict's subjectivity.

The process is a failure,

as fear transplants anxiety

with

the

the

object-relation

fear

relation to the object of addiction.

addict

experiences

in

The particular, specific

object-relation fear is transposed upon the universal (nonspecific) experience of anxiety.

Even if the former is experi-

enced as preferential, the latter cannot be wholly suppressed.

67

cf. The Concept of Anxiety, 44.

68

"Man would rather will nothingness than not will."
[Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, 3rd essay, section 28:
162, 163.)
As a result of the existential vacuum that he is [the nothingness of freedom, the valuelessness of being prior to free
determination], man experienced no meaning in life [that is,
he experienced the inherent meaninglessness of existence] , and
thus acted so as to create meaning and thereby overcome this
lack.
Addiction is an attempt to create meaning by the
repeated process of willing the same thing.
The addict
persists in this behavior, fearfully believing that it is
better to have a "negative" [self-indicting, "evil"] meaning,
than to risk the possibility of having none at all (or, that
it is preferable to the risk involved in the attempt to go
outside oneself to another, or to the Ground). Such "quantification" of willing in no way affects the existential
qualification of the will, which is always tertiary to (a
tributary of) the project. The will to power as the will to
quantification.
69

The Concept of Anxiety, 61.
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Thus the counterpoint of fear-anxiety which harrows the being
of the addict.

70

Fear is in relation to guilt because guilt is the only
source of the loss of freedom.
guilt

is

that

of

a

71

The relation of freedom to

continuum:

I

am responsible

for

the

diminution of my self (loss of freedom), and I am responsible
for the expansion of the self (utilization of freedom) .
involves the loss of freedom.
the loss of self.

Guilt

The loss of freedom involves

The loss of self involves one in addictive

relations with one's world in order to recoup this self

(a

/

necessary

failure) .

Kierkegaard,

The

task of

the

is to become itself.

accrues guilt and the loss of freedom.

self,

according

Failing this,

to

the self

As one is responsible

70

This passage is not meant in any way to suggest that all
attempts to escape from the anxiety of freedom are addictions.
One can seek escape through taking two Xanax, a couple of
Valium, watching a Woody Allen film, eating two boxes of Pop
Tarts and washing them down with two liters of Coca Cola. One
could ride 120 miles on a bicycle, call fourteen people in
succession on the telephone, or watch MTV for three hours.
One could play an album of Roxy Music, followed by albums of
Hank Williams, Stan Kenton, and Frankie Widder. Or, one could
get married. In all of these ways, anxiety may be terminated,
lessened, or masked. Does this make the behavior addictive?
I am not prepared to say so.
Behavior alone is always
insufficient to determine the existence of addiction.
The
marks of addiction are specified throughout this chapter, and
the above behaviors may or may not in fact be addictions. It
depends, again, on the object of the behavior in question, the
telos of the actor.
71

The origin of guilt is the suppression of the self. It
is also a function of the decision of the self not to be
certain possible selves, these possible selves being negated
by the self in the very act of choosing a self. That is to
say, the destruction of possibility creates guilt within the
self. To live is to choose, and to choose is to destroy
possibility. Therefore, to live is to incur guilt.
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for becoming oneself, one is responsible for the consequences
of the failure to become oneself,

i.e.

guilt and loss of

freedom.
Freedom and guilt are antithetical: " .... the opposite of
'
gui'l t." 72
f ree d om is

Fear,

loss of freedom,

and guilt are

always intertwined, but always in an ambiguous, ever-changing
way.

Addiction, as the experience of the loss of freedom, is

also the concomitant realization (recognition) of one's own
guilt.

Guilt, as

utilized here, does not have to be defined

ethically (at least not initially), but ontologically.

Guilt

is the ontological recognition of the discrepancy between the
way things are and the way things ought to be.
'
lf
itse

'
is

seen as an

'
f ection.
'
74
imper

The

73

Existence

recognition of

addiction per se involves the simultaneous recognition of
"bondage" or "limited"

freedom.

The recognition of guilt

involves the simultaneous recognition of one's own freedom and
culpability.

72

Addiction is thus the absurd, the unthinkable,

The Concept of Anxiety, 107, 108.

73

cf. Cervantes' Man of La Mancha: "True insanity is to
accept the world as it is and not as it should be." If this
were the case, the truly guiltless would be she who is
thoroughly insane.
74

cf. Jean-Paul Sartre's Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander
(New York: New Directions, 1964), lOlff.
Also note the
following, taken from the same work:
" .... I find the same desire again: to drive existence out of
me ... " [p. 175]
" .... the sin of existing." [p. 177]
" .... I was In the way for eternity." [p. 129]
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the paradox.

75

The place where reason does not penetrate.

Addiction as hell.

To think the paradox that is addiction

would be to eradicate the mythical belief that the locus of
bondage is outside the self.
"The good is freedom.
gaard and Sartre.

77

1176

This is true for both Kierke-

Addiction, as the experience of the loss

of freedom ( 11 unfreedom 11 ) is negated as good by this standard.
Good and evil,

for Kierkegaard, are always in concrete and

never in abstracto, therefore, freedom cannot be thought.

The

object of addiction becomes an object for thought, "masking"
freedom,

which cannot become an object for thought,

cannot

become abstract, but must be real-ized (not thought) concretely.

Thus

the

(experience)

of

object
the

is

intended

nothingness

to

of

"block"

freedom.

the vision
The

object

functions as a device for surrogate self-objectification via
projection.

78

Addiction is thus an attempt to circumvent the

impossibility of self-objectification.
7511

Absurd 11 and "paradox" as here utilized are meant in no
way to designate that specific "object" which Kierkegaard
often denoted by them, namely, the Incarnation of the son of
God.
I am using "absurd" and "paradox" here to suggest a
situation of apparent irrationality, contradiction, senselessness.
For it is, in part, precisely because the addict can
make "no sense" of her predicament that she remains trapped
within it.
76

The Concept of Anxiety, 110.

77

It is also true for de Beauvoir.
See Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman
(Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1980), 70-80, 156.
78

cf. chapter one on the impossibility of becoming an
object for oneself.
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"Freedom

is

infinite

Sartre's view exactly.
freedom

itself,

functions

as

for

the

and

arises

out

of

nothing.

1179

The end of all legitimate action is

Sartre,

infinite

showing
within

clearly that

the

Sartrean

freedom

paradigm.

Freedom functions as an infinite within the Kierkegaardian
paradigm.
viewed

Freedom,

as

infinite

the

only

passion

for both Kierkegaard and Sartre,

is

legitimate

of

(freedom) .

and appropriate

80

The

kosher

object

(legitimate)

81
.
. o f f ree d om: in
. f inity
. .
. f inity.
. .
circuit
to in

Kierkegaard delineates a

concept he

reserve" in The Concept of Anxiety.

calls

"inclosing

As the term suggests, an

individual of inclosing reserve remains tacit regarding some
aspect of herself before both herself and others.

Such an

individual refuses to fully face herself, or even to acknowledge that this is the case.

This individual seeks to avoid

even the knowledge that she seeks to avoid certain knowledge
about herself,

and thus she lives in a world of falsehood

brought on by her own self-deception.
then, signifies a lie or untruth:
unfreedom."

82

Inc losing

reserve,

"But untruth is precisely

The bondage of unfreedom is addiction.

The

addict is the· individual of inclosing reserve, the solitary

79

80

The Concept of Anxiety, 111.
To this we shall turn more extensively in chapter four.

81

The importance of this paragraph for any viable theory
of addiction cannot be overestimated.
82

The Concept of Anxiety, 128.
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one,

even amidst

the multitude .

83

This

reserve signifies

that "there is something that freedom is unwilling to per84

vade."

Such a person has "two wills": the stronger, which

wills inclosing reserve, and the weaker, which wills revela•

tion.

85

polemic.

Addiction
Precisely,

is

promulgated

by

addiction is a

this

intrapsychic

nonreflective project

("strong" will} in opposition to the weaker reflective will.
Therefore, the ontologically "irremediable" nature of addic•

tion.

86

"Whoever is educated by anxiety is educated by possibility [freedom] , and only he who is educated by possibility is
educated according to his infinitude.
failure

to be educated by anxiety,

1187

Addiction is the

and the

corresponding

experience of the loss of possibility (freedom} .

"Whoever

does not wish to sink into the wretchedness of the finite is
83

The person of inclosing reserve is the addict because
such a person exists in untruth, and untruth is unfreedom.
This person is bound to her own untruth about herself, and
experiences the unfreedom of the lie. This person may have,
in fact, no "external" object of addiction. Instead, she is
addicted to her own psychic constructs, produced via impure
reflection.
The person of inclosing reserve is addicted to
her own self- concept.
Such an addiction is insidious and
extremely difficult to treat. Inclosing reserve, then, is a
special case of inauthenticity.
84

85

The Concept of Anxiety, 130, 131.
The Concept of Anxiety, 129.

86

"Irremediable," that is, from within the fundamentally
deceptive/self-deceptive framework of the individual of
inclosing reserve, because inclosing reserve is itself a
choice.
87

The Concept of Anxiety, 156.
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constrained in the most profound way to struggle with the
. f.i n i. te.

in

1188

The infinite, here, is freedom itself, and the

Ground of that freedom.

Struggling with freedom alone never

allows one to get outside of the circuit of freedom,
necessitates one's remaining within the circuit,

but

since the

circuit lacks a Ground.
Put

differently,

freedom per

se

is

unable

to

fully

penetrate itself in order to appear to itself in its full
lucidity.

Freedom must be referenced in terms of something

other than itself in order to embody and grasp
stand) its own infinitude.
wishes to apprehend,

(not under-

This is because one is what one

and this apprehension can occur only

subsequent to the coupling of the self into a

circuit of

infinitude that draws one outside of the self (metaphysical
ekstasis). Thus the infinite struggle with addiction must be
fought on two fronts.

One must run the gauntlet on both the

"Eastern" (self) and the "Western" (Power) fronts, always, and
at once.

Put differently, to struggle fruitfully with one's

own infinitude necessarily involves one also in a struggle
with the Ground of this infinitude.
88

89

89

The Concept of Anxiety, 160.

The reader is encouraged to review part one, section A
of the present chapter for an elucidation of the metaphysical/theological overtones contained in this paragraph.
In
addition, it will be helpful to again quote Otto Rank: "For
only by living in close union with a god-ideal that has been
erected outside one's own ego is one able to live at all."
[Modern Education: A Critique of Its Fundamental Ideas
(Agathon Press, 1968), 142.) See chapter 1, part two of this
dissertation for the earlier discussion surrounding Rank's
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Section D
Addiction Involves One in the Contradictory Effort
of Attempting to Absolutely Will the Finite

"It is a contradiction to will something finite absolutely, since the finite must have an end.

But to will absolutely

is to will the infinite, because this is an end which can be
willed at every moment.

1190

The addict engages in the strict-

ly contradictory behavior of taking her object of addiction as
an absolute telos,
necessary. 91

An

although it is but contingent and not
"absolute

telos,"

anything (person, object, activity,

as

utilized here,

cognitive construct)

person feels they cannot live without.

is
a

To "live without,"

such a person feels, would necessitate a radical change in
selfhood, self-definition, human being. And this is precisely

contention. I am interpreting this quote in such a way that
no "metaphysical"/"theological" claims need be posited. That
is, the god-ideal set up by the self need only be transcendent
to consciousness, but not external to it.
If the god-ideal and the object of addiction are equally
the products of imaginary consciousness, how is it that the
former is the answer to the problem of addiction?
Some
imaginary constructs are imprisoning, whereas others are
liberating?

9

°Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 353.

91

"Infinite passion" as directed toward the "absolute
telos" could be rendered, alternately, as simply that ·which is
the preeminent value or source of value in any given person's
Weltanschauung.
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the case, due to the psychic function the object of addiction
plays in the life of the addict.
Addiction is the incommensurability between the object
and the passion with which it is attended.

"It would be

irrational to yield absolute devotion to a relative [contingent] end."

92

The only legitimate ends for infinite passion

are God and freedom qua freedom,
commensurate with that passion.

because only these are

All other ends convolute that

freedom and turn it inward upon itself.

Addiction is the

pathology (suffering) of this turning inward, the suffering of
introjected freedom/inclosing reserve.
Can freedom take itself as an end?
structure of such praxis?

What would be the

How is freedom "known" as an end?

Is "freedom" a "self-evident" end?

What could this mean?

Can

the knowledge of what it means to be free be universal?

How

do I know that what you mean by "being free" is what I mean by
"being free? 11

Must conceptions

common or at least overlap?

Why?

(perceptions)

be held in

If the human being does not

have freedom but is freedom, how can he or she do otherwise
than be free?

Thus, the prima facie legitimacy of all action.

Nevertheless,

the phenomenological

experience of bondage.

Therefore, even though I am freedom, it is possible for me to
be less than myself. 93

92
93

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 355.

This lessening of the self being a function of aesthetic
desire, hysteria of spirit, inclosing reserve, and bad faith.
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Section E
The Mutual Exclusivity of Addicted
and Nonaddicted Modes of Being

The addict is in despair because she relates herself with
infinite passion (ultimate concern, or, even, "seriousness")
to the addiction-object, but with infinite passion one can
relate oneself
Eternal.

94

-

if one is not in despair -

The ontology of

ontology of despair.

the addict

is

only to the

necessarily an

Despair is a disrelationship in one's

inmost being, precisely that condition that obtains when a
human being seeks to discharge her infinitude solely in that
which

is

finite.

95

A man despairs

because he

lacks

the

Eternal, which is equivalent to Sartre's in-itself-for-itself,
'
96
t h e necessary, f ree b eing.

Despair precedes and yet is

94

This is an obvious revamping of Soren Kierkegaard's
Works of Love, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (New York, Harper
and Row, 1964), 54.
95
96

See The Sickness Unto Death, 13ff.

Can one be in bondage to her own idea of "God?"
Definitely.
Not every case in which an individual erects a
god-ideal outside of her ego is clearly not a case of addiction.
The god-ideal functions as an object of addiction
insofar as it constricts the freedom of the self. A nonaddictive god-ideal must be a function of imaginary/emotional
consciousness, since a conceptual ideal precludes the possibility of infinitization.
To attempt to conceptualize the
god-ideal is to attempt to contain the ideal; to attempt to
contain the ideal is, simultaneously, to hem in the self. To
hem in the self through the god-ideal is to produce for
oneself an addictive god-ideal.
To seek to conc.eptually
delineate a nonaddictive god-ideal would effectively erase
both the ideal and its nonaddictive nature.
In order to
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addiction, despair promulgates addiction, and despair perpetuates addiction. The woman who has no disrelationship in her
inmost being is not in despair,

this acquired equilibrium

being the result of discharging her freedom (infinitude) in
relation to an object with which it is commensurate, that is,
Freedom itself.

Therefore, addicted and nonaddicted being are

ontologically mutually exclusive 97 •

Section F
Addiction is a Function of Despair, Which is
a Disrelationship in One's Inmost Being

"Necessity's despair is to lack possibility.

1198

The

·

despair of addiction is the experience of the "necessity" of
the object of addiction - and the lack of the possibility of
the cessation of the addiction - short of death.

This is a

"It is
, I 100
"se lf -accusation'

description of the addict's phenomenological field.
indeed freedom which despairs.

1199

Th e

of despair is freedom freely despairing over freedom.

This

ontological contradiction is experienced phenomenologically
prevent a disrelation in one's inmost being, the nature of the
god-ideal must be such that it is a function of imaginary/emotional consciousness, an ideal infinitude to correspond with the infinite nature of the self.
97

This exclusivity will be addressed in chapter four.

98

The Sickness Unto Death, 38.

99

The Sickness Unto Death, 145 (draft) .

100

The Sickness Unto Death, 146 (draft) .
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but not known, as it cannot ever become an object for consciousness.

Thus the addict "knows"

(experiences) what she

cannot know, and it is this "knowledge" which brings torment.
.
.
d espair
.
Add 1ct1on:
over somet h'ing earthly. 101
"pure immediacy"

This is

(and, as such, is subject only to aesthetic

categories), it has an "external" motivation.

Despair here is

experienced as a submitting (to the object of addiction, upon
which

the

addict

bestows

magical

powers).

Consciousness

progresses dialectically from despair over something earthly
(the particular object

of addiction)

to despair over the

earthly (in toto, as a category of totality) .

The latter is

experienced as despair over one's total existential condition,
including one's own ontology, which appears irremediable.
object of addiction makes the despair "bearable"
period of time by focusing and particularizing it.

The

for some
Better to

despair over one's relation to the object (externality) than
over oneself (internality).

The internalized threat is seen

as more horrifying; therefore, projection onto the external
.
.
102
o b Ject
o f a dd'1ct1on.
1

See The Sickness Unto Death, 50-60 for a discussion of
despair over the earthly (the particular) .
rn

10211

! first guessed how an activity [selfhood] chosen in
defiance of one's instincts ... is related to the need for
deadening the feeling of desolation by means of a narcotic art
[addiction] ... " [Ecce Homo, 286, 287. Underlining mine.] The
concept of "defying one's instincts" in Nietzsche's works
certainly overlaps with Kierkegaard's concept of "refusing to
be oneself" as explicated in The Sickness Unto Death.
Both
can be interpreted to show the "necessity" of addiction to
anaesthetize oneself against the pain of failing to be
oneself.
Nietzsche speaks of "my task" repeatedly in Ecce
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"Not until a self as this specific individual is conscious of

existing before God,

' f'ini't e se lf ....
in
self,

II

103

(the addiction-object)

seeks the Ground.

freedom.

is

it

the

but is crushed beneath the
in its finitude

- unless he

The infinite self can only be real-ized

through such a relation.
Infinitude

then is

The addict seeks the expansion of the

seeks the infinite self,

finite

not until

For how can finitude spawn infinity?

"spiritual"

reality

(nonmaterial),

as

Each species gives birth only to its own kind.

is
"The

wind blows where it will, you hear the sound of it, but you do
not know where it is coming from or where it is going.
with everyone who is born of spirit.

11104

So

Such birth allows

freedom (spirit) to be free.

Homo (e.g. pp. 286, 288, 289ff.), signaling the need to become
oneself while performing it and in order to perform it, a
sentiment likewise expressed in The Sickness Unto Death (Of
course, for Nietzsche, the "self" is certainly not the
unfolding of the creative Spirit of God. Nietzsche's unfolding would have more to do with allowing oneself to acquiesce
within the inexorable nature of the Eternal recurrence).
Failure to become oneself (perform one's task) brings about
the "need" for "idealism" (meaning producing belief) and the
concomitant (necessitated) rituals by which these meaning
producing beliefs are maintained. This cycle of flight from
oneself into ritualized meaning producing praxis-belief
involves the necessity of perpetuating these rituals to
sustain the web of belief and consequent continued flight from
the self. This cycle is the addictive behavior pattern, which
results from a flight from self and produces a flight from
self.
cf. "Fundamentalism" as addictive meaning producing
praxis-belief.
103

The Sickness Unto Death, 80.

~ John 3:8 (New English Translation).
4
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"The human being as spirit simply cannot have equilibrium
in himself. "

105

.
S 1nce most

.

.

persons are in despair,

106

equilibrium is the normal "state" for most persons.

nonThis

metastable condition is the self in bad faith, that self which
fails to recognize and draw implications from the fact that it
is spirit.

The thread that can be followed from the heart of

the self will make this evident if one has but ears to
hear.

107

From the thought of Kierkegaard I have culled part of my
theory of addiction.

Kierkegaard, believing that the funda-

mental ontological nature of the human person is spiritual,
has focused on the self's
Ground (God) .
truth/untruth,
anxiety,

(freedom's)

relation to its own

Kierkegaard has operated within categories of
inclosing

and despair.

reserve,

repetition

(renewal),

These concepts already broached in

Kierkegaard, in addition to others found in Sartre's philosophy, have given me the necessary tools for the groundwork of
an existential

theory of

addiction.

It

is

to Sartre's

conceptual contribution to the theory that I now turn.

105

The Sickness Unto Death, 146 (draft) .

106

cf. "The Universality of the Sickness (Despair) " in The
Sickness Unto Death, 22-28.
107

See Matt. 11:15, 13:9, 43, Mark 4:9, 23, 7:16, 8:18,
Luke 8:8, 14:35.
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CHAPTER 3

Sartre's nomenclature as well as his atheistic viewpoint
are both radically different from the thought of Kierkegaard.
Nevertheless, through the utilization of Sartre's ontology in
connection with that of Kierkegaard, I am able to flesh out
and complete an existential theory of addiction.

In particu-

lar, I wish to focus on Sartre's notion of the imagination and
his notion of self-deception, both being indispensable for the
construction of my theory.

The coupling of these two Sartrean

concepts with the fundamental ontological nature of the foritself in Sartre results in the existential possibility of
being-addicted.

It is this very being-addicted that I wish to

describe in Sartrean terms in part two of the present chapter.

Section A
Addiction as a Phenomenon "Undergone"
By an "Imprisoned" Consciousness:
The Addict Experiences the Spontaneity
That is Consciousness as "Beyond Preedom"

Impure reflection exists, for Sartre, whenever the self
seeks to apprehend itself through self-objectification.

In

impure reflection, the self seeks within itself a substantial
nature, an essence, a being from which its thoughts, feelings,

147
.
and indeed its very actions
emanate. 1

Impure reflection,

then, does not and cannot ascertain the true nature of the
self, which is to be free, to have no essence or substantial
being.

Insofar as the self seeks and

substantial self, it is self deceived.

11

apprehends 11 such a

All objectifications

of the for-itself are blockages created by the for-itself to
allow for the nonapprehension of its own nonessence (freedom).
In pure reflection, contrariwise, the self achieves a lucid
apprehension of itself as free being, having no substantive
essence.
In impure reflection, consciousness "imprisons 11 itself in
the world in order to flee from itself (this is only too true
of the addict); consciousnesses are "given" as "emanating"
from states, and states are apprehended as a function of the
ego.

Thus the substantive ego, phenomenologically, appears to

have primacy.

But,

in actuality,

consciousnesses are first.

the order is reversed:

Through consciousnesses, states

come about, and, through states, the ego is "produced. 112
lebenswel t

The

of the imprisoned consciousness is made up of

1

This is not to deny that the self must act, must engage
in praxis. What is at issue is the nature of this self, and
the locus of the action. Freedom, being primordial, acts to
create the self. The self has no essence from which freedom
is derived; the self, instead, is reducible to freedom. The
goal, here, for Sartre, is to get away from the positing of a
(substantive) "metaphysical" entity known as the "self . 11
Impersonal freedom is sufficient, in lieu of "self."
2

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans.
Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, n.d.), 81.
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"magical objects" which are simultaneously objects of the
world, and through memory, spontaneous artifices of consciousness: "··· [M]an is always a sorcerer for man.
Consciousness of addiction,

then,

113

for the addict,

is

given as emanating from the "state" of being addicted, rather
than the "state" of being addicted being recognized as a
project of (a) consciousness attempting to imprison itself in
the world.
were,

The magical object of addiction retains, as it

a memory of the spontaneity of consciousness while

remaining an object in the world.

Addiction experienced as a

"state" or a function of the "ego" is merely the secondary
description of a more primary phenomenon, which can only be a
free project of the for-itself. 4
"The
3

[addict's]

'me'

[or,

ego,

which is a construct

4

The Transcendence of the Ego, 82.

The claim here presented concerning addiction based on
the state/fluidity (impure/pure) dichotomy is phenomenological
to the degree that Sartre's dichotomy is phenomenological.
Phenomenology, as the descriptive study of the nature of
consciousness and its contents (noesis) and the surrounding
"world" (noema), allows procedural/ontological room within its
parameters for the advancing of the above claim. Phenomenological description is not reducible to conceptual analysis and
"cognitive" epistemology, being instead an intuitive existential process (see Being and Nothingness on knowledge, pp. 216218) .
The intuitive apprehension of truth is not always
amenable to non-intuitive "justification" (nor is such
"justification" warranted or appropriate within such an
epistemology).
Is the previous statement open to non-intuitive "justification? 11
Intuitive "justification?"
These
questions, of course, leave aside the question concerning what
would count as a "justification" to begin with.
And - why
"justification" at all? Is the question of "justification" an
appropriate one after all? Or is it the case that we've got
it all wrong? What would this even mean? And - how would we
know?
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produced through impure reflection]

can do nothing to this

spontaneity [(of) consciousness], for will is an object which
constitutes itself for and by [is consequent to] this spontaneity.

"5

This spontaneity frightens consciousness, as it is

"beyond freedom."

6

This spontaneity is perceived as "beyond

freedom" because it is experienced by the for-itself as the
source of its freedom, that is, its very being.
the being of the for-itself?

Whence cometh

Insofar as the for-itself has no

easily accessible answer to this question, since it is beyond
the for-itself 's phenomenological purview, this spontaneity
(source of being)

is a source of fear to the for-itself

because it is shrouded in mystery.
The addict, too, experiences her own spontaneity that is
consciousness as

"fixating"

(cathecting,

obsessing,

being

spontaneously "unfree") on one "thing," a state of affairs
experienced as being beyond freedom.

The addict feels "free"

only in her response to this (spontaneous) consciousness, but
not free to determine this consciousness as a matter of will.
The spontaneity, as such, is outside the scope of the will.
"It is an essential necessity that one not be able to distinguish between voluntary spontaneity and involuntary spontane.t

llY·

117

The Sartrean "category" of "involuntary spontaneity"

as noted in The Transcendence of the Ego is precisely the
5

The Transcendence of the Ego, 99.

6

The Transcendence of the Ego, 100.

7

The Transcendence of the Ego, 101.

Underlining mine.
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category of addiction - from the addict's phenomenological
vantage point.
Involuntary spontaneity is beyond freedom, but this is
not really the realm in which addiction originates, it merely
"appears" there so as to mask the underlying nonreflective
project of voluntary spontaneity.

Regardless of this fact,

Sartrean consciousness cannot distinguish the two (at least
not prior to the reduction or reduction/ conversion) ,
addiction

is

a

consciousness.
of

pure

8

phenomenon

9

by an

"imprisoned"

Absolute and irremediable dread is the result

consciousness

spontaneity. "

"undergone"

thus

apprehending

this

"fatality of

its

Consciousness degrades itself to the level of

8

Addiction:
Freedom
(voluntary
spontaneity)
being
discharged predictably in an "unfree" manner (involuntary
spontaneity). This can be a result of the addict's nostalgia
for her lost childhood, a period when she did not know the
exigencies of freedom, these being concealed from her by preanguished childhood subjectivity.
The addict's world, in
terms of freedom, is the child's make believe world of dolls
and trucks and trains, a controllable system of "finite
freedoms" (freedom discharged in an "unfree" - i.e. controlled
or controllable - manner) . This of course is contradictory in
theory and in fact and is a necessary failure. It is freedom
freely recognizing not to realize its own essence and the
demands of that essence.
One cannot become free by circumscribing (via prescience) the boundaries of one's own freedom.
This is not within the jurisdiction of freedom itself, but
rather that of involuntary spontaneity. The attempt at such
circumscription is self-manipulative and repressive, it is an
attempt to rise above oneself (get "outside" of one's own
freedom) , take an external point of view on oneself, meet
oneself ahead of oneself and so coincide with oneself. It is
an attempt to turn freedom into a thing.
See Simone de
Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman
(Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1980), 35-42 for the.child's
relation to her own freedom.
9

The Transcendence of the Ego, 102.
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impure reflection (which entails the absence of this spontaneity)

to submerge this anguish: this is precisely what the

addict does with his "state" of being addicted.

In

consci-

ousness' frenetic "escape" from itself, it seeks refuge and
dissolution in the "me" (a psychic object, a bid for "thingness").

10

The addict

attempts

consciousness into the me.

this very projection of

The resultant consciousness is

particularly precarious in that it can "wake up" to itself via
purifying reflection at any time.

Thus the addict is perpetu-

ally insecure.

Section B
Addiction is a Habitual Way of Being Emotional
and a Phenomenon of Belief

Addiction is

"incantatory behavior"

carried out with

seriousness (as is the case with Sartrean emotional consciousness) : it is an attempt to alter (reperceive) a world that we
cannot control, it is a reversion to the level of magic when
the "instrumental" approach is seen to be a failure.

Being

addicted is g, habitual way of being emotional, unrecognized by
the addict as such, as the project of emotional consciousness
is

only

10

nonthetically

conscious

of

itself

The Transcendence of the Ego, 103.

as

such,

and
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thetically conscious of the object of addiction. 11

We set up

the "magical" world by using the body as a means of incantati on

and

appear.

the physiological manifestations

Consciousness simply has "reversed"

subsequently
(reperceived,

interpreted inversely) the order of causation. Consciousness
believes, thetically, that it is the result of physiological/deterministic

factors,

rather

than

the

physiologi-

cal/"deterministic" factors being the result of the project of
emotional consciousness (addiction) .

"The image [of imagi-

nary, that is, addicted consciousness] is a sort of ideal for
feeling. "

12

Emotions

are

thus

experienced

through the circuit that is comprised
'
'
b'Ject. 13
a dd 1ct1on-o

Addiction,

then,

and

"known"

of the addict and her
is

the

process

of

11

For Sartre's views on emotional consciousness which I
utilize in my description of addictive consciousness, see
Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions: Outline of a Theory, trans.
Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948),
52-70. Hereafter referred to as The Emotions.
12

Jean- Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, trans.
Bernard Frechtman (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, n.d.), 103.
13

Granted, the claims made here may seem odd, para-doxa.
They may not seem to reflect the addict's own self-consciousness. Maybe all this Sartrean talk about freedom is a kind of
existentialist mythology. But then, maybe we need mythology
in order to live, be human, be "free." What is the function
of the mythological within the human psyche? Can any cultural
anthropologist seriously claim that at any time throughout
human history there were mythology-free civilizations? So we
aspire to be such? What would this mean?
Then again, maybe all this Sartrean talk about freedom is
not a kind of existentialist mythology. Maybe the "biological"/"genetic" theories of addiction are truly mythological.
Or, maybe the existential as well as the "biological"/ "genetic" theories are all "true" under some commensurable description yet to be developed. How did the true world
finally become a fable?
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objectifying one's own affectivity (in the object of addiction), allowing it to be "known" (as an object for knowledge).
The final progression of this calculus of affectivity results
when the addict can no longer feel unless she is "under the
influence

of 11

her

object

(person,

experience,

cognitive

construct) of addiction.
11

••••

[B] ehavior pure and simple is not emotion [nor is it

addiction] , and pure and simple consciousness of this behavior
is

not

emotion

accompanied

by

either .... true
belief.

14

emotion

Addiction

is

[addiction] .... is
g

phenomenon

of

belief: The seeds of belief (the psychic objects created via
impure reflection which blossom into a

"substantive" self

[ego]) are necessarily antecedents to the clinging vines that
are the phenomenological experience of bondage.

For one is in

bondage to oneself, but one feels as if in the grip of an
alien power.

These psychic objects could in no way take root

in the soil of the consciousness of the for-itself were it not
for the project of impure reflection vying to ground itself
through seeking for itself an essence.

It is this very

(created, fictitious) essence which subsequently throttles the
consciousness

of

the

for-itself

with

the

death

grip

of

addiction.

How is it that consciousness engages in the

project of addiction (emotional consciousness) and subsequent ly believes in the project,

i.e. that its being is being-

addicted, an "immutable" ontological reality not open to being
14

.
Th e Emotions,
71, 73.
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freely amended, altered or truncated?

Addiction is a phenome-

non of belief in that the addict believes that (at least) a
portion

of her freedom - heretofore experienced as such - has

been circumscribed by some reality other than herself.
origin of

emotion

degradation of

[addiction]

consciousness

is a

"The

spontaneous and lived

in the

face

of

the world. "

15

Degraded consciousness (impure reflective consciousness) does
not experience itself as being-free (having no essence), but
as

being-addicted

(having an

essence),

its

actual

inver-

'
16
sion.

Being-addicted is the inversion of consciousness which
does not recognize its own inversion, lacking any perspective
17

save the recognition of the previous

experience of freedom.

This being-free of consciousness in

on this perspective,

the past is separated from present consciousness by a nothingness which it must be and so cannot effect the alteration of
the inverted consciousness by recourse to this past.

Being-

addicted is g species of impure reflection taking itself as
pure reflection.

That is to say, the for-itself believes that

it is engaging in the project of pure reflection when in fact
it is engaging in the project of impure reflection.
How is

it

that

consciousness

can produce

for

itself

15

The Emotions, 77.

16

Note carefully the phrase "does not experience itself
as being."
This is merely a note to carefully delineate
ontological reality from perceptions of the same.
17

That is,
'
1 ac k'ing a metaperspective.
'
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believable belief?

(The addict as mythologizer) .

Conscious-

ness has confused itself regarding its own reflective status,
and,

in so doing,

nebulous

has opened itself up to a wasteland of

and noxious

fabrications.

In

this

existential

condition, the for- itself is in grave and ever-present danger,
yet this is the condition in which the addict perpetually
exists and maintains herself.

The lie (consciousness degraded

to the level of impure reflection)

has become the truth

(ersatz pure reflection) and the true world has finally become
a fable.

18

Ah! Free at last!

19

What happens when consciousness "wakes up" through a
purifying reflection (the dispensation with impure reflection,
that is, impure reflection's erasure) to the recognition that
the "state" of "being-addicted" is an ever-threatening reality
as long as the reflective apprehension of oneself as freedom
(in pure reflection) is necessarily accompanied by anguish,
pure dread?

Consciousness perpetually seeks to elude its own

dread as part of the project of attempting to ground (found,
18

cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols (1888),
trans. Walter Kaufmann. In Walter Kaufmann, ed., The Portable
Nietzsche (New York: The Viking Press, 1982), 485, 486.
19

Freedom being too much of a burden for the addict to
bear, she finally "realizes" this (free-being) in her own
mythological construct
if she realizes it at all. (She
would, then, only experience "freedom" when under the influence of her object of addiction) .
Freedom, in this case,
coincides with the dispensing of the real. One becomes more
"free" as one becomes less "real." But I caution the reader
to allow that some addicts become less "free" as they become
less "real." It all depends upon the mythological constructs
employed. Not all phenomenological attributes of the experience of addiction are universal.
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legitimate, necessitate)

its own being.

As freedom always

appears contingent and therefore unaccounted for (unnecessary,
superfluous), consciousness invariably seeks suppression of
consciousness of this freedom.

Once pure reflection is real-

ized in the face of being-addicted, consciousness is free to
abandon this particular project of being-addicted (emotional
consciousness) .

It will succumb nonthetically to the next

project of addiction unless through conversion it can relate
itself thetically to the Ground. 20
"Freedom [for the captive consciousness caught in its own
trap]

has to come from a purifying reflection or a total

21
.
.
.
.
d isappearance
o f t h e a ff ecting
situation."

In addiction,

the addict denies her addiction (at least at times) because of
its phenomenological (experiential, existential) discontinuity, which is the result of periodic purifying reflections,
during which time the addict is
"addiction."

"free"

of her object of

The addict here experiences a break in freedom

in relation to the object, but not its total temporal demise.
The addict is "free" during the reflection only because she
20

Does it follow, then, that we should seek a theological
rather than a clinical "cure" for addiction? This does not
necessarily follow, since "theology" can be addictive in
itself. The "cure" will be "metaphysical" in nature, being
comprised of clinical, philosophical, and "theological" (godideal) elements.
The focus throughout the healing process
remains the existential condition of the self. Since addiction involves an inadequacy in the self, and the self is
itself a "metaphysical" construct (although nonsubstantive; it
is freedom alone) , the "cure" will be, necessarily, "metaphys ical."
21

The Emotions, 78, 79.
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recognizes herself as the author of the project to-be-addicted.

Nevertheless, such consciousness does not necessitate the

abandonment of the project (praxis), but may in fact merely
alter the project so that it appears in different forms or
guises.

The realization that one is free in relation to a

given project does not mean that the project is g project to
be free,

a project which aims at freedom as an end.

The

recognition that one has freely engaged in a project is not
synonymous with the ability to
project.

freely abandon that very

The ontological/axiological reality hidden behind

the original (free) choice must be addressed.
"Emotion is a revelation of the meaning of the world."

22

Addiction, too, is a revelation of the meaning of the "world."
The addict "realizes" that freedom was the illusion, and that
.
.
f act un f ree. 23
s h e is
in

"Can I become free?"

Her question to herself now becomes

She then sets about attempting to detail

the necessary and sufficient conditions for her own liberation
- always within brackets - realizing all the while (based on
the

"deception"

of

her

"pre-addicted"

phenomenological

condition) that the struggle against her own "unfreedom" could
~
b

mere 1 y g

22

.
lf
facet of the unfreedom 1tse
.. 24

How can an

The Emotions, 81.

23

"The qualities which the emotion confers upon the object
and the world it confers upon them ad aeternum [forever] . "
[The Emotions, 80.]
24

That is, the description of the illness is itself part
of the illness.
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.
b ecome
un f ree b eing

f

ree.?

can sue h a t h.1ng ever transpire.
.
?25

Can such a being free himself?

The addict as philosopher.

"Consciousness can be a transcendent

[psychic]

only by undergoing the modification of passivity. "

26

object
Con-

sciousness is symbolized (made symbolic, reified, solidified,
coagulated, objectified) by the addict ;Qybeing projected onto
the object of addiction.

Thus the addict looks at his own

consciousness when beholding the object of addiction, a vision
masked as such by the addict.

Addiction is yet another

attempt on the part of woman to flee her own consciousness
(or, put differently, for consciousness to flee itself), the
perennial,

tragic saga of humankind.

Consciousness here

obstructs itself (its vision of itself) through the utilization of the

object of addiction.

25

This "works"

(functions

Note Sartre's discussion of freedom in Jean- Paul Sartre,
Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York:
Philosophical Library, n.d.), 433-481.
Sartre, of course,
would say that the addict' s "realization" is fallacious, since
an unfree being cannot even contemplate the idea of freedom.
Such an idea for an unfree being would be counterfactual. The
contemplation of such a counterfactual would involve the
negation of being (current reality) via imaginative construction. Such negation based on the imagination would never be
possible for an unfree being, for such a being could only
operate on the level of what is (the factual) and never on the
level of what is not (the counterfactual).
Therefore, for
Sartre, to ask oneself "Can I become free?" is a contradiction. One is either wholly and forever free, or not free at
all. If the question of freedom were not an issue, if it were
not a question at all, this would not necessarily mean that
man was not free.
But since the question of freedom is an
issue, man is free.
Interrogation involves a distance or
distancing from what is, which shows, for Sartre, that freedom
lies at its root. Every question belies the freedom of the
interrogator, that is, her very being.
26

The Emotions, 84.
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effectively) as long as the object of addiction is seen as
such ("nonfreely" beheld).

Should this guise of

11

nonfreedom 11

break down, consciousness will effect a purifying reflection
upon itself and simultaneously recognize its own previous bad
faith (self-deception).

Or, we may be able to say that this

breakdown is an integral aspect of this purifying reflection.
It is evident, then, why the addict has "good reason" to
maintain her addiction as such.

Recognition of one's bad

faith throws one at the feet of good faith, 27 the realization
of the real possibility of an alternate project, 28 and this
realization's attendant necessary conditions - anguish and
dread.

Freedom and anguish are forever intertwined.

reality the addict rejects as she seeks
at ion of the same.

This

evasion and alter-

She realizes a phenomenological separation

of the two once she becomes the addict: she is in a condition
of dread while experiencing herself as "unfree."

What she

sought, of course, was the inverse, freedom without dread.
The project of addiction delivers only the contrary.

Never-

theless, this is a result of the addict's skewed phenomenological vantage point,
intertwined.

since freedom and dread are

forever

The addict has succeeded only in embezzling her

own experience of freedom,

while in no sense successfully

27

All recognition of bad faith is, in fact, an exercise
in good faith.
That is, it is consciousness waking up to
itself, realizing itself, being itself.
In this sense, all
movement toward good faith is a movement away from addiction.
28

cf. Being and Nothingness, 70.
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negating her experience of dread.

Even if dread were ephemer-

ally negated, the addict would simply find herself experiencing a second level dis-ease: the dread of dread.

This dis-

ease was the originary impetus for the project to-be-addicted.
The steel jaw trap of addiction closes once again.

Section C
Addiction is a Function of the Imagination
By Way of Self-induced Hypnagogic Imagery:
The Quest for Simultaneous and Symbiotic
Self-real-ization and Self-dereal-ization, or
How Consciousness Creates for Itself Believable Belief

"What defines the imaginary world and also the world of
the real is an attitude of consciousness.

1129

Addiction, as

stated in the previous section, is g phenomenon of belief.
The object of addiction becomes such based on the confusion of
voluntary spontaneity with involuntary spontaneity. Voluntary
spontaneity is a matter of will; involuntary spontaneity is a
matter o f
29
30

.

.

intention.

30

This the addict is conscious of but

The Psychology of Imagination, 27.

Underlining mine.

Addiction is a phenomenon of belief because impure
consciousness bestows upon the object of addiction magical
powers, and it is the resulting consciousness' belief in these
powers that fuels the phenomenon of addiction. These powers
are in no way contained in the object itself, and without
these powers, the phenomenon of addiction would dissipate as
such. Belief is voluntary to the degree that consciousness
refuses to face the nature of itself. For Sartre, voluntary
spontaneity is a matter of will (the scope of our freedom, our
possibilities, a reflective sphere), and involuntary spontaneity is a matter of intention (the conscious but nonreflective
project that is at-one with consciousness). · [See Being and
(continued ... )
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chooses not to know.

31

.
.
.
.
1 . 32
Consciousness,
as sue h , is
1ntent1ona

Thus only the

cessation of consciousness qua consciousness can extinguish
intentionality (involuntary spontaneity} . 33

The imaginative

image produced by the addict is beheld quasi-observationally,
thus it can be infused with "magical" ("addictive"} powers.
When

quasi-observation

spontaneity},

"becomes"

observation

(involuntary

the observer becomes the addict.

This is a

function of the addict confusing pure reflection with impure
reflection,
spontaneity.

and

voluntary

spontaneity

with

involuntary

The reversal of this procedure is much more

difficult for consciousness, since we now have a bona fide
phenomenon of belief, whereas the initiation of the imaginative construct did not involve such.
to man

34

for himself,

Man truly is a "wizard"

and for others in that

" ... every

human being is ... egµally unfree, that is, we ... create out of

30

( • • • continued}
Nothingness, 407, 433-481.]
In The Psychology of Imagination, Sartre defines "belief"
as "fascination without existential position." [p. 245] Once
consciousness is fascinated, it can in no way be said that
belief is wholly "voluntary." All belief, for Sartre, seems
to involve elements both of the voluntary and the involuntary.

31

Knowledge of this confusion would necessarily involve
an antecedent reflective katharsis so as to purge consciousness of impure reflectivity and open it up to a perception of
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary spontaneity.
32

That is, it is always consciousness of something.

33

c f . The Psychology of Imagination, 24.

34

The Emotions, 84.
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.
35
f ree d om a prison."

We imagine the walls quasi-observation-

ally, they then appear as a pristine bucolic scene; then, in
the aftermath and carnage, we observe the walls.
"We must under no circumstances confuse intention with
will.

To say that there can be an image without will implies

in no way that there can be an image without intention. "

36

Addiction is an intentional (nonthetic. at one with consciousness) project contrary to the (thetic. conscious) will.

This

is an ontological subversion, an ontological mutilation,
splitting of one's being.
Since

addiction

is

schizophrenia does

a

project

The
"charmed,"
11

unrecognized

Ambi-valence.
as

consciousness

she thinks

.
.
d ." 38
1mpr1sone

constitutive

"In

basis

of

in a
normal
the

the

(for the

The addict experiences herself as

The addict's own Shadow masks the sun.
addict's

such,

not appear phenomenologically

addict) to be self-induced.
"victim."

A schizophrenia.

a

permits

new way,
and

37

itself

to

be

her consciousness is

pathological

hypnagogic

cases,

consciousness

the
is

a

35

0tto Rank, Modern Education: A Critiaue of its Fundamental Ideas, trans. Mabel E. Moxon (New York: Agathon Press,
1968), 13. Underlining mine.
36

The Psychology of Imagination, 24.

37

Underlining mine.

cf. Carl Jung, The Undiscovered Self, trans. R. F. C. Hall
(New York: Mentor, 1958), 101-125. The Shadow, for Jung, is
the destructive/self-destructive aspect of oneself.·
38

The Psychology of Imagination, 59.
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modification of attention. "

39

This modification of attention

is precisely the situation that obtains in addiction

(and

love) : it is a situation of mania - "an abnormal state of
attention in a normal person."

40

Consciousness puts itself

to sleep through the utilization of such hypnagogic imagery.

41

Self-hypnosis is induced by consciousness and "for-

gotten" as such by that very consciousness.

Hypnagogic images

are a way of being conscious, rather than being contemplated
;Qy

consciousness; this fascinated consciousness is in bondage

to itself, paralyzed by its own constructions.
addict' s

consciousness:

not distracted,

42

Such is the

but fascinated.

43

This consciousness is of course not in bondage to objects
(hypnagogic images) but to itself, since consciousness creates
for itself its own hypnagogic imagery.

Since it is not

reflectively aware of this, it posits an "external" source of
bondage.

39

The Psychology of Imagination, 60. Underlining mine.
"Hypnagogic consciousness", as here utilized, is impure
reflective consciousness creating for itself a nonexistent
world peopled with psychic objects, a function of the imagination.
40

Jose Ortega y Gasset, On Love, trans. Toby Talbot (New
York: World Publishing Company, 1968), 47.
41

An

sions as
means of
through
object."

"image" is defined by Sartre as "an act that envian actual body an absent or non-existent object by
a physical or mental content, but which appears only
an 'analogical representative' of the envisioned
[The Psychology of Imagination, 75.]

42

The Psychology of Imagination, 62.

43

•
.
As is
t h e consciousness
of t he

s artrean

1 over.
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Hypnagogic images appear with a certain nervousness,

44

because the hypnagogic "state" is unstable (metastable) and
artificial

(constructed

of

quasi-observational

material),

coupled with the fact that consciousness has allowed itself to
be charmed and hence is complicit in instigating and perpetuating the "dream".
sciousness

taking

This allowance is the process of connothing

(freedom)

for

something

(the

hypnagogic image) so as to surmount being as the negation of
being.

This

fatality,

charmed

consciousness

the negation of freedom.

45

is

self-infused

with

Consciousness does not

seem to be able to imagine itself otherwise, it fails to be
able to take g, point of view on itself, to "suspend judgement;" it seems fated to believe in itself (as the hypnagogic
negation of freedom) .

The representation of the object is

conflated with the object.
The addict is constantly haunted by the presence of the
imaginary image as an absence.

46

Thus, the harrowing torture

of desire for the "object," even in its absence (no, precisely
in its absence) .

The addict truly is haunted by the image

rather than the object.

The addict goes on the rack before

44

cf. The Psychology of Imagination, 64, and The Concept
of Anxiety, 41-51.
45
46

cf. The Psychology of Imagination, 67.
cf. The Psychology of Imagination, 104.
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the image.

The image is the essence of the addiction.

47

The

image is the self haunting itself as its own absence of being.
The image is not (reality) , and yet the addict is pursued by
what is not, and she falls down in terror before that which
she cannot evade.

48

.

to the e nd o f

time."

to one in Gehenna.
presences.

50

"··· [F]or lo, I am with you always, even
49

The beckoning of the Nothing (image)

"Reason" balks at these abhorrent absent

The absent presence that comprises the quasi-

observational object of addiction is repugnant to far more
than the reason of the addict.
her damnation.

It is both her salvation and

Certainly, this is repugnant to her reason.

Yet the pain of the ontological circumcision is far greater to
bear, and it is upon this gibbet that the addict hangs.

The

mirage of addiction as leading to the oasis of truth.
The object that is the imaginary image does not "obey"
the

"laws"

of

individuation

or

identity,

says

Sartre.

51

Hence the addict's belief that she may be able to transcend

47

Ergo, without the "faculty" (power) of the imagination,
the phenomenon of addiction would not occur, as addiction is
a function of the imagination.
48

Cannot from her own perspective, that is.

49

Matthew 28: 20.

50

cf. The Psychology of Imagination, 126. God's "absent"
presence, by this standard, would likewise be repugnant to my
reason. This is equally the case for Kierkegaard as well as
Sartre. A possible case for the meaningfulness, via indirect
proof, of a subcategory in relation to reason designated
"repugnant."
·
51

The Psychology of Imagination, 130, 131.
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herself into the object of addiction, thus achieving at-onement.

Addiction, as a project based on imaginary conscious-

.
.
.
ness, is
a variation
on t h e

s artrean "Jonah comp 1 ex." 52

I

become external to myself while simultaneously internalizing
the

object

of

addiction.

53

This

genre

of

thought.

the

imaginary. negates the very possibility of perception. since
the image

1.§.

not perceptible, even in principle. 54

tion" without perception.

11

"Sensa-

Contamination 1155 is an essential

structure of the addictive image,
impoverished quality which makes
perceivable, even in principle.

meaning that it has an
it such that

it is not

Contamination is essential to

introduce the magical aspect into the object, which is in turn
essential to bestow upon it its addictive qualities.

52

Being and Nothingness, 631. Hazel Barnes here defines
this complex as the "Irrational desire to assimilate and to
identify with oneself either the object of knowledge or a
beloved person - without in any way impairing that object's
character as an external object." In the case of addiction,
the "object of knowledge" is beheld quasi-observationally (via
imaginary consciousness) , thus making the Jonah complex doubly
irrational, since one seeks to assimilate not an external
object but an imaginative construct of one's own creation (the
object of addiction as object of addiction, rather than merely
as object). Here we evidence a desperate bid for connectedness in which the addict fails even to get outside of her own
head. Thus the hypnagogically induced internal circuit that
is the project to-be-addicted is the ultimate in metaphysical
impotence.
53

The addict may seek to appropriate the addiction-object,
become at-one with this object, or both at once, showing forth
the impossible and contradictory nature of addiction. cf. de
Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 47.
54

55

The Psychology of Imagination, 133.
The Psychology of Imagination, 132.
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The image is neither concept nor percept, nor can it be
' h er. 56
eit

The image is contaminated by an impure imaginary

consciousness which prevents it from being witnessed clearly
by consciousness as either a percept or as a concept.

Such

clear comprehension can only be the result of pure reflection,
which necessarily involves the erasure of impure imaginary
consciousness.

That is to say, impure imaginary consciousness

and pure reflective consciousness are mutually exclusive: one
cannot reflect purely and impurely at the same time, and one
cannot

perceive/conceive

and

imagine

at

the

same

time.

Addiction is a phenomenon originating necessarily in the
imagination, then emanating from the imagination and flowing,
surreptitiously,
realms.

57

omnium,

58

56

The

into

the

imagination truly

including

the

capacity

"conceptual"/"perceptual"
is
for

the

capacity

instar

project

to-be-

the

See The Psychology of Imagination, 133.

57

Since (A) One cannot simultaneously reflect purely and
impurely (pure reflection destroys the psychic constructs of
impure reflection) and (B) One cannot imagine at the same time
that one perceives or conceives, and (C) Because I am arguing
that the addictive object becomes such based on the powers
with which it is infused through the imagination (resulting in
hypnagogic imagery), any perception/conception of the experience of addiction is subsequent to the bondage produced via
imaginatively produced hypnagogic imagery (see earlier
footnotes in the present section on "hypnagogic consciousness"
and "imagery") . This in no way means that the addict does not
experience real bondage.
My usage of "perceive," "conceive," and "imagine" follows
Sartre's usage in The Psychology of Imagination. [See pp. 827]
For further clarification, please see the remainder of
the present section.
58

cf. The Sickness Unto Death, 30, 31.
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addicted.
"An

image

has

no

persuasive

power

but

we

persuade

ourselves by the very act by which we construct the image.

59

To be (self)-persuaded regarding g certain state of affairs in
one's relation to the object is to be an addict.
persuasion is at- one with the addiction.
result of attempting to dissuade oneself

For the

Bondage is the
(reflectively) of

that which is the nonreflective project to-be-addicted.

The

image does in fact have persuasive power, but not qua image.
"Pure knowledge can become debased into imaginative knowledge
by losing its pre-reflective character [its capacity for being
readily reflectively accessible]
.
60
non-re fl ective."

in order to become wholly

In the "interest of understanding,"
artifice of impure reflection)
clarity and reflectivity.

(a self-deceptive

the addict moves away from

What passes itself off for thought

is in fact nothing other than that resultant from the attempt
of consciousness to prevent thought, to induce a somnambulism,
to create a magical world in which the purifying reflection
can no longer be a threat because it can no longer take place.
Consciousness has become a hedge against itself.

The threat

of being-in-the-world is circumvented and mutilated via the
imaginary object of addiction, such that the addict identifies

59

The Psychology of Imagination, 137.

60

The Psychology of Imagination, 150.

Underlining mine.
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with the object as a being-in-the-midst-of-the-world.

61

If

bad faith were not possible, addiction would not be possible.

62

Imaginative consciousness necessarily confuses transcen.
u
d ence and externa 1 ity.
The addict's consciousness, in
trying to transcend itself (or, in trying to real-ize its own
transcendence, or be its own transcendence)

"realizes" that

its intention is toward an externality which could serve to
ground

1. ts

b eing.
.
64

The

object

of

addiction

external to the transcending consciousness.

is

in

fact

But the object of

addiction as object of addiction is an (imaginary) image and
thus

can be

only transcendent

addict's own consciousness.

but

never external

to

the

The addict, without the purifying

reflection, is left to flounder within the confines of his own
.

.

.

sub Ject1v1ty.
61

65

The object of addiction as object is always

cf. Being and Nothingness, 58.

62

That is, the project of consciousness, by way of the
imagination, to prevent access to the perceptual/conceptual
realms.
63

See The Psychology of Imagination, 151.

64

This belief, of course, is already a fiction.

65

cf. Addiction as Joseph Chilton Pearce's "Eureka"
(metanoia) experience.
This could be characterized as the
"transcending" of one's transcendence, which is illusory.
This may be seen as an attempt to be Other for oneself, while
bypassing the need for concrete relations with others and/or
the Ground, in an effort to ground ourselves or wholly unify
our experience (become at-one with "reality", the cosmos,
etc. ) .
We can experience the Other as a transcendence
transcended. In addiction, we experience ourselves as a
transcendence transcended (the metanoia experience) under the
(continued ... )
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conflated with the object of addiction as image.

It is this

object/image (external/transcendent) synthetic structure that
allows for the faulty bifurcation of the same, displacing the
.
b y t h e image.
.
66
obJect

" ... [T]he image is like an incarnation of non-reflective
thought,"

67

that is, an incarnation of the God-project (the

project to "legitimate" one's own existence) in the object of
addiction.
thought.

The image is the stage for the reification of

The ability to dispense with the object of addiction

(image) would be coextensive with the ability to abandon the
God-project, since the project to-be-addicted is a subset and
concrete manifestation of the metaproj ect that is the God
project.

65

( ••• continued)
illusory guise that we can get "outside" of our own transcendence (experience, subjectivity) . Just as the Other can "wake
up" to us in her subjectivity, so the addict can "wake up" to
himself and the fact that his experience of "transcending his
own transcendence" was in fact self-deceptive and the result
of transcendence entangled within itself (introjected, selfintrojected).
What the addict seeks, he can only find via
externality, yet the object of addiction as such remains
forever transcendent but not external.
For more on the
"Eureka" (metanoia) experience, see Joseph Chilton Pearce, The
Crack in the Cosmic Egg: Challenging Constructs of Mind and
Reality (New York: Washington Square Press, 1973), 63-83, 110,

111, 143, 173.
66

0f course, the addict is always aware of this, but she
does not know it. To make the imaginatively constructed image
an object for reflective consciousness would destroy that very
image. Its evanescent nature would immediately give way to
the nothingness of consciousness. This the addict has a stake
in preventing.
67

The Psychology of Imagination, 160.
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"Non-reflective thought is a possession.

1168

This is the

case because the non-reflective pursuit of being can be, for
Sartre, totally independent of reflectivity, that is, it has
no need of reflectivity for its existence.

Ideas on the non-

reflective level are always images, and there is no path to
travel from thought as image to thought as thought.
colorized world

retains

the

colorization

described

This
quite

eloquently by Sartre in chapter three of The Emotions.
veritable

exorcism

is

needed

to

purge

woman

of

69

her

A
own

hypnagogic imagery, which she believes to be ideas (conceptualizations) as such while she is in her self-induced somnambulistic state.

The image is thought to be an adequate repre-

sentation of the thought.
'
not b eing

bl

~

70

Addiction is the experience of

'
7l
to get out: P 1 ato I s cave once again.

"Oh,

sir, it's not just that I'm no good, but you lose track of the
light."

72

light,

it has itself sought to extinguish that light which

68

69

Yes, consciousness as image has lost track of the

The Psychology of Imagination, 165.
The Emotions, 50-94.

7011

There follows a war.ping of the further course
consciousness." [The Psychology of Imagination, 166]

of

7

1with the major difference being that the addict has seen
the sun but nevertheless gone back to chain herself into the
cave. See Plato, The Republic (Bk. VII), trans. Paul Shorey,
in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds., The Collected
Dialogues of Plato (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University
Press, 1973), 747-772.
72

Albert Camus, The Fall, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York:
Vintage, 1956), 145.
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would illumine the meaning of being.

For the meaning of being

is the last thing that the addict wants to apprehend, and yet
in her frenzied attempt to flee herself she shows that she
knows all too well just what it is that she flees.
All

unreal

appre h end e d

(imaginatively

on 1 y

produced)

'
b servationa
'
11 y.
quasi-a

objects

73

The

can

be

addictive

object, as shown above, is and must be such an imaginatively
produced unreal object, although the original impetus for such
an

imaginative

production

is

always

rooted

in

the

real.

Addiction, therefore, is a quasi-existential phenomenon, based
on the quasi-observation of its unreal object.
is real except the project to-be-unreal.

Nothing here

I must derealize
I

(or, unrealize) myself to enter the world of imagery, since
there is absolutely no other way in which to enter.
real-ize oneself (the state of faith in Kierkegaard)

74

To

is the

converse of the addicted condition of being, a project which
necessitates self-derealization.

Self-derealization is the

process whereby through analogical

thought,

utilizing

the

object of addiction, we evade the responsibility of having to
be our own nothingness of being:

"The images offer us an

escape, they present themselves as a negation of the condition
of being-in-the-world [in-der-Welt-sein of Heidegger] as an
'
ld . 75
anti-wor
73

74
75

The Psychology of Imagination, 174.
The Psychology of Imagination, 188.
The Psychology of Imagination, 194.
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The original impetus for the imaginative production of
addictive imagery,

then,

being always rooted in the real,

involves the inability/unwillingness to accept the existential
conditions of life.

It is a sign of nihilism or idealism,

76

coupled with the inability/unwillingness to advance (positive)
viable

alternative projects.

.
suppression

Because

of

being

unjustified.

th e
is

of

nausea

seen

as

the

Why
de

attempted

the

nausea?

trop,

forever

How then could any attempt at "rectification" be

her addiction) experiences
78

is

77
b eing.
.

superfluous,

anything other than spurious?

able.

Addiction

The addict, too,

(in spite of

existence as such as unjustifi-

"Why is there something rather than nothing?" re-

sounds hopelessly before the nothing with untrammeled hollowness.

The human person beckons for meaning, and the universe

fails to respond.

79

Yet,

for the addict,

addiction is likewise absurd.

the experience of

It becomes one more necessity

in a world of facticity in which all things are given and
nothing is justified.

The illegitimacy of fate.

76

cf. Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals,
third essay, sections 13-28 (pp. 120-163).
77

cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans.
(New York: New Directions, 1964), lOOff.

The illegit-

especially the
Lloyd Alexander

78

This is not to say that she doesn't believe existence
as such is justified or justifiable.
79

For Camus, the origin of the experience of the Absurd.
The "odd trinity" is comprised of man (the interrogator) , the
world (which remains silent), and the juxtaposition of the
two, which brings forth the Absurd.
See Albert Camus, The
Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, trans. Justin O'Brien (New
York: Vintage, 1955), 2-48.
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imacy of freedom.

No way out.

Addiction as folly to the

Greeks and a stumbling block to the Jews. 80
addict is to think being - her own being -

The task for the
yet the scissipar-

i ty between being and thought makes this forever impossible.
"The affective state,
exist without a

being consciousness,

transcendent correlate.

1181

could not

The object of

addiction performs the service of posing as this transcendent
correlate (it is transcendent as object, but merely immanent
as object of addiction), so that the addict may engage in
emotional consciousness with "impunity" (the only "punishment"
being the loss of the real.
"knows.").

But this the addict no longer

The object of addiction, that is, thus exists as

an excuse for the choice of a chronic affective "state."
Emotion would otherwise return to its origin to be fed there,
and so realize the nothing (freedom) of its original construction.

The object of addiction allows the emotion to transcend

into the object and be "absorbed" there, without remainder.
Addiction. then. allows for sedimented and successful patterns
of flight (from freedom). 82
80

cf. I Cor. 1:23.
That is, addiction involves both
conceptual (Greeks) and praxiological (Jews) bafflement. It
is that which one goes out of one's way to preserve and engage
in and is, nevertheless, a centre coeur. A centre coeur. ne
a centre meta-coeur pas.
81

The Psychology of Imagination, 199.
This follows
clearly from the Husserlian-Sartrean phenomenological dictum
that "All consciousness is consciousness of something."
82

Put differently, addiction is a sedimented and successful pattern of flight, a pattern of flight being the process
(continued ... )
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"Feeling ... behaves in the face of the unreal as in that
of the real ... [the unreal] is only the simple reflection of
the feeling."

83

The (real) object of addiction is utilized

in an attempt to real-ize the imaginary image at the same time
as oneself while simultaneously derealizing oneself in order
to create the (imaginary) object of addiction which is then
surreptitiously substituted for the real object.

Hence, the

inevitable failure of the project of addiction: it is attempted simultaneous and symbiotic self-real-ization and selfdereal- ization.

84

The attempt at simultaneous and symbiotic self- realization and self-de-real-ization (the structure of the project
to-be-addicted) is a failure in principle on two counts:
(1) One cannot at the same time move toward and away from her
own freedom.

Freedom is spent either in discharging itself or

obstructing itself, since it is a contradiction in principle
to act so as to effect both at once.
(2) One cannot, as detailed previously, engage in imaginary
consciousness

(a function of impure reflection)

reflection simultaneously.

and pure

To engage in pure reflection is to

82

( ••• continued)
within which
the
for-itself
attempts
to move away
from/negate/vitiate/deny its own freedom (self) . See Being
and Nothingness, p. 40, on patterns of flight.
83

The Psychology of Imagination, 200.

84

0nly the unreal self can real-ize the (imaginary) object

of addiction as object of addiction.

But since there is no

unreal self, this has to be a project of the real self, which
cannot real-ize the imaginary object.
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effect

upon

one's

own

consciousness

the

katharsis

that

necessarily eradicates all vestiges of the imaginary constructs of impure reflection.
effect

the

katharsis

upon

Were consciousness able to

itself

and

still

be

duped

}2y

imaginary contents therein, the for-itself would have no way
of delineating the real from the unreal, and all purported
truth claims would be forever suspect.

The imaginary may take

itself (as a function of nonreflective and impure reflective
consciousnesses)

as the real,

but reflective consciousness

dare not be forever confused concerning its own veracity, lest
one find herself forever adrift upon the sea of not only
pseudo-objectivity,

but

pseudo-subjectivity.

For

if

the

reflective for-itself has no certitude even regarding its own
consciousness, then it has no certitude even regarding its own
subjectivity,

to

say nothing

of

the

problematic

task

of

escaping its own intentional beam to something outside of it.
Conclusion,

as

stated previously:

Either

pure

reflective

consciousness or impure reflective consciousness,
both,

unless

but not

the consciousnesses are not simultaneous but

sequential.
.
.
Th e p h enomenological
experience
of

.
85
"emptiness"
can b e

seen as an impetus for the adoption of imaginary consciousness
and the construction of the image.

The abysmal nature of this

experience can be such that imaginative consciousness is seen

85

See The Psychology of Imagination, 206.
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as preferential.

Once consciousness is "degraded"

86

to the

level of imaginary consciousness and thinking becomes analogical, consciousness experiences the same objects as somehow
binding (fantastic), as freedom bleeds toward and into them.
The price of admission,

as

it were,

into this fantastic

universe of imaginary consciousness is precisely the acceptance of fatality over freedom.

I watch my dreams unfold as

I sleep; at times, I am shocked by what I see.
think of acting within the dream,

Yet I can only

rather than thinking of

shattering its fictitious (self-induced) parameters.

I am no

longer empty because I no longer behold the panorama before me
in a voluntary fashion.
the addict.

I am condemned to be unfree.

I am

87

"There is no passage between real and imaginary feelings,
the real is always accompanied by the ruin of the imaginary."

88

of the

The addict, we have said, has an ongoing experience
"object of addiction" which she has imaginatively

constructed as such.

This (imaginary) image is the focus of

her emotion (imaginary feelings), yet the image is the work of
her real feelings. As long as consciousness remains self-

86

.
Th e Emotions,
76.

87

The addict may be viewed as the woman pretending to fall
asleep who has in fact fallen asleep. Can such a woman wake
herself up? The addict is a victim of metaphysical carpal
tunnels: through engaging in repetitious forms of (addictive)
praxis, the self is finally crippled and finds itself ontologically self-mutilated.
88

The Psychology of Imagination, 209.
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enchanted by the image (that is, as long as the project to-beaddicted remains) , consciousness only has access to imaginary
feelings, not real feelings, the latter of which would begin
to serve to indicate the meaning of the construction of the
imaginary object

(as image) . Therefore, the meaning of the

addict's own consciousness is veiled from her. 89
The real and the imaginary selves are two distinct selves
which, by their very natures, cannot coexist. 90

The imagi-

nary self, as I have indicated, is a project of the real self.
The addict rejects her real self in favor of the project-tobe-her-imaginary-self.

The addict becomes

"bound" by her

imaginary self: her imaginary self becomes her "real self.
Her imaginary self transcends

(overcomes,

itself utilizing the "purifying reflection"

1191

dispenses with)
(in this case,

also a function of the imagination), to collapse at the feet
of her "real self"

( a subset of the imaginary self).

She

begins the project (to-be-addicted) again, only to collapse
· b efore her "rea1 self." n
again
89

And

ye t

only the

addict

Repeated 1'ndef1'n1'tely.~
can be

conscious

of

this

meaning.
90

The Psychology of Imagination, 210.

91

The contrary would be that the imaginary self would know
itself as such. This, of course, could not take place in the
phenomenon of addiction, and from a Sartrean perspective,
could not occur regardless of circumstance. Once the imaginary self becomes an object for itself, it collapses before
its own freedom that is the real self.
n

.

From a Kierkegaardian perspective, "real self," as
engaged here, should always appear within quotations (Sartre
(continued ... )
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Consciousness is spontaneity.

But in the "syndrome of

influence" which occurs with imaginary consciousness,

says

Sartre, consciousness recognizes in itself its own "counterspontaneity.

1194

Such counter-spontaneity has run wild in the

imaginary consciousness of the addict, and the addict experiences a "loss of control, " even in regards to her own consciousness.

If I am defined as freedom, why can't I think

what I want to think?

The existence of the notion of counter-

spontaneity, at least in part, addresses this issue.
sciousness is a "victim" of itself,
otherness.

95

Con-

it experiences its own

But if I am not free, then I am not responsible:

the makeshift ontology of
(ethical) obligation.

the addict,

crafted to suspend

96

"There is no imaginary world.

In fact,

it is but a

92

( • • • continued)
does not follow this practice) , because the self that refuses
to be itself is not a self at all. Hence, "real self." See
The Sickness Unto Death, 42-74.
930
94

95
96

r, until reduction/conversion.

The Psychology of Imagination, 225.
The Psychology of Imagination, 222.

The addict makes the illicit move from not finding
herself responsible for her own intentionality that is her
consciousness to not finding herself responsible for her own
praxis.
It is true that she is not the source of her own
consciousness.
But it is false to say that she is not
responsible for the praxiological choices she makes based upon
this consciousness - provided she is responsible for anything
at all. In addition, she is responsible not for consciousness
itself, but for its mode of being, in this case, beingaddicted.
Response-ability is entailed by the choice of a
project, provided one is responsible for anything at all; if
one's project is not chosen, then one is not free.
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matter of belief.
addict.

So,

too,

the imaginary world of the

Phenomenologically, the addict perceives only the

imaginary world.
of

1197

belief,

Addiction is not experienced as a phenomenon

therefore,

the

addict's

sitz

im

leben

seems

"sedimented" and is experienced vividly as real (irremediable) .

If terror before the unreal exceeds terror before the

real, katharsis/conversion may result.
The experience of the imaginary world is an experience
not of freedom or determinism, but of fatalism. 98
precisely the

This is

experience of the phenomenon of addiction in

that consciousness fatal-izes itself and subsequently unrealizes this fatal-ization.

Fatalism transpires when conscious-

ness degrades itself to the impure, imaginary level, and then
"forgets" (suppresses) the process whereby it effected this
degradation upon itself.
As argued previously, either the unreal/aesthetic or the
real/perceived: "Esthetic contemplation ... a sort of recoil in
relation to the object contemplated which slips into nothingness so that, from this moment on, it is no longer perceived;
it functions as an analogue of itself, that is, that an unreal
image of what it is appears to us through its actual pres-

97

The Psychology of Imagination, 242.
For Sartre,
"belief" is defined as " ... fascination without existential
position." [The Psychology of Imagination, 245.]
Described
thusly, it seems to be an "involuntary" version and subset of
Husserlian bracketing, if such a thing is possible.
98

The Psychology of Imagination, 246.
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ence.

11

99

Either the unreal/addictive or the real/perceived.

(Actual) presence effaces imaginative consciousness.
fore, actual presence effaces addiction.

There-

Actual presence is

accompanied by absurdity and contingency.

The function of

imaginative consciousness in addiction is an attempt to negate
both the former and the latter.

100

Section D
Addiction is a Phenomenon of Bad Faith

Bad faith (self-deception) is an effort to evade one's
.
.
.
. a con f ession.
.
101
own b eing
and in
t h.is sense it
is

Addiction

is likewise a confession in that one prefers being-addicted to
being-oneself.

One can either be addicted or be oneself.

The failure to achieve "wholeness,

11

11

oneness,"

11

102

unifica-

tion," or "ontological integration" leads one to the project
of addiction, in whatever form this project may veil itself.
The experience of ontological integration can occur only when
the for-itself has concretely faced its own desires and its

99

The Psychology of Imagination, 281.

100

This, of course, is a failure in principle, since any
project of the unjustified and unjustifiable for-itself is
equally unjustifiable.
101
102

B eing
'
and Not h'ingness, 2 6 1.

Please see part one, section A of this chapter for the
Kierkegaardian perspective on this same dynamic. The fullthrottled theory of addiction, of course, involves the union
of both Kierkegaardian and Sartrean perspectives.
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own freedom.

Both sadism and masochism, says Sartre, are "two

reefs on which desire may founder."

103

The nonrealization of

the desire for "wholeness" leads to the sado-masochistic selfrelation of

addiction,

an alternate

approach

to unifica-

.
104
t ion.

Addiction is an attempt to effectuate one's own salvation
via the rejection of one's own freedom.

"Thus the refusal of

freedom can be conceived only as an attempt to apprehend
onese lf

as

,
.
,
lf .
b eing-in-itse

11

10s

The

addict

attempts

to

become at-one with the object of addiction by projecting her
freedom into the object (which is g totem for herself), and,
collapsing at its feet, pays it obeisance in hopes of becoming
like

it

(in-itself) .

(self)-extinguishment

106

of

conception of "salvation."

Addiction
one's

own

Simply to

is

the project

freedom

an

of

the

Eastern

seek to become one with

the object of addiction while preserving one's own consciousness would be a Western conception of

103
104

106

Both

•
Being
an d Not h.ingness, 404.

For more on this,
chapter.
105

"salvation. "

see part two,

section E of this

Being
·
and No th·ingness, 440 .

This is equally true of addictive interpersonal
relations, since one can never experience for oneself the
freedom of the Other, that is, one can never experience the
Other's subjectivity, which is in essence the experience of
freedom. See Being and Nothingness, p. 611, for the description of "anti-value", which is the attempt to utilize one's
freedom to become in-itself.
The addict does not flee this
anti-value (even if she fears it), but instead welcomes it.
Nevertheless, she welcomes it only as addict.
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"conceptions" of "salvation" are necessary failures

(since

being-in-itself and being-for-itself are nonnegotiable realms
of being), and the addict has a (nonreflective) awareness of
this.
"The will can reach only details and structures and will
never modify the original project from which it has
sue d . II 107

The will is an epiphenomenon of the project:

isin

relation to the project to-be-addicted, the will can provide
only temporary reflective respite from (the effects of) this
project.

One chooses reflectively ("will") to circumvent the

nonreflective choice which one is - thus one "chooses" against
oneself (the freedom that is being itself against the being of
freedom itself in the for-itself) - although reflectively in
favor of oneself.
Therefore, a reflective "abandonment" of addiction is a
necessary failure unless a nonreflective abandonment can be
. h .
coup 1 e d wit
it. 108

This would be the attempt to integrate

thetic and nonthetic projects.

How does one make the nonre-

flective reflective, or how does one make imaginary consciousness/emotional consciousness reflective consciousness?

The

ability to shift and focus awareness from the one to the other
is consciously and deliberately impaired by the addict.
can one abandon a

107
108

project

{of addiction)

•
Being
and Not h.ingness, 476.

if

one

How

cannot

Underlining mine.

In fact, if the latter is realized, the former will
appear superfluous.
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reflectively or nonreflectively choose to engage in a new
•

?109

proJect.

When one does not have a

reflective awareness of the

project to-be-addicted, addiction is experienced as the "fall"
(psychological and ontological) into facticity. 1 w
Addiction is surrogate intimacy,

an attempt to ground

one's being without the necessity of relations with other
freedoms as such.

The ontological flue vent of the Other is

voided in favor of the pseudofreedom proffered by the imaginatively constructed object of addiction.

This is the case even

in interpersonal addictions, since the addict fails to relate
to the freedom of the Other as freedom, but rather seeks to
acquire (imbibe) it in the manner of an object - the imaginatively constructed object of addiction.

Section E
Addiction is a Basic Fear of the Human Condition:
The Addict Prepares Her Own Death

Th e

·
t ed
'' inver

1 i· b er t y ''

of

Sartre's

anti' - Semi' te

111

i's

. 1 y wh at t h e addict
.
h as apparent 1 y o b
. d . 112
precise
taine

Per-

haps

this

she

experiences

it

rather

as

an

inversion

of

109

That is , be a new project.

110

viz. addiction is the nonreflective telos.

111
112

That is, liberty without responsibility.

cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew,
George J. Becker (New York: Schocken, 1972), 32.

trans.
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inverted liberty:

as responsibility without liberty.

She

feels responsible for her addiction without feeling free to
abandon it.

.
.
lLl
Th e experience
o f b eing-towards-death.

The

social psychology, i.e. group psychology, of the anti-Semite
is the individual psychology of the addict.
operates

intrapsychically;

the

former,

The latter

interpsychically.

Nevertheless, the imagination and construction of the imaginary object remains identical in both cases: its purpose is to
vitiate and mask freedom and its corollary,
t y.

responsibili-

114

The relationship that the anti-Semite has with the Jew is
the relationship the addict has with himself:

the addict

discerns in himself a "metaphysical principle that drives him
to do evil under all circumstances [that is, perpetuate the
. . ] , 115 even though he thereby destroy himself, 11116
a dd iction

113

The addict feels that this 11 nonevadeable 11 addiction is
leading her towards death, towards unhope, inexorably, even if
this death is not ostensibly "physical" or corporeal.
114

The "sub-man" in de Beauvoir's The Ethics of Ambiguity
(pp. 42-45)
is afraid of engaging himself as a project, is
afraid of a "positive" use of freedom. It is this "sub-man"
who turns to addiction as a project-unrecognized-as-such. In
this way, his freedom is discharged "without" responsibility,
the very conditions the "sub-man" sought to attain.
The
"positive" use of freedom entails the movement toward becoming
a self. The "negative" use of freedom entails anything that
involves self-negation. A person becomes a slave to any end
(project) not posited as such.
"The sub-man makes his way
across a world deprived of meaning toward a death which merely
confirms his long negation of himself." [p. 45]
Quite the
saga of the addict.
115

itself.

Based on the principle that consciousness "ethicizes"
See part one of the present chapter.
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Anti-Semitism

represents

a

basic

sadism;

120

once

the

anti-Semite and "the Jew" are within the domain of a single
human consciousness
masochism.

(that

of

the

addict) ,

The addict as sado-masochist.

the sado-masochist

in that

she has

121

sadism becomes
The addict is

introjected the anti-

Semi te' s belief in the metaphysical principle that drives the
Jew to do evil, and then has undertaken the process of trying
to dispel this principle from her own psyche.
seeks a

psychic incision to

heinous evil.
guilt

The addict thus

induce the expulsion of

this

Addiction is thus the creation of ontological

(freedom-negation)

and

also

a

bid

for

ontological

expiation (i.e. rectification of the previous psychic surgery
or ontological mutilation resultant from this freedom-nega'
) . 122
t ion

As the anti-Semite prepares the death of the Jew,

the

addict prepares her own death because she finds herself to be

120

Anti-Semite and Jew, 46.

121

cf. Ernest Becker's The Denial of Death (New York: The
Free Press, 1973) , 244-248, and Nietzsche's Genealogy of
Morals, second essay, 57-96.
122

Addiction, as a species of self-mutilation, is a kind
of masochism.
This is not to say that all masochists are
addicts.
Insofar as the addict utilizes her addiction to
manipulate the Other, the addict is a sadist. This is not to
say that all sadists are addicts. Unless it is the case that
masochism, sadism, and sado-masochism are themselves kinds of
addictions.
To support this claim, I would be required to
provide a detailed description/analysis of these practices,
something clearly beyond the scope of this work.
These
practices appear to be addictions to the degree in which they
exhibit teleology synonymous with other addictions, coupled
with imaginatively produced hypnagogic imagery.

188

the embodied "principle of evil" that she seeks to stamp out.
The addict' s only recourse lay in eradicating this very "evil"
thing - her own freedom -

(for how can there be evil without

freedom and responsibility? she "thinks"), thus the in-itself
becomes the goal of the project of addiction.
itself is precisely the death of the for-itself.
prepares her own death.

123

And the inThe addict

123

This description of addiction calls to mind Camus'
brilliant history of "metaphysical rebellion" as expounded in
his 1951 work, The Rebel. I feel that it would be difficult
to overrate this amazing and often misunderstood book.
The
publication of this volume led to the definitive split between
Sartre and Camus. In it, Camus attacks Marxism and Christianity directly, but implicitly attacks existentialism as well as
all other forms of what he called "idealism." ["To abandon
oneself to principles is really to die - and to die for an
impossible love which is the contrary of love." (pp. 129,
130)]
I view addiction as a form of introverted or introjected
metaphysical rebellion. In delineating this rebellion, Camus
makes the following claims (these few excerpts are by no means
meant to be exhaustive) :
"Rebellion cannot exist without the feeling that, somewhere
and somehow, someone is right." (p. 13).
"The transition from facts to rights is manifest ... in rebellion." (p. 15) .
"··· [R]ebellion puts total freedom up for trial." (p. 284).
The addict is the rebel, she recognizes herself as
calling the metaphysics of existence into question, yet she
fails to engage in interpersonal (social/political, etc.)
rebellion, but instead remains yoked through fear of freedom
and its implications to a fully introjected (internalized)
form of rebellion. She recognizes the legitimacy of rebellion
while recognizing the illegitimacy of her form of (introjected) rebellion, which is no more than legitimated freedom
negated as legitimate praxis.
The being of the rebel (as
addict) becomes sour, becomes rancid, as she tries to forcefully expel her (self-introjected) freedom.
The rebel may
utilize her freedom in two conflicting ways: introjection and
expulsion. The dominance of one of these forms over the other
will determine rebellion as praxis or as addiction.

189
Anti-Semitism is a basic fear of the human condition,
precisely as is the case of the addict.

124

"His life [the anti-

Semite's] is nothing but a long flight from others and from
himself,

11125

the addictive

flight

from

the being of

d om.

126

ed;

the addict particularizes the anxiety,

Universal existential anxiety (angst)

free-

is introject-

turning it into

fear, centering it on repercussions/machinations/ruminations
surrounding the object of addiction.

Death (global freedom-

negation) is less an object of fear than the pain of addiction, which is, for the addict, a specific and ever present
phenomenological reality.

The absence of this flight (free-

dam-negation) in the for-itself would be authenticity.
To broach the topic of authenticity, for Sartre, is to
broach the topic of morality: "Thus the choice of authenticity
.

.

appears to b e a mora 1 d ecision. "

124

127

Sartre states on page

Anti-Semite and Jew, 54.

125

Anti-Semite and Jew, 135.

126

Under a certain description, we could in fact conceptualize the anti-Semite as an addict with her imaginatively
constructed/nuanced external object, the Jew.
In this case,
the anti-Semite could no more do without the Jew than any
other addict could do without her object of addiction.
The
"loss" of the Jew (as an object of execration) would thus
involve the anti-Semite in withdrawal. Therefore, the antiSemite has a stake in preventing the death of the Jew, that
very class of people she may conceptually and even praxiologically seek to exterminate.
Withdrawal: Existential pain
experienced over the loss/prospective loss of the object of
addiction.
• s
. and Jew, 141. I as k the reader kindly to
Antiemite
recall the bridging of the is-ought gap in the phenomenon of
addiction, as delineated in part one of this chapter.
127

190

ninety-three of the same volume that the term "inauthentic"
implies "no moral blame."

Here we see clearly the strange

relation, for Sartre, between the authentic and the inauthentic human being.

Authenticity appears in the moral sphere,

but inauthenticity somehow does not.
reconciled?

Can these viewpoints be

I certainly shall not even feign to solve the

problem here, but shall leave the reader with one thought: If
the anti-Semite is "inauthentic," and inauthenticity implies
no moral blame, on what grounds can Sartre condemn the antiSemite?

It seems that if the anti-Semite is inconsistent in

. .
h er position,

t h en

s artre is
.

too. 128

If addiction is merely

an ontological phenomenon (as, supposedly, is anti-Semitism),
stemming

from

the

improper utilization of

one's

freedom,

freedom itself cannot be seen as a legitimate aim and ground
(metavalue)

for a morality.
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The categorization of addic-

tion (and anti-Semitism) as moral phenomena is essential for
the possibility of any Sartrean ethical theory.

If freedom

can be truncated by the for-itself (as in the case of addiction) without ethical ramifications, then the for-itself can
have no legitimate value at which it can project

itself.

f inconsistency
.
.
.
. d ictmen
.
t , then on wh at
is
no in
Sartrean grounds can we ever impute "moral blame, " since
Sartre wants so much to censor anti-Semitism? How does Sartre
fail to be caught in his own trap?
128 I

129

Sartre attempts the latter repeatedly, in Anti-Semite
and Jew, in Existentialism and Human Emotions, in Cahiers,
and, I believe one could argue, in The Psychology of Imagination and Being and Nothingness, the latter volume, o{ course,
merely by implication, since the text remains on an ontological level.
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Which may well be the case.

"Thus it amounts to the same

thing whether one gets drunk alone or is a
tions.

leader of na-

11130

Section F
Addiction: The Illicit Illusion

To conclude this work's Sartrean section on addiction, I
wish to note but a few ethical implications of the phenomenon
of addiction.

These observations are not essential for the

theory, but are certainly important tangential considerations
when

dealing

with

this

phenomenon within

the

context

of

Sartre's philosophy.
"The ultimate meaning of the acts of honest men is the

130

Being and Nothingness, 62 7. This is found at the very
end of this volume, under the section entitled "Ethical
Implications." Interestingly, Sartre says in the same short
section the following: "Thus existential psychoanalysis is
moral description for it releases to us the ethical meaning of
various human projects ... Thus we are already on the moral
plane but concurrently on that of bad faith ... existential
psychoanalysis is going to reveal to man the real goal of his
pursuit ... as a means of deliverance and salvation ... In
particular is it possible for freedom to take itself for a
value as the source of all value, or must it necessarily be
defined in relation to a transcendent value which haunts it?"
[pp. 626, 627]
The latter scenario, as Sartre repeatedly
points out, is a failure in principle.
The former, which
would require the "conversion," delivers us over to an
"ethical plane." [p. 628] Of course, if it really does amount
to the "same thing" if one gets drunk or is a leader of
nations, then it makes no difference if one loves or hates her
neighbor, for one would have no "neighbors" at all. All talk
concerning the value and sanctity of freedom as such would be
strictly rubbish.
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quest for freedom as such."

131

Given the preceding section,

one could certainly ask "Why be honest?"

Choosing freedom,
132
for Sartre, is an ethical rather than an aesthetic choice.

Why is this?

How so?

Sartre tells us that coherence is the
proper ground for ethical decision making. 133 Why is this?

What does coherence have to do with morality?
unquestionable

ideal?

unguestionable ideal?

Why is

this?

Is coherence an

Why is

freedom an

Is it? Other statements regarding this

issue from the same work include the following:
"We want freedom for freedom's sake and in every
particular circumstance. 11134
"Therefore, in the name of the will for freedom, which
freedom itself implies
[the inexorable dythrarnbic
ontology of individuation? cf. The Birth of Tragedy], i
may pass judgement [moral judgement] on those who seek to
hide from themselves the complete arbi~rariness
and the
13
complete freedom of their existence. "
"One may choose anvthing if it is on the grounds of
.
1 vement." 13!!
ree invo

f

If my description of addiction is correct, then addiction, for
Sartre, is illegitimate.
free,

It cannot be the free project of a

honest being (engaging in pure reflective conscious-

131
Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions,
trans. Bernard Frechtman and Hazel E. Barnes (Secaucus, NJ:
Citadel, 1957), 45.
132Existentia
.
. l.ism and Human Emotions, 42.

mine.

133Existentia
.
. l.ism and Human Emotions, 45.
134Existentia
.
. l.ism and Human Emotions, 46.
13SExistentia
.
. l.ism and Human Emotions, 46.
13sExistentia
.
. l.ism and Human Emotions, 48.

Underlining
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ness), and it is therefore "immoral," given the statements
above.
In terms of addiction,

the addict' s phenomenological

loss/restriction of freedom is:
(1)

An

illusion

(voodoo metaphysics).

In fact,

(A)

the

project of addiction is involved in the quest for freedom, or
(B)

the project of addiction is involved in masking one's

freedom from oneself, but one is in fact not less free, or (C)
the project of addiction is an unsuccessful project to become
less free.

All projects are projects to-be-free. but one does

not become free through all projects.

One seeks to become

"less free" because this is perceived as a "freeing" experience.

Movement relative to freedom is a function

of the for-

itself and must be ascertained/evaluated only through each
for-itself 's phenomenal field.
(2) A process consciousness effects on itself.

Therefore, the

addict is necessarily dishonest with herself, i.e. she is in
bad faith, and
(3) The addict thinks (1) nonreflectively, while thinking she
is "less" free (reflectively) .

Consciousness thus thinks A (I

am equally free) and not-A (I am "less" free) at the same time
(bad faith), violating Aristotle's "law" of noncontradiction.
The addict thinks A and not-A simultaneously (this she
must do in her role as addict) ;

addiction is

inherently
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paradoxical, unthinkable, absurd.

137

The goal of addiction

is the cessation (or discharge) of freedom as such, hence the
end

.
is
not va l i'd . 138

extinguishing itself.
project.

Therefore,

it

is not a

of

valid free

"The constructive activities of man take on a valid

meaning only when
freedom.

Freedom is engulfed in the goal

they are

assumed as

a

movement

toward

139

Now either addiction is a movement toward freedom which
involves the experience of "unf reedom" or "loss of freedom" as
a movement toward freedom,

or addiction is a movement away

from freedom, in which case it would lack a valid meaning.
have argued throughout this

chapter for the latter.

I
The

project to-be-addicted is one of attempting to hide one's
freedom from oneself, and to do so in the dynamic surrounding
the "object of addiction."

Addiction is a "negative" action

in that transcendence is "condemned to fall uselessly back
upon itself because it is cut off from its real goals."
defines a situation of

(self)

•

"oppression."

140

This

Addiction is

illegitimate as a project because "A freedom which is inter-

137

"An end is valid only by a return to the freedom which
established it and which willed itself through this end. But
this implies that freedom is not to be engulfed in any goal;
neither is it to dissipate itself vainly without aiming at a
goal." [The Ethics of Ambiguity, 70]
138

Th'is is
'
' k egaard , Sartre, and d e
equally true for Kier
Beauvoir.
139
140

The Ethics of Ambiguity, 80.
The Ethics of Ambiguity, 81.
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ested only in denying freedom must be denied ... [F]reedom will
'
'
never b e given;
it
a 1 ways h as to b e won ... " 141

the addict consistently fails to recognize.

This reality
The flaying of

being upon the stake of truth.
Yet the reflective slat of opportunity waits quietly for
the addict as an eye in a dim cavern, as a lantern on a hill,
as a voice in the wind, if the addict will but turn a weary
gaze upon the halcion illumination.

Fail not, O wayward one,

to heed the beckoning beam that is within you!

The light of

freedom dances deftly upon the razor's edge of reflection,
singing brightly of another being,
another land, yet the same land.

yet the same being,

of

The horn pipe plays to your

gossamer-like figure sweet tales of moon beams playing upon
your destiny the hope of an eternity.

Your being cries out!

Do not mute its wistful voice of pining.
'
'
Rise
up, my 1 ove, my f air
one, an d come away. 142

In

the

next

chapter

I

shall

address

the

necessary

preconditions for the possibility of a nonaddictive relationI shall also demonstrate that Sartre advances not a

ship.

theory of love, but a theory of addiction.

REED'S THEORY OF ADDICTION: A SUMMATION
Addiction is the self (A) seeking to be other than it is,
(B) seeking to mask the project to be other than it is from
141
142

The Ethics of Ambiguity, 91, 119.
Song of Songs 2:10b
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itself, and (C) seeking to mask its "true nature" from itself.
Truth about the self and freedom are inseparable; untruth (the
lie) and bondage are likewise linked.
The experience of the contingent and unaccounted for
(unnecessary,

superfluous)

nature of freedom is such that

consciousness fears freedom and the dread/anguish that is an
integral

part

of

the

consciousness fears

experience

of

freedom.

Therefore,

itself and the truth of itself,

since

consciousness is freedom.
Since consciousness fears freedom (the truth of itself) ,
it seeks to elude its own self-knowledge by way of an addictive encounter with being.

By means of such an encounter,

consciousness (A) effectively (self-deceptively) obscures its
knowledge

of

itself,

(B)

gives

itself

a

"nature"

or

"essence" (the "locus" of the addiction), and therefore,
"OVERCOMES"

THE

INSOLUBLE

PROBLEM

SUPERFLUITY OF ITS OWN FREEDOM

OF

THE

(BEING).

CONTINGENCY

an
(C)
OR

It achieves this

through the "realization" that it cannot dispense with the
"object" of addiction, thus legitimating, due to its experiential inexorable exigency, the praxiological link between the
addict and the object of addiction.

The addiction "results

from"

self

the essential

nature

of

the

and is

therefore

"irremediable" and consequently justified, since it can no
longer fall within the realm of free being.

Put differently,

if one's project is not chosen, then one is not free.
the self is determined as addict.

Addiction, then,

Ergo,
is the
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contradictory effort of the self seeking self-constitution
through the not-self (object of addiction) .
But being is either free or determined, but not freely
determined.

The addict seeks to freely determine being,

therefore engaging in the project of denying his or her own
freedom.

If freedom is denied, there is n.g hope of constitut-

ing oneself as a valid project, since freedom is the only
possible source of validity (validity

=

meaning) .

Indetermi-

nate free being equals nonself, so the task of consciousness
is to become a self without recourse to freedom-denying selfdeterminative projects.
Consciousness of and knowledge about the self allow one
to seek to

~

free rather than to be.

Addiction is a project

in which the self seeks being as an end.

The self desires to

think its own being, but the necessary difference between
being and thought makes this impossible in principle.
self as addict seeks to be what it cannot think:

So the
its own

being.
In order for addiction to be possible,

emotional and

imaginative consciousnesses must be possible, since emotion
and imagination are necessary for addiction to transpire.
Both types of consciousness operate on a sub-reflective level,
a level at which consciousness is not clear to itself, a level
at which consciousness is not fully aware of its own "nature."
On this sub-reflective level,

consciousness

imaginatively

produces an addictive image which functions as an analogue of
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the existential object in question.

The addict bestows upon

this object-as-image "magical" powers, most importantly, the
"power" to coopt a degree of the freedom that is the self.
Unless the addict can dispense with this mode of consciousness,

he or she can only think of acting within the sub-

reflective "dream."

The unreal (addicted) self is mesmerized

by the image produced via emotional/imaginative consciousness,
and remains trapped within the imaginary feelings/thoughts
produced thereby.

The unreal self is produced by the real

self simultaneous with the production of the (unreal) object
of addiction (image) .
real

(free)

The addict cannot return to his or her

self unless

imaginary

consciousness

and

its

attendant image is eradicated, as perception and imagination
are antithetical (both being wholly consciousness) , and cannot
occur together.

This is because the image, being imaginative-

ly constructed, is not perceivable, even in theory.
Addiction is possible because the self is both voluntary
and

involuntary

spontaneity.

Voluntary

reflective or sub-reflective freedom,

spontaneity

whereas

is

involuntary

spontaneity is nonreflective (yet intentional), at one with
consciousness.

How does one become conscious of one's own

consciousness?

How can one know consciousness as such, when

consciousness is not knowledge? One cannot know consciousness
qua consciousness,

and therefore the project that one is

escapes reflective comprehension.
The will, being voluntary spontaneity, being reflective
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consciousness, cannot comprehend and therefore cannot alter
the

fundamental

project

or being that

one

is.

The only

solution, therefore, to the problem of addiction would be to
redirect the project-to-be, for as long as one seeks being as
an end, one is the addict: one seeks to imbibe being and make
one's own existence necessary.
If one cannot renounce the nonreflective project to be,
one is forever the addict.
(nonreflectively)

This is because one believes

that one needs to ingest the nonself in

order to be a self.

The necessary and sufficient condition

for the possibility of a nonaddicted mode of being would be
the possibility of the project of freedom as an end, the being
of play.

Therefore, we could ask the question concerning the

possibility of a nonaddicted mode of being in a different but
equally accurate way: Is it possible for human being to play?
For the possibility of play is the possibility of freedom.
And the possibility of

freedom is

the possibility of

the

Any unacknowledged project of the self

nonaddicted self.

creates in the self a condition of bondage, a condition of
slavery.
seeking

Addiction is the self slavishly but nonreflectively
to

justify

its

own unjustified and unjustifiable

freedom that it is, a freedom that is indelibly precarious, a
freedom that cannot exist as anything but praxis.

For freedom

cannot be reif ied or collected, but must be utilized as the
flow that it is.

Anything less is self-mutilation.

CHAPTER 4
SARTRE'S THEORY OF LOVE: A THEORY OF ADDICTION
Introduction

In the present chapter, I will do a closer analysis of
Sartre's phenomenological apparatus as it impinges upon the
topics of love and addiction.

Of particular import for this

project will be the following well-trod Sartrean notions: prereflective (nonreflective), impure reflective and reflective
consciousnesses, bad faith in both the weak and strong senses
of this term (to be elucidated below), the purifying reflection (katharsis), the phenomenological reduction, deliverance,
salvation, conversion, and authenticity.

Among the conten-

tions I wish to make in this chapter are the following:
(1) That pre-reflective consciousness
(2) That impure reflection
(3)

That

the

purifying

=

=

"immediacy".

bad faith consciousness.

reflection

is

not

equivalent

to

conversion.
The purifying reflection allows for consciousness of bad
faith.

Consciousness of bad faith

authenticity.

is good faith but not

Good faith is a certain point of view on one's

bad faith, but not a

(radical) escape 1 from it.

Existential

psychoanalysis, via the purifying reflection, allows the human
1

i.e. as would be necessary for conversion.
200
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person to "see" the project that he is

(the project of the

recovery of being), but this alone does not constitute the
abandonment of the project.

This is why it is possible to

glean from Sartre's writings weak and strong notions of bad
faith.

2

Strong bad faith exists in the for-itself that sees

its project for what it is, and yet still engages itself as
this very project (a scenario possible only subsequent to the
purifying reflection) .
Weak bad faith would constitute engagement in the same
project prior to the purifying reflection,
reflection.

"Deliverance

and

salvation,"

subsequent to the purifying reflection,
through existential psychoanalysis.
ance

(conversion,

salvation)

through impure

3

possible

only

are made possible

A condition of deliver-

would be authenticity.

addict can exist in weak or strong bad faith;

in fact,

for-itself in weak or strong bad faith is the addict

The
the
(non-

being inexorably seeking to be through that which is other
than itself) .

Authenticity dispenses with the conditionality

of addiction in the for-itself.

That is, the authentic self

does not need to seek to imbibe the non-self in order to be
2

Joseph Catalano, "Good and Bad Faith: Weak and Strong
Notions, " Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry,
vol. XVII, no. 1 (1980-81): 79-90.
I utilize but radically
alter Catalano's distinction between weak and strong notions
of bad faith in Sartre, nearly to the point of a complete
inversion.
I see this as necessary for a more complete
rendering of Sartre's concept of bad faith.
3

See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: Ari Essay on
Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York:
Philosophical Library, n.d.), 626, 627.
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its self.

"Self"-ingestion is not a constitutive ground for

selfhood for either the addict or the authentic self.

The

authentic self recognizes this and operates knowing that it is
the case, whereas the addict continues his flight toward the
ingestion of freedom/being.

The purifying reflection alone is

not enough to spawn authenticity, because awareness
reflection)

and knowledge

(or quasi-knowledge,

(impure

through pure

reflection) are not equivalent to authentic being, but merely
are preconditions for its possibility.

Authentic being,

if

such is possible, would arise simultaneous with a choice based
upon this awareness and knowledge, but would not be reducible
merely to this awareness and knowledge.
not equivalent to authenticity,

Good faith, then, is

but is,

again,

a necessary

prerequisite for the possibility of the same.
There are thus four levels of being, not three:
{I) Pre-reflective consciousness.

Innocence?

No, since being

still seeks to be other than itself.
{II) Impure reflection.
(III) Pure reflection.

This is the realm of weak bad faith.
This is the realm of strong bad faith

when coupled with the refusal of (IV).
realm of good faith,

This could also be the

depending upon one's own relation to

one's own self-knowledge.
(IV) Conversion.

This is authentic human being.

For Sartre, level (IV) is unattainable.
strate this below.

I shall demon-

Being and Nothingness is written from the

point of view of pure reflection (III) , about persons engaged
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in impure reflectivity (II) .
downward,"
is

always

4

"Reasons are always from above

and the explication and analysis of any paradigm
extraparadigmatical.

Those

who

engage

in

the

purifying reflection and subsequently suppress the evidence
derived therefrom are in bad faith in the strong sense.

Those

of pre-reflective consciousness cannot be in bad faith in the
strong sense because they have not yet taken a point of view
on

their

own being as

such,

rather,

being

it,

they

are

absolutely taken in.

Those who engage in impure reflection

are

the

"captivated"

by

psychic

objects

which

their

own

consciousness has spun, and, due to the element of captivity,
are in bad faith in the weak sense.

Such a consciousness has

become drunk through the consumption of its own pharmacological elixir (the pharmacon), imbibing to the dregs the draught
of its own serum of falsehood.

Truth is temporally suspended

in the balance of unknowing, as consciousness has eclipsed the
vision of its own sun.

Many of these contentions may

appear

to run counter to much of accepted scholarship on Sartre and
therefore appear untenable, but seeming is not always being,
and sometimes, at least, the crowd is untruth.

5

The aim of part one of this chapter is to show that the
Sartrean conversion is not possible.

4

If conversion is not

C.S. Lewis, ed., George MacDonald: An Anthology
York: Macmillan, 1978), 22.
5

(New

See Soren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Work as
an Author: A Report to History, trans. by Walter Lowrie (New
York: Harper and Row, 1962), 109-120.
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possible, for Sartre, then the only possible type of Sartrean
human being is the addicted being.
attack,

a

flank,

if you will,

This is another angle of

on Sartrean type two love,

showing the impossibility of its existence in any Sartrean
world.

In chapter two I demonstrated that the conversion was

a necessary precondition for the possibility of Sartrean type
two love.

I also showed in that chapter that Sartrean type

one and type two love were incompatible.

In addition,

I

sought to show the impossibility of Sartrean type two love
against the backdrop of Sartrean ontology.
argue that the conversion is not possible.

Here, I wish to
Since the conver-

sion was previously shown to be a necessary prerequisite for
type two love, type two love, then, is likewise excluded from
any possible Sartrean world.

This being the case, Sartre is

left with only type one love.

Type one love, as I shall argue

in this chapter, is nothing but g form of addiction in light
of

the

phenomenological

chapter three.

theory of

addiction proffered

in

Therefore, Sartre's theory of love is actually

a theory of addiction.

This I shall conclusively demonstrate

in part two of the present chapter.

The Sartrean world thus

remains, many "critical" empyrean accolades to the contrary,
loveless.

Part One
Section A
The Phenomenological Reduction in Sartre
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What is the phenomenological reduction in Sartre?
question may be premature,

This

as there is no consensus as to

whether the reduction even exists in Sartre's philosophy.

If

the reduction in fact exists in Sartre (a question we shall
attend to momentarily) , what would it involve?

It could/would

involve one or more of the following:
( 1)

The

process

whereby

consciousness

suspends

judgement

concerning the existential condition or truth value of the
phenomenon (experiential reality) in question. "Experience" is
the operative word here, rather than "reality," the "real,"
etc.

What is at issue, once the reduction has taken place, is

not the existence or nonexistence of the datum before consciousness,

but

the

specific

nature

of

tha data

and

the

conditions for its appearing/possibility of its appearing. In
this way, no existential truth claims need be made about the
"object" pole of consciousness, and consciousness is free to
focus on the appearing itself.
(2) The process whereby consciousness seeks to go beyond the
phenomenon and its series of appearances in order to grasp its
essence.

The essence could be said to be the meaning of the

phenomenon.
(3)

The process whereby consciousness purges itself of bad

faith,

viz.

a

faces

itself,

reflective katharsis in which consciousness
unfettered by duplicity.

The nature of the
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project that is the for-itself will come to light under this
description.
The above

three descriptions

of

the phenomenological

reduction are by no means mutually exclusive.

It

is my

contention that they are in fact compatible, a claim that will
be developed coincident with the development of a number of
other claims relevant to the topic at hand.

But before this

can take place, we need to address squarely the possibility of
the phenomenological reduction in Sartre.
The translators of Sartre's early work, The Transcendence
of the Ego, state that
... the rejection of the transcendental ego and the return
to the phenomenological doctrine of intentionality in its
original significance had a radical consequence
seemingly not fully evident to Sartre himself at the time
of the following essay [1936-37] - which led directly to
existentialism, that is, to a philosophy of human
existence. The radical consequence is that the important
Husserlian 6 technique of "reduction" or "epoche" is
.
'bl e.
1mposs1
Much

of

the

debate

ity/possibility/impossibility

surrounding
of

the

the

reduction

necessin

Sartre

revolves around what is meant by the reduction, and can be
resolved at this level.

Sartre himself spoke of the necessary

use of the phenomenological reduction in his brilliant 1940
work entitled The Psychology of Imagination.

7

Hazel Barnes

6

Robert Kirkpatrick and Forrest Williams, Introduction to
Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, n.d.), 23.
7

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, trans,
anonymous. (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, n.d.), 259ff.
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writes in her "Key to Special Terminology" in her translation
of Being and Nothingness that Sartre approves of the "eidetic
reduction" but rejects the epoche.
the Ego,

Sartre writes that

8

In The Transcendence of

" ... the epoche is no longer a

miracle, an intellectual method, an erudite procedure: it is
an anxiety which is imposed on us and which we cannot avoid:
it is both a pure event of transcendental origin and an ever
possible accident of our daily life."

9

Many other notable thinkers have maintained that Sartre
rejects the reduction(s).

Wilfred Desan states that "Heideg-

ger and Sartre have abolished the
Natanson maintains

that

his

"rejects

commentary

on

Husserl's

1110

Maurice

"no epoche or reduction has

performed" in Sartre's philosophy.
in

reductions.

Being

11

and

Joseph Catalano writes

Nothingness

phenomenological

been

that

reduction."

12

Sartre
Robert

Solomon claims that "Sartre and Heidegger explicitly reject
the

reduction in all

its forms.

1113

A.

G.

Pleydell-Pearce

claims that "Sartre found no role in his philosophical method
8
9

Being and Nothingness, 630.
The Transcendence of the Ego, 103. Underlining mine.

10

wilfred Desan,
Books, 1960), 5.

The Tragic

Finale

(New York:

Anchor

1

1Maurice Natanson, A Critigµe of Jean-Paul Sartre's
Ontology (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1951), 70.
12

Joseph S. Catalano, A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's
"Being and Nothingness" (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 8.
13

Robert Solomon, Phenomenology and Existentialism (New
York: Harper and Row, 1974), 20.
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for that central feature of Husserlian phenomenology - the
epoche.

14

Contrary to this view is that espoused by Kerry Walters,
Linda Bel 1 , and Thomas Bus ch.
Nothingness

15

Bus ch holds that "Being and

can be understood only within the context of

Sartre's use of the phenomenological reduction.

1116

He also

states that Sartre's philosophy can be seen as an "extension
of Husserl's programmatic."
in

fact

a

necessary place

philosophy.

17

My own view is that there is
for

the

reduction

in Sartre's

I also feel that it is necessary to deal with

this issue in order to adequately address the topics of love
and addiction.

The possibility/impossibility of the reduction

has extensive ramifications vis-a-vis Sartre's notion of love,
and also for the construction of a phenomenological theory of
addiction.

14

A. G. Pleydell-Pearce, The Journal of
Society for Phenomenology 5 (January 1974): 86.

the

British

15

See Linda Bell, Sartre's Ethics of Authenticity (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1989); Thomas Busch,
"Sartre's Use of the Reduction: Being and Nothingness Reconsidered," in Jean-Paul Sartre: Contemporary Approaches to His
Philosophy, edited by Silverman and Elliston (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1980), 17-29; Thomas Busch,
"Sartre: The Phenomenological Reduction and Human Relationships," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 6: 1
(January 1975): 55-61; and Kerry S. Walters, "A Recovery of
Innocence: The Dynamics of Sartrean Radical Conversion, "
Auslegung, XI: 1 (Fall 1984): 358-377.
16

17

Thomas Busch, "Sartre's Use of the Reduction": ·10.
Ibid.

I

18.
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What is the phenomenological reduction in Sartre?

It is

certainly true that some critics deny that such a reduction
exists, but I wish to focus on the line of interpretation that
maintains that the writings of Sartre can only be understood
within
This,

the
most

context

of

certainly,

the

phenomenological

is my view.

Thomas

reduction.

Busch,

18

in his

article entitled "Sartre: The Phenomenological Reduction and
Human Relationships" maintains, simply, that impure reflection
constitutes the "natural attitude" and that pure reflection
(effected by way of the purifying reflection) constitutes the
"phenomenological

viewpoint,"

The natural attitude,
faith.

he says,

or

the

"reduced"

attitude.

19

is marked by indelible bad

Busch maintains that "If Being and Nothingness is read

within the context of Sartre's presentation of the reduction
in The Transcendence of the Ego, it is evident that a purifying reflection can be effected which delivers a consciousness
from bad

faith.

1120

This

reduction

is

the

move

from

the

18

See, e.g. Thomas W. Busch, "Sartre: The Phenomenological
Reduction and Human Relationships,": 55-61; Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman
(Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1980): 14; Francis Jeanson,
Sartre and the Problem of Morality, trans. Robert V. Stone
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980): 34, 83-89;
and Kerry S. Walters, "A Recovery of Innocence: The Dynamics
of Sartrean Radical Conversion," : 358-377. These writers are
in agreement in that they maintain that the phenomenological
reduction is a katharsis during which consciousness moves from
the level of impure reflection to pure reflection.
19

"Sartre: The
Relationships": 57.
20

Ibid., 61.

Phenomenological

Reduction

and

Human
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natural attitude characterized by bad faith to the phenomenalogical attitude in which bad faith is rooted out.

Busch also

maintains that subsequent to the reduction, "the stage is set
for

the

refusal

by phenomenological

project to be God ... "

21

consciousness

of

the

I can follow Busch this far, as long

as this stage-setting is not confused with the conversion
itself.

The order is therefore (1) The natural attitude,

The reduced attitude, and

(3)

question both in play and at
whether or not (3) is possible.

The converted attitude.
bay at

this

point

(2)
The

concerns

In another article on Being

and Nothingness, Busch claims that Sartre "··· reserves his
treatment of authentic human relations for separate study,"
because Being and Nothingness is only meant to be a conditional,

partialized ontology.

22

Linda Bell,

in Sartre's Ethics

of Authenticity, equates pure reflection (the phenomenological
reduction) with (radical) conversion.

23

Kerry Walters seeks

to clearly delineate the reduction from the conversion.
21

24

In

Ibid., 57.

22

Thomas W. Busch, "Sartre's Use of the Reduction: Being
and Nothingness Reconsidered": 26, 18. Note that Sartre in
fact does not reserve his treatment of authentic human
relationships for separate study, as he does not study them
at all.
23

Linda Bell, Sartre's Ethics of Authenticity, 118.
Others also seem to equate the reduction with the conversion.
See, e.g. de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 14; Francis
Jeanson, Sartre and the Problem of Morality, 28; and Thomas C.
Anderson, The Foundation and Structure of Sartrean Ethics
(Lawrence, KS: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), 41.
24

Kerry Walters, "A Recovery of Innocence: The Dynamics
of Sartrean Radical Conversion": 358-377.
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Cahiers, we may remember, Sartre tells us that

the "pursuit

of being is hell, " and that Being and Nothingness was an
"ontology before conversion. 1125
What is the relationship between reduction and conversion
in Sartre?
work

is

Sartre tells us in Being and Nothingness that the

writ ten as

a

description

reflection rather than a

of

accessory

or

impure
26
description of pure reflection.

Therefore, all consciousness described in Being and Nothingness would be immersed in bad faith,

unable to imbibe the

breath of pure reflective consciousness unless the reduction
was effected.

As a result of the reduction,

consciousness

comes to realize (know) the project that it is.

Consciousness

recognizes that it is the project of "assimilating and making
27
an object of the Other,"
that it is the project of the
.
b eing.
.
28
recovery o f its

Prior to this reflective katharsis,

the for-itself is not aware that it seeks to be being: "There
is no consciousness of this being

[the unrealizable ideal]

since it haunts non-thetic [pre-reflective] self-conscious29
ness. "
Note here that Sartre says "no consciousness of, "
not "no knowledge of."

This means, precisely, that at no time

25

Jean-Paul Sartre, Cahiers pour une morale (Paris:
Gallimard, 1983), 42, 13. Hereafter referred to as Cahiers.
26 .
Being and Nothingness, 581.
27 .
Being and Nothingness, 363.
2aB eing
.
and Nothingness, 364.
2sB eing
.
and Nothingness, 90.
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could consciousness have knowledge of the unrealizable ideal
of the recovery of being, since knowledge is the result only
of a reflective focusing upon that which consciousness was
heretofore

nonpositionally

aware

of.

One

cannot

become

positionally (reflectively) aware of (know) that of which one
was

not

previously

reflectivity

nonpositionally

(knowledge)

nonreflectivity
(consciousness)

is

(awareness,

a

aware

tributary

(conscious
of

the

consciousness) .

circumscribes knowing,

of):

river

of

Awareness

therefore,

awareness

circumscribes potential modes of being.
The reduction brings this nonthetic unrealizable before
the gaze of consciousness (or does it?) so that consciousness
may therefore realize the project that is its own being.
is a revelation of self, for I am my project.

It

This unrealiz-

able ideal haunts my being as that which I must be, and is in
no sense

I

'
'
'imaginary.

II

30

For I am my unrealizable ideal in

the mode of not being it or I am not it at all, since I cannot
be anything other than the attempt to be.

The unrealizable

ideal appears as an imperative, since it appears to me as "to
be realized.

1131

I

recognize this previously pre-reflective

imperative for what it is after my consciousness is purged, so
to speak, by the phenomenological reduction.

It is at this

point.that I acquire a "bad conscience," which is synonymous
with

consciousness
30

31

of

bad

faith,

the

cf. Being and Nothingness, 527.
B eing
'
and N ot h'ingness,

528 .

ideal

of

which

is
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" ... taking toward oneself the point of view of the Other [a
self-judgement] .
impure

1132

reflection,

This,
and it

of course,
is for

is also the goal of

this

reason that

reflection exhibits bad faith in the weak sense.
"bad conscience"

(bad faith)

because I

impure

I have a

realize that I have

been attempting to objectify myself, deny my own freedom, and
surreptitiously and inexorably pursue an unrealistic ideal.
The ideal of a "good conscience"

(good faith) as it presents

itself to me at this time would entail the cessation of the
project that involves the fusion of this triad.
In the Psychology of Imagination, Sartre makes clear that
"After the phenomenological reduction ... consciousness ... unveils itself to our reflective descriptions. "

33

The reduc-

tion and pure reflectivity thus amount to the same thing, and
by this means we purge consciousness of bad faith
squarely face the task of becoming authentic,

(if we

rather than

retreating into the nebulous nether world of the pre-reflective/impure

reflective) .

In

Being and Nothingness,

the

reduction is that which is indispensable for the practice of
existential psychoanalysis.

Sartre makes many claims regard-

ing this psychoanalysis, his own non-Freudian type of psychoanalysis, among them that

32
33

Being and Nothingness, 527.

The Psychology of Imagination, 259.
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Thus existential psychoanalysis is moral description,
for it releases
to us the ethical meaning of various
.
34
h uman proJects.
The principle result of existential psychoanalysis must
be to make us repudiate the spirit of seriousness.":rs-Existential psychoanalysis is going to reveal to man
the real goal of his pursuit ... this psychoanalysis
may
36
function as a means of deliverance and salvation.
Notice the following about these passages:
(A)

The

normative

standard

invoked,

i.e.

the

necessary

repudiation of the God-project (deliverance from the spirit of
seriousness) .
(B) The tentative nature of deliverance and salvation.

That

is, in spite of the fact that existential psychoanalysis DOES
reveal

to us

(reflectively)

description) ,

our own bad faith

DOES acquaint us with our passion

(via moral
(the God-

proj ect), it MAY OR MAY NOT operate as a means of deliverance
and salvation.
is

possible,

possible.

This is the same thing as saying the reduction
and

that

the

conversion may

or may not

be

Therefore, we can conclude that the two notions are

separate ones in Sartre's
even be possible,

that is,

mind, and that the second may not
that it may be another Sartrean

unrealizable ideal, albeit one that would allow one to get out
of hell,

34

since one would no longer pursue being but free-

Being and Nothingness, 626.

35

Ibid.

36

Ibid., 626, 627.

Underlining mine.

Underlining mine.
Underlining mine.
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dom.

37

Once consciousness makes the reflective turn upon

itself which comprises

the phenomenological

opens itself to anguish, to fear.

reduction,

it

For it then recognizes the

inexorable nature of its freedom while concomitantly recognizing that it is not the author of this very freedom.
.
. h
ext1ngu1s

38

b ut not create f ree d om.

One can

It is present as the

negation of facticity, as the beckoning of responsibility, as
the genesis of the ethical.

The consciousness that realizes

this becomes afraid: "Consciousness is frightened by its own
spontaneity because
freedom.

11

39

it

senses

this

spontaneity as

beyond

The response to this fear is at least in part

determinative of the possibility of conversion.

Consciousness

may once again flee its own spontaneity, retreating once again
into the bad faith of impure reflectivity which characterized
it prior to the reduction, or it can choose to respond to the
realization of itself as the pursuit of the impossible.
would be constitutive of the latter response?

What

Is the for-

itself forever immured in the pursuit of the in-itself-foritself, all attempts to the contrary being somewhat less than
feckless?

Is this the nadir of the Sartrean corpus,

horrible achilles heel?

37

Again, this too is only possibly the case.

38

That is,
'
' d eat h .
in

39

The Transcendence of the Ego, 100.

its
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In section B of part one, I shall utilize Kerry Walter's
.
d art1c
. 1 e to a great extent. 40
a f orement1one

I find it to be

the most inclusive and accurate rendition of the Sartrean
processes of reduction and conversion.

41

Walters tells us

that "The progression [from the reduction to the conversion]
is

not

an

inevitable

one,

in

the

sense

that

anyone

who

acquires pure reflection will automatically undergo a conversion, nor even that anyone who undergoes the conversion will
sustain it

in her

•

future actions."

42

Now,

the

notion of

"undergoing" either the reduction or the conversion indicates
passivity.

For Sartre,

consciousness is all activity,

spontaneity, having no inertia.

all

Furthermore, nothing can act

upon consciousness save consciousness itself.

Therefore, all

connotations of passivity must be expunged in relation to
consciousness itself,

and in particular in relation to the

notions

and

of

reduction

conversion.

Assuming

that

the

phenomenological reduction has been effected upon consciousness by itself, what then can be said of the conversion?

This

is the very question I shall delve into in section B.

Section B
Conversion and Authenticity in Sartre

40

"A Recovery of
Radical Conversion."
41
42

Innocence:

The Dynamics

of

Sartrean

With a major flaw, to which we shall attend momentarily.
Ibid., 359.

Underlining mine.
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The authentic individual, for Sartre, is the converted
. d.1v1. d ua 1 .
in

43

The authentic individual knows of the god-

project which he is,
unrealizable.

44

and no longer wishes to pursue this

The authentic, converted individual no longer

seeks to appropriate being, but seeks instead freedom as an
end.

45

Phyllis Sutton Morris equates authenticity with lack

of self-deception.

46

This

is not enough,

since one could

most certainly recognize his pursuit of being and therefore
not be in bad faith, yet still engage in such a pursuit.
is why a

This

clear distinction between the reduction and the

conversion must be made.

The reduced individual recognizes

that he is the pursuit of being (awareness); the converted,
authentic individual abandons this very project (praxis) .

The

abyss between the two is enormous, comparable to that between
Lazarus and the rich man.
the

"radical

47

conversion"

Carole Haynes-Curtis has likened
to

the

Kierkegaardian

"leap

of

faith, " but she has not attempted to produce a strict argument
43c

a h'1ers, 42.

44

"The Last Words of Jean-Paul Sartre, An Interview with
Benny Levy," trans. Adrienne Foulke, Dissent (Fall 1980), 400.
4sc

a h'1ers, 495, 496.

46

Phyllis
Sutton Morris,
"Self-Deception:
Sartre's
Resolution of the Paradox," as found in Silverman and Elliston, eds., Jean-Paul Sartre: Contempora:r:y Approaches to his
Philosophy (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1980),
30-49.
She focuses on the equation of self-deception and
authenticity on p. 44.
47

cf. Luke 16:19-31.
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f or

t he

and I

.

comparison.

48

This comparison I

believe it shows promise.

find interesting,

The connection,

however,

certainly cannot be made from within the Sartrean paradigm,
but only from within that of Kierkegaard.

To say this is to

say that there is no conversion in Sartre because the possibility is delimited by his ontology.

49

Simone de Beauvoir does an interesting gloss of Sartre's
notion of the
Ambiguity.

conversion in her celebrated The Ethics

of

She tells us that the converted individual puts

his "will to be 'in parentheses. '"

5

°

First he recognizes his

will to be (the reduction), then he denies it as a basis for
action

(the conversion) .

parentheses?

But how can I

For Sartre makes it only too clear that human

being is this very project.
will?

put what I AM in

51

Is this a simple act of the

Does volition allow for the alteration of ontology?

de

Beauvoir goes on to say that in the conversion "[Man] rejoins
himself only to the extent that he agrees to remain at a
distance from himself and ambiguous. "
appropriate

and moral

52

But how does this

distantiation come

48

Carole Haynes-Curtis, "The
Philosophy, 63 (1988): 269-274.

'Faith'

about?
of

Bad

Through
Faith,"

49

This, as it turns out, is in fact my view. But HaynesCurtis says none of this and my spelling it out shall have to
await a later section of this work.
50

The Ethics of Ambiguity, 14.

51

" I am the project of the recovery of my being. " [Being
and Nothingness, 364]
52

Th e Et h.1CS

0

f Amb.1gu1ty,
.
13 .
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volitional recognition alone?
wor ld o f
men?

Does this turn the Sartrean

•
" f ai. 1 ure" 53 into
a wor ld of

Was it

"successful,"

"moral"

all a matter of the will, unrecognized as such?

de Beauvoir follows Sartre in saying that to will oneself free
and to will oneself moral are identical.

54

Morality,

then,

55
.
b orn wit
. h t h e conversion.
.
is

de Beauvoir continues: "To will oneself free is to effect
the

transition from nature

to morality by establishing a

genuine freedom on the original upsurge of our existence. "
Nature, as Busch told us earlier,
tude of bad faith consciousness.

57

is the nonreduced atti-

The move to morality, then,

is effected by the reduction and conversion.

If freedom is

"total and infinite," how can I will myself free?
freedom prior to will?

56

58

How could it be otherwise?

Isn't

"Willing

oneself free" involves precisely the hypostasization of self
(the

psychic)

that

Sartre

has

repeatedly

repudiated

53

"The history of a life, whatever it may be,
history of a failure." [Being and Nothingness, 481]
54

and

is the

The Ethics of Ambiguity, 24.

55

But - why be moral? Maybe this amounts to asking why
the pursuit of being is hell. Here I think Sartre is mistaken.
The pursuit of being recognized as such is hell.
This
means that man is born into hell through the phenomenological
reduction.
The conversion?
Only a matter of will?
No
symmetry here? The end of the "allegory?"
56

The Ethics of Ambiguity, 25.

57

"Sartre: The Phenomenological
Relationships,": 57.
58

Being and Nothingness, 531.

Reduction

and

Human
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scourged.

And if I can will myself free, in what sense was I

heretofore not free?
what

sense was

"become"

I

If freedom is total and infinite,

"less

(will myself)

free"
free?

before?

how can I

In Sartrean ontology,

there are only two kinds of being,
.
59
f ore1gn.

Again,

in

where

such an occurrence is

For I am either free (pour-soi) or not free

(en-

soi) .

What is this mythological hybrid that can will itself

free?

The whole point of the Sartrean corpus is to show that

we do not and cannot have an essence, that we cannot achieve
in-itself-for-itselfness,
contradiction in terms.

that the very idea of such is a

60

59

cf. John A. Schumacher, "The Existential Sociology of
Jean-Paul Sartre."
Unpublished munuscript,
Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY, 1985. Schumacher states that
"[For Sartre] there are no totalities whatsoever (ontologically, separation and the individual reign), though human beings
can act as if there were ... Indeed, the challenge posed by the
non- classical conception of materiality is to find a nonclassical conception of freedom (and an associated conception
of social sciences) , a conception based on fusion rather than
separation. Moreover, Sartre's disputants do not consider a
non-classical materiality any more than he does, and if the
classical materiality is to remain - as it may very well do then there is no way, I have argued, to escape Sartre's
conclusions about human sociality, that is, if human freedom
is to remain as well." (pp. 10, 16). Sartre's (contemporary)
disputants may well have failed to directly challenge the
"classical" (Cartesian) conception of materiality. But this
does not mean that certain of Sartre's precursors did not do
this very thing. I have in mind Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, t.o
say nothing of Pav~l Florensky.
60

And, therefore, according to Sartre, God cannot exist.
The parallels to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche at this point are
almost uncanny.
I am not trying to legitimate Sartre's
bifurcated, simplistic ontology here. I am merely attempting
to shed at least a bit of light on the issue.
Could it be
that " ... the negation of everything [which is equivalent to
the original upsurge of the for-itself] is in itself a form of
(continued ... )
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Let us at this time take a closer look at Walters' claims
concerning the reduction and the conversion.

In delineating

the difference, Walters says that
In short, the phenomenological reduction, by illuminating
the essential structure of the for-itself, reveals the
futility of the god-project.
It does not, however,
represent the abandonment of the project.
That act of
the will, clearly not a .part of the dispassionately
neutral reduction's mandate, just as 61
clearly belongs to
the domain of the radical conversion.
I would like to make two fundamental points here:
(1) The will (freedom) cannot alter fundamental ontology since
this would be an attempt to volitionally alter the spontaneity
that we are.
will.

Freedom is the ground of the possibility of the

Freedom's primordial nature is such that it cannot be

induced or impeded by the will, but only reflectively acknowledged and utilized.
flectively.

Otherwise, it is merely utilized nonre-

Whatever the case, it is utilized as a function

of existence itself, rather than willing, for freedom is the
very "stuff" of our being.

If Sartre believed it was in fact

60

( • • • continued)
servitude and [that] real freedom is an inner submission to a
value which defies history and its successes."[?] [Albert
Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage,
1951), 186.] Of course, with these words, the "good friendship" between Sartre and Camus came to an end (1951) . "He who
has ears to hear, let him hear. " [Matthew 13: 9] Camus goes on
to say in the same work that "Atheist existentialism at least
wishes to create a morality ... But the real difficulty lies in
creating it without reintroducing into historical existence a
value foreign to history." [p. 249] Camus translated "difficulty" as "impossibility" and in one fell swoop "realized" the
necessity of dispensing with (at least) this form of "existentialism."

61

"A Recovery of Innocence:
Radical Conversion": 368.

The Dynamics

of

Sartrean
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possible for the for-itself to will itself free, he never made
a case for it, and based on the Sartrean corpus we do have, we
can positively exclude such a possibility.

It simply makes no

sense for a being that is freedom to "will itself free," as if
an additional measure of freedom could be superadded to a
being that
(2)

~

nothing other than freedom.

The reduction is not "dispassionately neutral."

If it

were, there would be no motivation to effect or sustain it.
"Why the reduction at all?" has no answer, especially in the
light of the accompanying anguish.

Such a naive belief (that

the reduction is "dispassionately neutral")

is relegated to

the playroom of mythology along with such ideas as "I am no
more than a thing which thinks.

1162

Walters claims that the conversion is "a direct volitional act of the for- itself arising from reflection upon the
reduction's

revelation of

the

for-itself 's

.

true nature."

63

If this is so, how does the "volitional act" change the "true
nature" of the for-itself,
(reflective)

is merely a

if this nature is such that will
tributary of the more primordial

(nonreflective) project which it is?

The reflective scissi-

parity of the will is only a secondary phenomenon, and in no
way can alter the fundamental structure of the for-itself,

62

Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, as
found in James Ogilvy, ed., Self and World, 2nd ed. (New York:
Harcourt Brace Javanovich, Inc.), 22.
63 11

A Recovery of Innocence:
Radical Conversion,": 368.

The Dynamics

of

Sartrean
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which

is

wholly

responsible

volitional activity.

for

the

form and

content

of

64

Furthermore, Walters claims that
This explicit acceptance of its non-being [as a result
of the conversion] does not mean that the foritself suppresses its desire to be god; that hunger
is a result of its ontological structure. It does
mean, however, that the for-itself is no longer a
slave to that desire, that its fundamental project

64

To say that the will alone can effect the conversion
seems to me to be Sartrean in only one way: the desperate,
futile attempt seeks to perpetuate the moral solipsism
inherent in the desolate Sartrean world.
Certainly, Sartre
made "optimistic" statements to the contrary, but optimistic
statements are not equivalent to a revamped ontology. Witness
the following: "In order to get any truth about myself, I must
have contact with another person. The Other is indispensable
to my own existence, as well as to my knowledge about myself ... Hence let us at once announce the discovery of a world
which we shall call intersubjectivity." [Jean-Paul Sartre,
Existentialism and Human Emotions, trans. Hazel Barnes and
Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), 38.
Underlining mine. Hereafter referred to as Existentialism.]
Sartre says this after he states in Being and Nothingness that
being-for-others is a contingent mode of being for the foritself: "Being-for-others is not an ontological structure of
the for-itself ... it is a fact ... not an essential necessity."
(282-283]
Furthermore, note that "My original fall is the
existence of the Other." (263]
See also pp. 362-412 on the
impossibility of intersubj ectivity. Philosophically, Existentialism and Human Emotions is probably the worst document
Sartre ever published (as well as the most popular) .
It is
also the most "optimistic." I do not think this is a coincidence.
On page 476 of Being and Nothingness, Sartre writes
that "The will can reach only details of structures and will
never modify the original project from which it has issued."
(underlining mine). This being the case, I do not see how any
type of call for a willful repudiation of the god-project can
do anything other than serve to drive this project to the
nonreflective level once again (if one ever left this plane to
begin with) . Even after the phenomenological reduction, the
realization of the project that I am does not alter the
scenario, for I am this project.
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is no longer
the god-project, but is instead free65
dom itself.
Now, the "hunger" is not merely a result of the for-itself 's
ontological structure, it is its ontological structure.

There

is a coextension here, rather than a causal connection.

This

is a world of difference.

To say that one can act

(will)

counter to what one is is like saying that there is a "neutral
substratum" (the "will") within the for-itself that can choose
or not choose to be what the for-itself is.
another

attempt

at

a

reflective

ekstasis,

This is just
a

bifurcation

between the reflecting and reflected self, and in no sense
will

lead to a
.

pursues b eing.

66

second

"innocence"

in which man no longer

To take a point of view on one's desire

(being) is simply no longer to be that desire in the mode of
being it, but is, rather, to be that desire in the mode of not
being it.

Otherwise,

there would be no such desire.

One

cannot consistently take freedom for an end, cannot sustain
the conversion (cannot not-be what one is) unless the desire
(being)

to be god is somehow obviated,

vitiated,

negated,

expunged, eradicated, quelled from the heart of being.

For

the desire to be god coupled with the horrifying fear of
freedom (the yawning abyss of the infinite) is too great, too

65

"A Recovery of Innocence:
Radical Conversion,'': 369.
66

The Dynamics

of

Sartrean

The attempt is akin to the weak asking the strong not
to be strong.
See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of
Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1969), 2456 (First essay) .
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monstrous, too boundless to be surmounted by the
for-itself.

11

will 11 of the

The conversion simply cannot be a matter of

simple reflective katharsis and subsequent volition.

Even for

Sartre, this was only too clear.
To quote Walters again: "In short, there is no necessary
connection between reduction and conversion.
"Satan" is "reduced" but not "converted":
which he fails to embody.
as

negation

or

refusal.

epiphenomenon of the project.

will.

Precisely.

"He" "knows" that

Put differently,
The

1167

"he" embodies it

again,

is

always

Without the project, the idea

of willing would make no sense and lack impetus.
deliberates

concerning

an

the making

of

the

While one

conversion,

one

deliberates from within the structures of an already existent
project.

The spontaneity that is consciousness thrusts us

toward both God and the god-project.
the

everflowing stream of

itself.

consciousness

that

is

the

for-

No, the conversion cannot be effected via purifying

reflection and volition alone.
does

The will is but a log in

Man is freedom, but freedom

not extend to the alleviation/truncation of his

spontaneity that

is

the god-project.

For the

own

for- itself

cannot get "outside" the project that it is - this attempt at
dissociation

like

the

dissociative

attempt

reflection - necessarily results in failure.

of

impure

How does one get

"outside" the project that one is - and one is nothing other

67

"A Recovery of Innocence:
Radical Conversion,": 369.
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than this project?
in fact and theory.

How does one get "outside?"

Impossible,

68

Walters states triumphantly that the "Post-conversion"
attitude

is marked by

"innocence,"

that

it

is

"natural,"

"naive," and ideally, "unsullied by ulterior motives."
said

to

context,

be

akin

to

pre-reflective

69

In

this

what could constitute an "ulterior motive?"

How

could this be determined?
"motive" at all?
"innocent?"

inunediacy.

It is

Indeed, what would constitute a

In what sense is this seamier for-itself

Is "innocence" a moral term?

Whence cometh the moral sphere?

If so, why?

How?

If not, what is its import?

Why should one deem it desirable enough to pursue it?
is merely ontological, why call it "innocence?"

If it

If it really

is a return to pre-reflective inunediacy, does this mean our
reflective capacities have been eradicated (a seeming condition for true

"innocence"),

or do we now simply have the

capacity to temporarily suspend reflectivity?

If so, wouldn't

we necessarily be aware of such a suspension,
sense no longer "innocent?"

Isn't the possibility of reflec-

tivity the possibility of philosophy?
philosophy?
"fall"

into

What?

and in this

Is this the end of

The possibility of philosophy based on the

reflectivity?

Philosophy

originary "loss" of "innocence?"

the

result

of

the

Are we "responsible" in some

68

Note the parallel between this problem and that of how
"objective" truth can be available to a "subject."
69

"A Recovery of Innocence:
Radical Conversion,": 371.
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sense

for

this

loss?

"forced" upon us?
innocence

a

The

reflective

dissociation

The reflective dissociation and loss of

victimization,

assented to?
innocence

No?

Yes?

a

process

undergone

but

not

The reflective dissociation and loss of

somehow our

"fault?"

But what

can ontological

(rather than moral) fault mean if not precisely a crevice in
being, that is, the reflective dissociation?

But why attempt

to induce such a "fault" and subsequently remediate the same unless

the

crevice

somehow like a

that

is

"mistake?"

cloying

But what?

reflectivity

seemed

The ground for the

possibility of the acknowledgement of selfhood is a mistake,
is the fundamental loss of "innocence?"
How can this "return" to "innocence" be merely an act of
the will after the katharsis?

It cannot be, if the will is an

epiphenomenon of the project, as I have been arguing.

The

will cannot modify the original project which I am, for it is
constituted by that project.

Conversion is ontological.

I am

freedom, and freedom is the equivalent of choice.

Therefore

my

the

ontology,

in

tote,

is

freedom/choice.

But

free-

dom/choice that constitutes my ontology cannot be utilized to
alter that very freedom/choice in its very being.

I

can

utilize my freedom to change my original relationship to my
freedom (as evidenced in the move from pure to impure reflection - if I can choose this.

It is possible that the reduc-

tion itself is not g_ choice, for if the for-itself "naturally"
flees

freedom,

why would

it

ever effect upon

itself

the
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reduction?),

yet I

cannot utilize my freedom to change my

freedom's original relationship to me, for i am it.
Walters wishes
conversion is a

to have us believe

"a return of

sorts

that

the Sartrean

to the

original pre-

reflective celebration of freedom which was characteristic of
original immediacy.

It is in this sense that we may call it

'
70
a recovery o f innocence."

In response,

(A) The pre-reflec-

tive for-itself did not celebrate freedom because it did not
know

itself

equivalent

as
of

free.

Therefore,

pre-reflective

conversion

immediacy.

(B)

is

not

There

was

the
no

originary "innocence" in the Sartrean world, because there was
never unadulterated, pure immediacy.

Such an idyllic state of

innocence could be postulated only upon the assumption of a
Sartrean "Garden of Eden."

The mythic Sartrean cosmology

grows to monstrous proportions.

But no such Garden could ever

have existed, since the original upsurge of the for-itself was
and is an upsurge of negation:
anything whatever) .
consciousness

(the

This,
only

"I am not X"

(Let

"X" be

being the universal property of
such

universal

in

the

Sartrean

description of consciousness) , negates pure immediacy or being
on

any
70

71

level.

71

Sartrean philosophy

is

a

philosophy

of

Ibid.

It is true that in the state of pre-reflectivity I am
not reflectively aware of myself as the negation of being.
Nevertheless, I am aware of this nonreflectively, and have
access to it reflectively if I choose to effect the reflective
dissociation. I am also nonreflectively aware of this latter
possibility but have simply not as yet made it an object for
(continued ... )
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hypervigilance: "I am never that which I apprehend."

Fear.

72

In "Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of Self" Sartre
tells us

that

" ... [We]

place ourselves ... on the

level

of

morality ... starting from the moment when we reject being,
since being has rejected us, the moment when we no longer want
values,

in the sense

in which want

coincidence with self. "
said this,

73

is taken as a

Kierkegaard certainly could have

in the sense that for Kierkegaard,

never be a simple coincidence with self,
birth

to

value,

coincidence.

and

simple

freedom

negates

value could

for freedom gives

the

possibility

of

The above passage seems to imply that if we do

not reject being (do not dispense with the project to be initself-for-itself), we are for that very reason premoral or
nonmoral.

What does this mean?

Does

suggest

this

that

none

What are its implications?
of

our

actions

under

these

conditions can be brought into question, having no basis from

71

( • • • continued)
consciousness.
For Sartre, pre-reflective consciousness
always entails non-positional self-consciousness. There is,
therefore, no such thing as originary or recovered innocence
in Sartre.
72

Hypervigilance: Being seen, if not by the Other (this
is contingent) , then by the self.
The latter is forever
impure and forever existent: no innocence.
73

Jean-Paul Sartre, "Consciousness of Self and Knowledge
of Self," trans. Mary Ellen and N. Lawrence, as found in N.
Lawrence and D. O'Connor, Readings in Existential Phenomeno1.Qgy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), 134.
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which to interrogate in a moral sense?

74

Regardless, Sartre

certainly would reject the idea that none of our actions could
be brought into question, for how then could freedom remain
the ultimate value?
tion.

75

It too, would be relative to my valua-

Certainly freedom is the basis for any valuation and is

in this sense ultimate, but why valuation at all?
The conversion,

then,

for Sartre, is subsumed under a

well-known Sartrean category: that of the unrealizable ideal.
Once again, we must refrain from confusing the unrealizable
. h t h e imaginary,
.
.
76
wit

and wonder why it is that the conver-

sion is an ideal at all.

74

Possibly, actions could be condemned on the grounds of
logic alone, as Sartre tries to do in Existentialism. But in
this work he seems to assume that both the reduction and the
conversion are realizable, otherwise he would not speak of the
world of "intersubjectivity," and one could not respect the
freedom (project) of the Other. What kind of indictment could
it be, to be incriminated on logical grounds? The essence of
the for-itself is contradiction - a being that is not what it
is, and is what it is not [Being and Nothingness, 58), in
addition to the fact that the for-itself is the contradiction
of being! Therefore, noncontradiction seems at best to be a
tenuous ground for a moral theory, at worst, positively
mistaken.
75

Mustn' t an ultimate value be valuable in terms of
something?
What is the basis for the designation of an
ultimate value within the Sartrean paradigm, if all other
values are designated as such only with reference to this
ultimate value?
Mustn't such an ultimate value be somehow
justified?
If we say that freedom is the ultimate value
because we are freedom, how does this legitimate freedom in
any sense, especially if it is the case that our existence is
de trap?
Insofar as a "thing" exists (and freedom is a
"nothing") it is "good," and "evil" really is a privation?
Ontology is destiny? What?
76

Being and Nothingness, 527.
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In Either/Or, vol. 2, Kierkegaard tells us through the
Judge that "I do not create myself, I choose myself," and the
.
se lf , as in

s artre, is
.

f ree d om. 77

He goes on to inform us

that choosing oneself is equivalent to repenting oneself, a
religious category in the presence of God.

There is quite a

gulf between the notions of choice and creation, all the more
so since they are both on the grounds of a freedom that is
tota 1

. f. .
in
ini te. 78

an d

The

difference between

notions will be unfolded as we progress.

these

two

Maybe it is the case

that Sartre is right in maintaining that the for-itself must
"repudiate

the

spirit

from the prison of

of

seriousness.

seriousness

1179

Sartre beckoned

in Being and Nothingn·ess,

faintly sensing an Elysian field of play.

For Sartre, it is

Kierkegaard who is the serious one, it is Kierkegaard who is
both a "coward" and a "stinker.
contrary?

°

Could it be precisely the

Could it be that Sartre is the serious one and that

Kierkegaard
humorist

118

is

not?

Could not

Kierkegaard

truly be

the

(as he often was pseudonymously), and this be the

final twist of existential irony?

Can one be playful (humor-

77

Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, vol. 2, trans. Walter
Lowrie and Howard A. Johnson (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1959),
220, 218.
78

Vigilius Haufniensis [Soren Kierkegaard] , The Concept
of Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte and Albert B. Anderson
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 112; Being
and Nothingness, 531.
79
80

Being and Nothingness, 62 6.
.
. l 'ism, 46, 47 .
c f . Existentia
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claims)

can be made apart

from a

specific and deliberate

grounding in nondemonstrable truth claims.

83

To continue with my line of reasoning, I am arguing that
Kierkegaard's
overlap

notion

of

significantly,

love

and

meaning

Sartrean

that

type

Kierkegaard

two

love

in

fact

espouses a viable existential theory of love, whereas Sartre
does not.

Sartre presents us with a theory of addiction,

whereas Kierkegaard presents us with a theory of love.
83

.

Yet

In the weakest rendition of this claim, I would be
maintaining that (A) One cannot legitimate presuppositional
truth claims from within the paradigm in question, because the
claims themselves serve to legitimate the paradigmatical
structure.
In addition, to assume a metaparadigmatical
approach to the epistemological legitimation of presuppositional truth claims is to announce implicitly the advent of
other such truth claims outside of any paradigm thus far
scrutinized, and (B) All truth, therefore, is perspectival.
These claims do not deny "objective" or (at least) nonrelativistic truth, they merely make statements about how the
"subject" can "get to" this truth. These claims, I realize,
are complicated and sweeping. To do them any type of justice
would require at least another dissertation.
Kierkegaard's
Johannes Climacus [trans. Howard v. Hong and Edna H. Hong
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985)] and
Concluding Unscientific Postscript [trans. David F. Swenson
and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1968] as well as Nietzsche's corpus more forcefully argue such
a position than I could ever hope to do. I urge the curious
reader to consult one or more of these outstanding works.
Phenomenological truth can be sufficient or even apodictic
without an attendant so-called "demonstration."
Furthermore, since the topic proper of this dissertation
is addiction, I do not need to advance any specific truth
claims regarding the specific substantive nature of love. I
merely need to show that Sartre's theory of "love" is in fact
a theory of addiction. It is theoretically possible that the
scope of addiction as a phenomenological reality is so broad
as to encompass all "types" of "love," and that not only the
Sartrean, but in fact all, worlds are loveless.
It is also
possible that the reduction and conversion are unrealizable
not only for Sartrean human being, but for all human being.
If this is the case, being-addicted is coextensive with beinghuman.

234

Sartre knows, as previously indicated, that type two love, if
it in fact existed, would in fact constitute love, and that
type one love is hell in the sense that addiction is hell
because it involves the grievous, heinous pursuit of being.
That is to say, Kierkegaard and Sartre agree in the main on
the ideal of love, yet only the former has uncovered sufficient groundwork for its theoretical realization.

Love as

well as addiction can exist in the Kierkegaardian world, but
only the latter can appear in the Sartrean world.
f or Sartre,

'
'
f ection,
'
84
is
an imper
yet Sartre

Existence,

can well envi-

sion another scenario, where one would lay down his pursuit of
being and be "completely visible" before his neighbor,

who

would be in turn completely visible to him.
At this point I wish to move to a more complete analysis
of Sartrean love, with a view to showing that Sartrean love,
of whatever variety,

85

is in fact addiction.

Sartrean Love as an Addiction

In

the

twilight

of

his

life,

in

"Self-Portrait

at

Seventy," Sartre tells us that "visibility" (truth, nondupli-

84

Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New
York: New Directions, 1969), 101.
85

Keep in mind that Sartrean type two love has been
eliminated.
All appearances of love in the Sartrean world
must be of type one, regardless of their particular guise.
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city,

openness)

others,

is

essential

for

concrete

including the relation of love.

this ideal,

with

Yet, in spite of

deception and self-deception are essential for

Sartrean love type one
existent

86

relations

Sartrean

Sartrean love) .

love

(as shown in chapter two),
(hereafter

ref erred

to

the only
simply

as

The lover must "seduce" the beloved because

the lover cannot make the true intentions. of her project known
to the beloved,

lest the entire edifice collapse.

87

Decep-

tion is necessary: I must appear partialized, that is, as an
object,

not a

subject attempting to appear as

an object.

Leni's love relation with Franz is predicated upon deception,
'
as is
Franz I s

1 ove

•
• h Joh anna.
re 1 ation
wit

88

Bad faith is

"intended to fill up the nothingness which I am in relation to
myself, "

89

and this

is precisely what

I

attempt

to do

in

becoming the object-limit (absolute value) for the subjectivity of the Other in the love relation.
Another salient characteristic of the bad faith that is
in play in the Sartrean love relation is that it "affirms
facticity

[essence]

as

being

transcendence

[freedom]

and

86

Jean-Paul Sartre,
"Self-Portrait at Seventy,"
in
Life/Situations, trans. Paul Auster and Lydia Davis, pp. 3-92
(New York: Pantheon, 1977), 13.
87

See Being and Nothingness, 371.

88

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Condemned of Altona, trans. Sylvia
and George Leeson (New York: Vintage, 1963), 17, 18 and 134,
135, respectively.
·
89

B eing
'
an d Not h'ingness, 43.
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.
transcend ence as b eing

f

. .
90
acticity."

The project

that

is

Sartrean love does precisely this in that it does not seek
freedom as an end, but rather being (the unrealizable ideal of
love) .

Yet the lover does not recognize the illusive and

unrealizable nature of this project, for the very reflective
ignorance of
project.

this

fact

allows

for

the possibility of

the

A necessary failure recognized as such would cease

to appear attractive in the eyes of the for-itself.

The Judge

in Either/Or, vol. 2 foresaw such a scenario in his insightful
corrunent that "If you know love is an illusion, you have lost
everything

[the possibility of being],

unless you struggle

again to fall into the same illusion, which is a self-contra.
.
91
d 1ct1on.

Love, being for Sartre a phenomenon of belief, necessitates perpetual deception and self-deception.
tells us that
himself

"In illusion,

The Aesthete

the individual is hidden from

[no reflective cognizance of the desire to be]; in

mystification, he is hidden from others [the Other does not
know that the lover seeks to incorporate into himself the
beloved's very freedom]."

92

"Love" as an addiction involves

both illusion and mystification.

A full recognition on the

part of the Other concerning the lover's project would reveal
a self seeking to become itself through the conduit of the
90

Being and Nothingness, 56.

91

Either/Or, vol. 2, 129.

0

Either/Or, vol. 1, 248.
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Other,

the

selfness.

latter being merely a

part

of

the

circle

of

The beloved could do nothing other than vituperate

against the seductive project in which the lover has engaged
to bleed the Other's freedom (enslavement) from him toward the
lover who utilizes it to fulfill himself.

93

The illusion and

mystification noted in addictive "love" is a function of a
certain kind of lover, the aesthetic lover.

94

"Generally, I can assure any girl who entrusts herself to
me a perfect aesthetic conduct: only it ends with her being
deceived;

but

this

is

consistent with my aesthetics,

either the girl deceives the man,
. 1.
gir

1195

for

or the man deceives the

Certainly this is the intransigent rule for Sartre-

.
an 1 ove re 1 at1ons,

f or 1 ove is
.
.
.
in
essence d ecept1ve.

"triple destructibility"

96

The

of Sartrean love is ever present

because all patterns of conduct toward the "Other-as-object
include within themselves an implicit and veiled reference to
.
. t h eir
. d eat h ... " 97
the Ot h er-as-subJect,
and th'
i s reference is
Sartrean love,

93

as is the case with all addiction,

must be

0n love as seduction, see Being and Nothingness, 371ff.

94

The same could be said for the ethical lover, as there
is no inherent kinetic power within the self sufficient to
offset the centripetal force of the love relation. The reader
is encouraged to consult chapter two of the present work for
a fuller rendition and analysis of Sartrean love.
95

96

Either/Or, vol. 1, 375.

0n the inherent
Nothingness, 374-377.
97

deception

Being and Nothingness, 408.

of

love,

see

Being

and
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based on the metastability of deception/self-deception, but
has

as

its

underlying

(ideal)

unrealizable

ideal

(telos)

nondeceptive love, which would move us into the ethical sphere
and

the

reality

of

ethical

love.

98

Sartrean

aesthetic

(addictive) love leads inexorably either to its own demise or
to ethical love.

99

"He who cannot reveal himself cannot love,
cannot love is the most unhappy man of all."

100

and he who
Love,

Sartre, demands that one conceal, not reveal, himself.

for

Thus,

98

. o f course true on 1 y sub sequent to t h e necessary
Th'1s 1s
phenomenological reduction and conversion, the latter of
which, in the previous section, has been shown to be, for
Sartre, an unrealizable ideal.
99

Note the metalevel in play in this argument, a level
which Sartre never explicitly deals with: The unrealizable
ideal of Sartrean love is being. The ideal unrealizable ideal
of Sartrean love is freedom. The real and the ideal unrealizable ideals are incompatible, and Sartre knows this, yet
continues to espouse the ideal as if somehow the conflict
might be volitionally resolved.
I certainly do not accuse
Sartre of bad faith here (as does Richard Bernstein [in Praxis
and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1971) .] I believe he was well aware of the sleight of hand he
attempted to effect. Yet just as freedom is the contradiction
of being in Sartrean ontology, so the real is the contradiction of the ideal in Sartrean love theory.
I would say that
Sartre lacked the heart to draw the logical conclusions from
his fundamental ontology which remained unaltered throughout
his lifetime, which is certainly not to say that he lacked the
insight.
"In the middle of the winter I at last discovered
that there was in me an invincible summer. " [Albert Camus, The
Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, trans. Justin O'Brien (New
York: Vintage, 19 55) , 144.]
Even Sartre - even Sartre
remained hopeful against reason - against his own reason.
I
would say again in an analysis of this issue that, for Sartre,
both the real and the ideal unrealizable ideals were not to be
confused with the imaginary, but were instead experienced as
imperatives [see Being and Nothingness, 529.] It is a mistake
to confuse the true with the beautiful.
0

~ Either/Or, vol. 2, 164.
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for Sartre, all consciousness is inevitably "unhappy" consciousness.

Love based on concealment is not love, but rather

addiction.

A clandestine and sordid attempt at ontological

.
f USJ.On.

101

"Only when one knows
1 ove.

II

102

For Sartre,

deceptive.

what

one

does

one

truly

love is in principle deceptive/self-

The lover engages in a series of ruses to "pre-

vent" the lover from "waking up."
the Judge,

loves

Sartre is the inverse of

the ethical lover in Either/Or, vol. 2,

addiction is the inverse of love.

just as

The incompatibility of the

two manifests the either/or nature of the relation.
gaard tells us

Kierke-

through the mouthpiece of Climacus in the

Concluding Unscientific Postscript that "All love is affected
by illusion,

but when love is interpenetrated with a God-

relationship

this

imperfection

of

illusion disappears. "

103

Kierkegaard recognizes the illusion inherent in all love, and
does not discount

this

noting

he

the

above,

existential phenomenon.
tells

us

that

this

In fact,

illusion

is

so

powerful that human being in its own subjectivity cannot be
freed of it - without recourse to the Ground.

104

10111

Fusion 11 as the interfacing of the for-itself and the
in-itself in "God."
102

• h er I Or, vo 1 . 2, 111.
. h F romm I s Th e Art o f
Eit
c f . Eric
Loving (New York: Harper and Row, 1958).
103
104

cone 1 u d ing
·

·
· f ic
·
· t , 52 .
Unscienti
Postscrip

This argument is similar to that of Descartes. in his
Meditations. Here Descartes says that the only way one can be
(continued ... )
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"This perpetual act by which the in-itself degenerates
into presence to itself we shall call an ontological act.
Nothingness is the putting into question of being by be,

1ng.

II

105

In Sartrean love,

the lover seeks to become the

"absolute value" for the beloved and thereby become the limit
of his freedom.
origin of value

Absolute value suppresses freedom since the
is

freedom.

But

absolute value would be

coincident with being (which represents the object state the
lover seeks to "become" for the beloved), and being is the
absence of freedom.

106

Sartrean love, which we construe as

•
d)
... continue
sure that one is not deceived is through belief in an all
powerful and benevolent (i.e. Judeo-Christian) God who would
not suffer His creatures to be involuntarily deluded - at
least not for an extensive period of time - concerning the
nature of reality.
Does this form of argument "work" for
Kierkegaard? By means of an indirect proof we can say (A) All
love involves illusion;
(B) Sartre's ontology precludes
eradication of this illusion, and, in fact, predicates "love"
upon its perpetual reality; (C) The resultant love is unpalatable for Sartre ("hell"); (D) Therefore, if one rejects
Sartrean love, the world is loveless unless one adopts
Kierkegaardian love. If Sartre is right, we are thrust either
upon a Kierkegaardian conception of love, or left with the
loveless world of Sartre. The third alternative, of course,
would be to reject this indirect type proof and make a
paradigm shift.
But these thinkers do not entertain this
possibility, and this would be another story altogether.
Either love or addiction. Or, merely addiction. How does one
accept the unacceptable? Impossible. We "reject being, since
being has rejected us ... " [Sartre, "Consciousness of Self and
Knowledge of Self.": 134.)
Rejection is the essence of the
affirmation of the for-itself. ·When explicating the above
claims, it is important to keep in mind Otto Rank's aforementioned concept of the "god-ideal."
See chapter one and
chapter three, part one. In no sense in a transcendent "godideal" necessarily external to consciousness.
104 (

105
106

B eing
'

and N ot h'ingness, 79 .

Except in the case of the unrealizable ideal, God.
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a functional addiction, is the (implicit) utilization ("interrogation") of being attempting to prevent the interrogation of
being by suppressing the possibility of valuation through the
attempted absolutization of value.

Being is thus not put into

question and therefore the realization of contingency remains
pre-reflective.

For Sartre, "Bad faith is also a confession,

since it is an effort to flee the being which I am.

11107

This

is precisely the avoidance of the interrogation of being.
love,

the lover seeks to be himself before God,

tion,

as

in bad faith,

one

seeks

God-relationship

to

flee

negates

108

In

in addic-

oneself.

For

Kierkegaard,

the

.
109
d eception.

Such a relationship is grounded in conscience,

which possibilizes love based on truth.
ontological

fusion,

but

telic

110

fusion,

illusion/self-

Love demands not
which

involves

a

recognition and respect for the freedom of the Other, and at
the same time a mutual enhancement of both projects toward
freedom.

Sartrean love, the antithesis of love, involves "two

hypnotists

in a

closed room"

who each seek to bleed the

freedom and the project of the Other into one's own.

111

107

Being and Nothingness, 261. Addiction (Sartrean love)
is also a confession that one prefers being-addicted to beingoneself.
One can either be addicted or be oneself. cf.
Kierkegaard's The Sickness Unto Death, 42-74.
108

works of Love, 251-253.

109

Works of Love, 129.

110

works of Love, 13 7.

111

With Sartrean love as with any addiction, an ever
present danger is the confusion of narcoticization with peace.
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Regarding selfhood, Sartre tells us that
The self therefore represents an ideal distance within
the immanence of the subject in relation to himself, a way of not being his own coincidence, 112of
escaping identity while positing it as a un~ty.
What the for-itself
lacks is the self - or itself as
113
in-itself .
... the ontological mirage of the Self.
The Kierkegaardian self,

114

on the other hand,

does not lack

itself in the Sartrean sense because it is a triple synthesis
of

freedom/necessity,

ty/eternity which
(self)

of God.

115

is

finitude/infinitude,
grounded in the

and

temporali-

in-itself-for-itself

The Kierkegaardian self as in-itself is

that which overlaps in the nexus of the God-relation.

Such

Kierkegaardian selfhood is not grounded in human being, lest
this self also disintegrate into an ontological mirage.

The

possibilities of nondeception and selfhood, for both Sartre
and Kierkegaard, are not found within one's own ontology.
Kierkegaard,
For Sartre,

For

they are found in the relation to the Ground.
if such g relation were possible.

it

would be

found in this Ground- relation, i.e. in whatever would function
ontologically as Ground (the god-ideal).
of the for-itself,

Therefore, the being

in addition to being for-itself and for-

others, has as a contingent ontological structure being-for112B

•
eing
and Nothingness, 77.

113B

•
eing
and Nothingness, 89.

i14B

•
eing
and Nothingness, 137.

115

See The Sickness Unto Death, 13,14.
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addiction or being-addicted.
itself

as

ontological

pursued

("by"

The very structure of the for-

being) -pursuing

structure of addiction.

116

(being)

is

the

Only by an ekstatic

relation to a being that would constitute

(ground)

its own

freedom could the transcendence of being-addicted transpire.
Regarding selfhood,

Heidegger claims

that

"as

'human

reality' is essentially its own possibility, this existent can
'choose'
itself
1' t se lf

[Note the word "choose" here rather than "create. "]

in
.

11117

its

being;

it

can win

itself

and

it

can lose

How can the Sartrean self "lose" itself if this

self is an ontological mirage?

How can the for-itself "lose"

the self if the for-itself lacks the self?

This is precisely

what happens in addiction (the Sartrean love relation) , since
the lover in objectifying himself (the equivalent of failing
to choose himself)

alienates his own freedom.

is a function of having no self.
one's

own

freedom,

so

projection of oneself.

to

118

Addiction

That is, one must "harness"

speak,

through

the

reflective

Otherwise, one is indeterminate free

being, that is, non-self.

Sartre tells us in The Psychology

of Imagination that in obsession, consciousness is a captivated victim of itself, yet " ... Not for a moment does he

[the

obsessive

real

116

person]

mistake

imaginary

objects

for

Being and Nothingness, 362.

117

'
Hei'degger, S ein
' un d Zei. t , 41 , as quo t e d in
' J eanMartin
Paul Sartre, The Emotions, 12.
118

See Being and Nothingness, 375.
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ones ... Nevertheless, something has disappeared: the feeling of
belonging to oneself ... "

119

This is a function of the fact

that the addict has to mask from himself the project to-beaddicted, that is, the project to alienate his freedom from
himself.

This is also the effect of the love project.

The

Sartrean lover/addict cannot give himself away and so suffers
from the loss of self and the loss of the possibility of
giving that self away.
Sartrean

world

demand

Both projects (love/addiction) in the
that

one's

freedom

be

alienated,

otherwise the true nature of the projects would be reflectively conscious and signal (be at one with) the collapse of the
project.

Sartrean love beyond the metastable illusion is just

as much a kind of bondage as is any other addiction, for both
are rooted in the same ontological structure.
Love is not possible in the Sartrean world because love
must be between two individual beings.

120

Selfhood is an

unrealizable ideal, therefore lovers pretend to give to one
another a

self

that they do not have.

myself, for I am not a self.

119
120
121

121

I

cannot possess

I cannot possess the Other,

The Psychology of Imagination, 222.
cf. Works of Love, 6 8 .

"He [the aesthete] does not possess himself; only when
the world trembles [reels] before him is he tranquilized."
[Either/Or, vol. 2, 191.] To not-be-oneself is to-be-addicted. Tranquilization must be induced in the non-self,· it must
be 11 self 11 -introjected, since it does not comprise in any sense
other than negation the being of the addict.
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for the Other is not a

self.

122

Therefore,

we must

"pre-

tend," and we can only pretend seriously as long as we tell
ourselves that pretending is the only thing we can do.

As

long as we believe our own narration/metanarration, pretense
is functional reality, the being of the phenomenon is appearance.

123

"A person who does not know himself cannot promise love
out

of

a

.
f ait
. h . " 124
sincere

Exactly.

The Sartrean lover

promises love out of faith - but this faith is bad faith.

The

Sartrean lover knows that he is a lack, and he engages in the
project of love to vitiate/"justify" this lack of being.

He

does not know himself as a positivity, but as a negativity
(i.e. negation), his "self" having no content but the interrogative, the absence of being.

The Sartrean pursuit of love

intended to fill the cavity that is the
being is the frenzy of addiction.

("self's")

lack of

Sincere faith is excluded.

122

I could not possess the Other even if the Other were a
self.
The goal of Sartrean love is therefore multiply
unrealizable.
123

The being of the human phenomenon is nevertheless
irreducible to the phenomenon of being, due to the transphenomenality of being. That is, all being exceeds any and all of
its manifestations. [See Being and Nothingness, xlvii-li for
Sartre's elucidation of his ontological position on this.]
But being free and the pretense of being free are not synonymous, therefore the possibility of the conflation of the two
necessary for the possibility of the deceptive/self-deceptive
Sartrean love relation.
The absence of self hood may be
discerned through a series of significations, one of which may
be an experience of entrapment in the addictive love relation.
124

Works of Love, 150.
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One does not focus on the seamier side: one is the seamier
side.

For Kierkegaard, selfhood is constituted through the

Ground.

For Sartre, selfhood is simply not constituted.

This

bleeding (free) cavity that is the Sartrean self can relate to
being in no other way than by way of addiction.

The Sartrean

for-itself, be it the lover or no, is the addictive leech on
being,
se lf .

that being which attempts to inject being into it-

125

"One must know oneself before knowing anything else. "

126

Sartrean type one love is necessarily a function of impure
reflection.

Since this is the case, the Sartrean lover has no

self-knowledge in the sense of knowing his being as
being.

free

Rather, he considers himself to be "determined" to be

free as g function of the psychic objects which appear to his
accessorily reflective gaze.

The Sartrean project of love is

predicated upon a lack of self-knowledge and is perpetuated as
such on the same grounds,

ed .

127

as is the project to-be-addict-

Love and addiction in the Sartrean world are predi-

cated upon pre-occupation,

a process of deflection whereby

125

An interesting conception of the intravenous addict' s
relationship to the needle whereby he "comes into being" (or,
"comes alive").
6

August 1835,
Kierkegaard's Journals,
1
Bretall, A Kierkegaard Anthology (Princeton, NJ:
University Press, 1973), 6.
"

127

found in
Princeton

Wh 1c
' h , as I h ave b een arguing,
'
' t h e same t h 1ng.
'
Th e
is
project to-be-addicted simply has broader scope,. as the
project of love is a single mode of the project to-be-addicted.
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consciousness induces in itself and the Other a somnambulistic
stupor via

hypnagogic

imagery.

As

the

possibility of

a

sleeper awaking is an ever present danger, the love/addiction
relation is

exceedingly precarious and generally involves

.
d t oward its
.
.
128
maintenance.
d esperate attempts d irecte
Kierkegaard maintains that the self is not a creation of
itself but a choice of itself.

He informs us that after God,

the self is that which is most eternal.

129

Kierkegaard also

states that "Not until a self as this specific single individual is conscious of existing before God, not until then is it
the infinite self.

130

What this indicates,

for Kierkegaard,

is that the self is a synthesis of finitude/inf initude but
that the self cannot tap into the infinitude of itself unless
it relates itself to the Infinite.

The Infinite allows the

self to release and fully utilize that which is infinite in

128 0

.
. h is
.
f ine
.
.
rtega y Gasset speak s o f ob session
in
series
of lectures compiled in What is Philosophy?, stating that
obsession is evidenced in those individuals who try "to
substitute for their own being another one." [Jose Ortega y
Gasset, What is Philosophy?, trans. Mildred Adams (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1960), 252.]- This overlaps Kierkegaard's notions
of the despairer under the categories both of despair in
weakness and despair in strength (the defiant despairer) . See
The Sickness Unto Death, 49-74.
129

The Sickness Unto Death, 53.
This is a problematic
claim, possibly analogous to that of "levels" of infinity.
Yet the essence of the claim, that the self is eternal,
remains unscathed and may be advanced (given the Kierkegaardian paradigm), sidestepping the issue of the genus of the
eternality specified. An investigation into this issue would
most likely prove quite fruitless and certainly would not be
in keeping with the spirit of Kierkegaardian existentialism.
130

The Sickness Unto Death, 80.
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itself,

that is,

(infinitude)

its freedom.

is

tion/instantiation

The free release of freedom

contingent
of

the

self

the

substantia-

Freedom

(Infinitude) .

upon
in

Otherwise freedom, entangled, turns back upon itself, having
no aim other than itself, and the self is being-addicted.

In

a draft of The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard states that
"To be a human being is to be a relation ... a relation which
is

[reflectively and responsibly]

for

itself

[for sig] .

131

The way I read this is that the self becomes reflectively for
itself

subsequent

to

the

phenomenological

reduction,

responsibly for itself following the conversion.

and

The self

outside of the reduction/conversion is the addicted self, a
self that cannot know itself because it cannot be a self, a
self that necessarily thwarts its own freedom
it

because
source.

131
132

132

is,

ontologically

A proper

relation

(infinitude)

nonsynchronous
to

the Ground

with
is

its

essen-

The Sickness Unto Death, 143, 144.

Related to this is the notion of "reflective grief,"
which Kierkegaard deals with at length in Either/Or, vol. 2,
165-187.
The sorrow that is reflective grief, says Kierkegaard, constantly and unsuccessfully seeks its "object." This
is a function, as I see it, of missing one's self, and is the
essence of addiction and Sartrean love.
Another example of
the absence of self is found in Kierkegaard's Repetition, p.
221: "I belong to the idea. When the idea calls, I abandon
everything, or, more correctly, I have nothing to abandon."
The speaker here is a young lover.
The sentiment expressed
could perhaps be more accurately rendered "I have no self to
abandon, therefore, I abandon everything [all existential
considerations] and lose 'myself' in the idea [hypnagogic
image] . " The subjectivity of the nonself is necessarily selfdeceptive (love and addiction) and deceptive (love) .
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tial for the nonaddictive love relation.
love

is

grounded

in the

Eternal,

says

All nonaddictive
133
Kierkegaard,
and

therefore can never be coopted into a nonreflective project
134
to-be-addicted.
The relationship to the Ground is primary
135
and must be the substratum for all other love relations,
. 136
Love
for only love itself can teach one what love is.
involves

hope because "Hope is the relationship to the
137
eternal."
Addictive love necessarily involves the absence
of hope, as one is paralyzed in the face of love's irruninent
demise.

The project of love (addiction) is the flight toward

the Sartrean anti-value, a process whereby one strips oneself
of one's own humanity, and flays one's freedom upon the stake
.
138
Of b eing.
The ramifications of the perversion of freedom
and value in addictive love (under the guise of love) course
through one's being as a nauseating emetic.
love project must be pro-jected (vomited)
disguise

the anti-value

The introjected
into the world to

in the form of value.

Hence,

the

advent of the Sartrean love relation.
For Kierkegaard, one achieves a faith relation (relation
of nondespair) with the Infinite through repetition.
133See Works of Love, 27.
134
cf. Works of Love, 51.
i3swork s of Love, 122.
136
Works of Love, 118.
137work s of Love, 237.
138
cf. Being and Nothingness, 611.

"Repeti-
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ti on' s love is the only happy love."

139

Such love would be

Kierkegaardian or Sartrean type two love.

Sartre envisages

this type of love as the ideal unrealizable ideal, as noted
previously.

This type of love would be the result of reduc-

tion/conversion,

a

null

set

in

the Sartrean world.

The

Sartrean reduction/conversion is equivalent to repetition for
Kierkegaard, an existential condition in which bad faith is
rooted out and the for-itself is free to pursue freedom as an
end

in

itself.

It

"takes

courage

to

will

•

•

repetition"

140

because it is equivalent to the dispensing with the project to
be one's own project.

Both the Sartrean conversion and the

Kierkegaardian notion of repetition involve acceptance of the
limitations upon one's own freedom in the face of being, the
difference being that in the Sartrean world the totality of
being,

as compared to the Kierkegaardian,

scribed.

is more circum-

Sartre realized that the conversion,

within the

confines of such a circumscription, was not possible, yet even
in his last interview with Benny Levy he still sought the
conversion as an ideal.

For Kierkegaard, the self connects

with the Eternal through repetition in such a way that the
self itself becomes eternal.

139

This claim, of course, is para-

K'ierk egaard , Repetition,
' '
1 3 1.

140R

•
•
epetition,
1 3 2.
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doxa:

"The proposition inaccessible to thought is: that one

can become eternal al though one was not such. "

141

Sartre makes two claims in Being and Nothingness that
serve to forever impose certain strictures upon his ontology
and disallow him from shifting toward Kierkegaard:
Being is uncreated.

142

'
' super fl uous (d e t rop ) ... f or eternity.
'
143
Being
is
I wish to make but one observation here.

If Sartre's major

work is "an essay in phenomenological ontology," neither of
the above claims can be advanced.

144

For Being and Nothing-

ness must remain on the level of pure description,

it must

remain an elucidation of the contents of the experiential
reality of the for-itself.
description of being.

Phenomenology is an essential

Therefore, truth claims outside of the

descriptive scope of the for-itself are a fundamental violation of the procedure expounded by Sartre himself. Both of the
above ontological claims, then, are extramethodological and
therefore cannot be legitimately advanced.

Sartre wishes to

make definitive truth claims here regarding both the past and

141

Cone 1 u d'ing Unscienti
'
' f 'ic P ostscript,
.
508 .
F rom a
philosophical standpoint, I am not even going to begin to
argue for this claim. It is simply a piece of Kierkegaardian
dogma.
142

Being
·
and No th ingness,
·
1 xv.

143

Being
·
and No th ingness,
·
1 xvi.
·

144

This is in fact Barnes' translation of the subtitle of
this very work, essai d' ontologie phenomenologigue.
See
L'etre et le neant (Paris: Gallimard, 1943).
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the future.

This seems clearly to be a fundamental violation

of his own methodological protocol.
If Sartre were to ref rain from describing what is in
essence nondescriptive, he may find himself open to a wider
range of ontological possibilities,

possibilities which he

himself would find admittedly more palatable. 145
envision such possibilities,

but

he

fails

Sartre can

to be able

to

explore them given his preexistent ontological mythology.

146

The issue is central for the possibility of a nonaddictive
love relation in the Sartrean world, and for the possibility
of a nonaddicted for-itself.
nausea,

revulsion,

bondage,

The experiences of anguish,
etc.

throughout the body of his works.
findings

serve

preexistent

as

backward

ontological

Sartre

well

These phenomenological

indicators

presuppositions

introduction of Being and Nothingness.
Put differently,

describes

to

illuminate

laid

down

in

the
the

147

cognitive presuppositions necessarily

color the nature of one's perceived phenomenological reality.

145

Hence, the possible superfluity of nausea?

146

"Mythology":
Methodologically
nondemonstrable/extraparadigmatic.
A myth may be true or false, or,
possibly, have no truth value at all. It is simply the case
that with mythology, knowledge of the truth value of the myth
is outside the knower's epistemological scope.
147

These findings do not, however, demonstrate the
fallaciousness of Sartre's presuppositions, that is, they in
no way show (demonstrate, prove} that Kierkegaard is right.
Sartre's findings are merely suggestive of other possibly
valid ontological frameworks, and the urgency of the need to
explore the same.
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Phenomenology, then, cannot be a science based on primordial
experience.

It becomes, rather, a description of cognitively

infested/presented/interpreted/discounted experiential data.
Back to things in themselves?
within the Garden?

A retreat to the tree of life

If and only if

immutable and distillable essence,
being-in-the-world.

"reason"

has

Mussolini was in Italy.

in Germany - and in Poland.

own

separate from originary

God was in his heaven no longer.

was in the Soviet Union.

its

And in France.

Stalin

Hitler was

And the people

needed to believe. Something.
Sartre sets love in opposition to God in his explication
of his play "The Devil and the Good Lord: "[E]very love is in
. .
opposition
to Go d ...

11

148

Finally,

Sartrean ontology denies

both God and love in favor of another absolute - freedom.

Yet

Sartre sees freedom without love as de trop, and life becomes
not only meaningless but nauseating.
in opposition to God?

149

Why is Sartrean love

Because it sets itself up as

the

absolute, because, if God existed, as Kierkegaard has said,

148

Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, eds. The Writings of
Jean-Paul Sartre. vol. 1: A Bibliographical Life. Trans.
Richard C. McCleary. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1974), 254.
149

'
'
'
' h t h e view
'
Camus I
Th is
is
in
stark contrast wit
espouses in The Myth of Sisyphus. The Plague. The Rebel. A
Happy Death, etc., that life is meaningless while also being
invigorating, affirming, joyful. Camus has no conception of
a reduction or a conversion because he sees no need of them.
Sartre, however, forever cried out concerning their absolute
necessity ( and simultaneous impossibility) .
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absolutized

love

would be

a

form

of

"idolatry."

150

Both

Sartrean love and addiction are idolatrous because they seek
to perform the ontological task of God and thus exist only as
God-surrogates.
world"

The Sartrean lover seeks to be "the whole

for the beloved,

151

he seeks to become the absolute

limit of the beloved's freedom and therefore "unsurpassable":
"As the absolute limit of freedom, i.e. as the absolute source
of all values,
lute value.

I am the absolute value."

I am the absolute.

lover is the God project,

I

am.

153

the

absolute

value

I am the abso-

The project of the

the project to-be-addicted,

project to freely create an essence.
become

152

for

the

The lover seeks to
beloved:

such

unrealizable telos of Sartrean love and addiction.
of addiction

(love)

the

is

the

The object

becomes the absolute limit of freedom,

hence one cannot get "outside" of it.

154

150

cf. Works of Love, 70.
In Either/Or, vol. 1, Kierkegaard also notes that aesthetic love, as the object of
ultimate concern, is equivalent to idolatry.
151

"

2

153
154

Being
·
and N
. o th·ingness, 367 .
Being
·
and No th'ingness, 369 .
Echoing Yahweh to Moses; an unrealizable telos.

Note the obvious parallel to omnipresence and omnipotence, the classical attributes said to be a part of the
essential nature of God.
These would also be said by the
addict to pertain to the object of addiction. The fork in the
road comes when we toss in omnibenevolence, said to be an
attribute of God but certainly not the addictive object.
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In Sartrean love,

I

addiction for the Other.

attempt to become the object of

155

"I [as the lover] try to cons ti-

tute myself as the necessary intermediary between the beloved
and the world."

156

I try to constitute myself as the addic-

tive object, the necessary object, the indispensable object,
. h is
. necessary f or on t o 1 ogica
. 1 f usion.
.
157
t h at wh ic
less,

"essence is what has been.

11158

Neverthe-

In Sartrean love and

addiction, I try to be in the manner of an essence, trying,
therefore,

to be what I

have been but am not.

Thus,

the

successful project to-be-addicted (to-be-in-love) would be the
death of the for-itself.

Yet I seek life through the contra-

dietary and self-disintegrating conduit of death,

forging

backward, as I am unable to meet my freedom ahead of me and so
coincide with my being.

"Reflective consciousness can be

called a moral consciousness since it cannot arise without at
the same moment disclosing values.

159

Reflective awareness

of the project of the self in both love and addiction,
Sartre,

"

would

5

156

entail

the

recognition

of

the

for

anti-value

cf. Being and Nothingness, 369.

Being and Nothingness, 3 72.

Fusion 11 in th~ sense of "overcoming" the fragmented
diasporatic nature of the for-itself by reference to an
"essence" (the lover) .
15711

158

Being
·
and No th ingness,
·
35 .

159

Being
·
and No th ingness,
·
95 .

Underlining mine.
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implicitly

espoused

as

the

telos

of

•

both

proJects.

160

deBeauvoir has this to say concerning the issue:
By virtue of the fact that he refuses to recognize
that he is freely establishing the value of the end
he sets up, the serious man [as lover, ad~jct, or
both] makes himself the slave of that end.
For the

lover

(addict),

the

"object"

of

love

(addiction)

appears as the object of ultimate concern (absolute limit),
and thus as a
ism") .

"necessary" choice

(absolute choice;

"fatal-

In Sartrean love, as in addiction, one does not become

more free in relation to the "object," but "less free.

11162

Imagination is the mode of communication between Sartrean
(addictive) lovers as well as the mode of communication the
addict has with himself.
of

the

imaginary

Both addiction and love are projects

rather than the

real

self.

cannot perceive and imagine simultaneously,
must flow from either the former
.
.
( imaginary
se lf) . 164

Love is a

160

cf. Being and Nothingness, 611.

161

The Ethics of Ambiguity, 48.

Since we

our experience

(real self)
project of

163

or the latter
the real

162

self,

Phenomenologically speaking. I am arguing against this
notion in any ontological sense. Like Sartre's description of
the experience of mi tsein in Being and Nothingness, the
experience of "loss of freedom" is psychological in nature.
I make the psychological/ontological distinction as Sartre
does in Being and Nothingness, and as Kierkegaard does in The
Sickness Unto Death, the latter when explaining the relationship between consciousness and despair.
The distinction is
both crucial and problematic.
163

c f . The Psychology of Imagination, 210.

164

cf. Being and Nothingness, 257, 258, 600.
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addiction (Sartrean love) is a project of the imaginary self.
Just as imagination and perception are mutually exclusive, so
are love and addiction.
such that

Sartrean consciousness is constructed

the dynamics of both love and addiction cannot

coexist, therefore love and addiction necessarily exclude each
other, as do perception and imagination.
an

affective

imaginary
(through

consciousness
•

consciousness. '1
the

green

fuse)

165

166

of

desire
The

drives

"So the structure of
is

already

desire
the

for

flower

that

being
of

of

that

Sartrean

love and addiction is an affective consciousness of desire for
the object of addiction (love), thereby negating perception,
encapsulating consciousness in its own hermetically sealed
hypnagogic vacuum.
a

"But if we form a second consciousness, or

reflective consciousness,

on top of this

imaginary con-

sciousness, a second kind of belief appears: the belief in the
,
existence
of

'
I 167
t h e image.
'

This means that the "reflective

katharsis" operative in imaginary consciousness is effected
only within the confines of imaginary consciousness itself.
Hence, a captivated consciousness (as in the case of imaginary
consciousness) , effects the katharsis (reduction) as a matter
of fallacious belief rather than as an effectual purifying

165

The Psychology of Imagination, 102.

166

Dylan Thomas, "The Force That Through the Green Fuse
Drives the Flower," The Norton Anthology of English Literature, vol. 2, 4th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979),
2410,
2411.
M

7

The P syc h o 1 ogy o f I magina
· · t'ion, 125 .
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reflection.

This game of mirrors operative in Sartrean love

and addiction allows
simply another

cul-de-sac

This being the case,
Sartre

is

169

in Sartrean

which is

self-consciousness.

the problematic of self-deception in

closely aligned with

.
.
168
Me d itat1ons.

tivity.

for imaginary reflectivity,

that

of

Descartes

in his

Cognition becomes the handmaiden of affec-

This means that in Sartrean love as in all addic-

tions, the "truth" of imaginary consciousness (as is also the
case with emotional consciousness)

is a function of affect,

not reflective intentional perception of the world.

Affect is

a necessary distortion of reflective phenomenological rela.
. h t h e wor ld . 170
t1ons
wit

"Everything is symbol; I myself am

171

a poignant statement of the relation

a myth about myself: "

the Sartrean lover has with his being-in-love or the addict
has with his being-addicted.

For if I were not a myth about

myself, I would be nothing at all.
The mythology imaginary consciousness proffers itself in
bad

faith

is

intended

to

fill

the

nothingness

relation to itself and so suppress its own anguish.
can I suppress that which I am?

it

is

in

Yet how

I become (am) an imaginary

168

That is, how does one know if one is (self) deceived?
Due to the insular structure of Sartrean imaginary consciousness (exclusionary of perception) and the attendant "warping"
of thought, this question becomes of utmost importance.
169
170
171

cf. The Psychology of Imagination, 129.

See The Emotions: Outline of a Theory, 58ff.
' h er I Or, VO 1 . 1, 439.
Elt
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self; I become (am) an addict (Sartrean lover).

"The idea [a

function of imaginary consciousness] is the life principle in
erotic [in this case, Sartrean] love and,
must

sacrifice

.
1.ie ]
h ypnagogic

life

[freedom,

if necessary, one

consciousness]

and even ero t.ic 1 ove i. tse lf .

for

11

172

it

[the

Camus has

said that an idealist is one who will kill for an idea.

173

The Sartrean lover is an idealist (forever forging toward the
mythic noncontingent being) who will kill his own love (self)
for the sake of the idea of the meaning of that love.

The

addict is the idealist who will kill his self for the nonreflective ideal addiction represents.

The addict (re)presents

this ideal to himself (imagination), and believes in his own
representation (faith).
In Either/Or, vol. 1, we see that imagination is the real
mode of conununication between Cordelia and Johannes, the two
"lovers" chronologized in The Diary Qt. the Seducer.

174

This

is quite consistent with any analysis of aesthetic erotic
love, and is in accord with Sartre's description of imaginary
consciousness in The Psychology of Imagination: the object of
love

(addiction)

is

the

hypnagogic

perception by its very existence.

image,

which

negates

It could not be otherwise,

for love (addiction} here is a fiction based on the project of
172

Repetition,
' '
'
' 1e
140.
Th us, t h e me t as tab i' 1 ity,
trip
destructibility, and perpetual insecurity of Sartrean love.
173

See Albert Camus, Neither Victims Nor Executioners,
trans. Dwight MacDonald (New York: Continuum, 1980}, 25-61.
114

• h
Eit
er I Or, 297-440.
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the false self.

175

Given analysis, the similarity should not

be unexpected at all, as the Sartrean lover induces in himself
imaginary consciousness (autohypnosis) which gives rise to the
mysticism of
parallel

hypnagogic

case of

imagery,

merely

a

subset

the broader spectrum of

of

the

other addictive

relations.
Sartrean love

is

a

despairing

love,

a

perpetually insecure and forever precarious.
is addiction.

love

that

is

Despairing love

Such despairing love is evidenced in Donna

Elvira's relation to Don Juan: nothing earthly or heavenly has
any significance for her except Don Juan, and from the very
.
.
.
.
d espair.
.
176
b eginning
s h e is
in

love,

as

the

lover

Such is the case in Sartrean

"becomes"

the

"whole

world"

for

the

beloved, and there is nothing beyond the world; the loss of
the

lover

is

the

effective death.

loss

of

the

world,

i.e.

affective

and

The lover seeks to induce despair in the

beloved, that is, being-addicted.

In this way, the beloved is

bonded to the lover through an act of affective treason.
Kierkegaard tells us in Works of Love that "Spontaneous
love is in despair because the lover relates himself with
infinite passion to a single individual,

but with infinite

passion one can relate onself - if one is not in despair -

175

0rtega, in On Love, notes what he calls an "unexpected
similarity" between falling in love, mysticism, and hypnosis.
See Jose Ortega y Gasset, On Love, trans. Toby Talbot (New
York: World, 1968), 56.
176

See Either/Or, vol. 1, 189.

261

only to

the

Eternal . "

177

Spontaneous

love

despairing

is

love; such despair is the equivalent of the ontology of the
addict.

Despair, we may recall, is an ontological disrelation

in one's

inmost being.

For Kierkegaard,

because he lacks the Eternal .

a man despairs

The "Eternal" in Kierkegaard is

the functional equivalent of Sartre's in-itself-for-itself,
which is the unrealizable telos of Sartrean love.

178

There-

fore, the unrealizable telos of addictive, despairing Sartrean
love is nonaddictive nondespairing love, which is contingent
upon the "creation" of the in-itself-for-itself.

Why does one

relate with infinite passion and thus induce disrelation/despair?

Because freedom is infinite.

The "stuff" of my project

that is me is my freedom and only my freedom.

179

For Kierkegaard, love must be consciously grounded in the
Eternal to eradicate despair, but love cannot be grounded in
an unrealizable and so disintegrates into addiction.

Put

177

Works of Love, 56.

178

Why is the unrealizable telos of Sartrean love the
Kierkegaardian Eternal? Because Sartre fully recognizes the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the possibility of a
nondespairing self. The nondespairing self is the nonaddicted
self, that is, the self that is capable of loving. For even
the addicted lover has as her unrealizable goal nonaddicted
love. Despair is the discrepancy between the former and the
latter; cognizance of the discrepancy generates a new level of
despair in which a certain level of translucency is operative
with regard to one's being.
179

Proj ect-ion cannot be partialized short of ontological
schizophrenia, which is the Sartrean lover/addict attempting
to derealize via imaginary consciousness his own despair.
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differently, the Sartrean project of love is a disintegrative
.
.
180
proJect
o f a dd.1ct1on.

"Doubt is a despair of thought, despair is a doubt of the
'
I 181
persona l 1ty.
'

Despair is ontological, not psychological.

It has significance in that it is indicative of something
other than itself

(being-addicted) .

hended not through doubt,

The Absolute is appre-

but despair,

ontological, as is knowledge.

because despair is

Despair is the starting point

for choosing oneself; choosing oneself is the starting point
.

f or k nowing.

182

The Sartrean lover

(addict)

seeks to hide

from his own anguish and so suppress the despair that he is.
Sartrean

love

and

addiction

function

as

the

anti-value,

leading one away from the truth of the self (despair) which
could lead to the proper (nontruncated) utilization of one's
own freedom - the condition of the nondespairing self.

"Every

man who has not tasted the bitterness of despair has missed
the

significance

of

life.

11183

Without

despair,

the

for-

itself lacks the impetus to effect the purifying reflection
(katharsis)

upon itself,

to say nothing of conversion,

which the former is requisite.

180

See Works of Love, 46.

181

Either/Or, vol. 2, 215.

182

for

Life truly does begin on the

Echoing Paracelsus: "He who knows nothing, loves
nothing ... The more knowledge is inherent in a thing, the
greater the love .... "
Found in Erich Fromm's The Art of
Loving, xxiii.
183

Either/Or, vol. 2, 212.
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.
184
ot h er si. d e o f d espair.

an project

of

Yet the flight that is the Sartre-

love/addiction

is

a

flight

from

self

that

disallows sufficient knowledge of oneself for the cognizance
of one's own despair, thus precluding the possibility of the
realization of this "other side."
and

cold/It

Love/addiction:

chills

the

body

"The Jordan river is chilly
but

not

the

sou 1 .

II

185

the amulet worn in flight to ward off the

"evil" of despair.

Soon, Draconian measures are necessary due

to the habituation (developed tolerance) of the addicted fori

. t se lf . 186
184

Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Flies." In No Exit and Three
Other Plays, trans. Gilbert (New York: Vintage, 1976), 123.
185

.
. d 1 an d , conversion,
.
Jor d an river:
t h e promise
t h e i. d ea 1
unrealizable ideal.
186

Even if I kill the Other, says Sartre, there is no way
that I can get away from my being- for-others, which still
exists as a result of the fact that the Other existed, and
exists now (as a nothingness). My suggestion is that, in the
for-itself 's codependent attempt to utilize the being of the
Other (or the object of addiction) to flee his own despair, he
becomes inextricably intertwined with that other being.
Sartre is well aware of this, as is Sade: "I am alone here, I
am at the world's end, withheld from every gaze [the Sartrean
look, whereby I am objectified by the Other and realize my
being-for-others], here no one can reach me; no limits, hence
no barriers, I AM FREE."
[Marquis de Sade, The 120 Days of
Sodom and Other Writings, trans. Austryn Wainhouse and Richard
Seaver (New York: Grove Press, 1987), 412.] Better yet might
be Austryn' s Wainhouse 's superb gloss on the philosophy of
Sade, which could quite directly also be said of Being and
Nothingness: 11 'The supreme good consists in living independent
of others' [thus, no drain hole, no crack, no bleeding of the
world toward the Other, no guilt following my original upsurge
in a world where there are others, no invisible flight, no
fixed sliding of the whole universe, no decentralization of
the world, no internal hemorrhaging. See Being and Nothingness, 255-257]; that being out of the question, one had to be
clever [deceptive] , supple [able to appear as subject or
(continued ... )
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"What the lover is demanding he expresses by the awkward
and vitiated phrases of
seeks

'fatalism. '

11187

to induce in the beloved the

consciousness,

The Sartrean lover

fatalism of

imaginary

the nonreflective dream state of the addict.

The beloved's being-in-the-world must be a "being-as-loving" an ontologically "determined" (nonfree) condition.

This must

be a free determination of being that subsequently ceases to
be within the realm of freely determined being - an impossibility.

It would be being that has

determined "forever",

irrevocably

(been)

(thus,

chosen to be

security).

188

The

lover seeks to induce dependency in the Other in order to

•
d)
... continue
object, depending upon the particular ruse de jour] in order
to live with them." [Writers in Revolt, ed. by Terry Southern,
Richard Seaver, and Alexander Trocchi (New York: Berkley,
1963), 58.]
For Sade, "Solitude is power" - just as is the
case for Sartre [See Albert Camus, The Rebel, 248], a power
(freedom) without warrant, without justification, and without
purpose.
Within the Sartrean paradigm, the conclusion,
therefore, is as follows: "I AM FREE, THEREFORE, I VOMIT."
This may appear absurd, but it is not humorous.
Incongruity
can be just as much a source of pain as pleasure. Erotic love
thus degenerates into "the mute nausea of my passion."
[Kierkegaard, Repetition, 204.]
Passion becomes engulfed in
the juxtaposition of its necessity (for man is the passion to
be God) and its own superfluity. The aim is not lacking, as
Nietzsche says in The Genealogy of Morals. What is lacking is
the reason for the aim (operative, of course, in Sartrean love
and addiction).
Again, a question for philosophers.
Or is
it? What do philosophers know about themselves? Or anything
else, for that matter? Despair expropriates the purview of
the pusillanimous.
186 (

187
188

Being and Nothingness, 3 70.

The necessity of deception and self-deception in this
process is readily evident, for how could one freely dBtermine
one's being?
Being is either free or determined but not
freely determined.
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create the lover's own necessity.

This ontological dependency

on the love-object is the addictive relation.
love and addiction is

11

The telos of

freedom's self-enslavement.

11

189

The

beloved's freedom runs aground upon the ubiquitous shore of
the lover, the endless shore from which one never again shall
set sail.

190

The induced/self-induced hypnagogic imagery at the center
of the addictive relation can be characterized in the following ways: imprisoned consciousness, modification of attention,
bondage,

fascination,

condition of paralysis,

enchantment,

nervousness, willing bondage, captive, possession.

All these

are terms Sartre utilizes in The Psychology of Imagination,
.
.
.
191
a 11 th e wh 1. 1 e ma k ing
no re f erence to a dd 1ct1on.
tells us
deceive

that

11

these are forms

consciousness

endlessly,

Sartre

that possess the power to
11

192

strikingly

indicating

the escape from freedom at the root of the project of such
self-induced hypnagogic imagery operative in Sartrean love and
in all addictions.

The Sartrean lover seeks the "alienated

freedom" of the Other, a desperate attempt which leads only to

189

See Being and Nothingness, 403.

190

That is, until the deception (love) is over. Ontological lucidity is a necessary but insufficient condition for the
possibility of a nonaddictive love relation, as delineated
previously in part one, section B of the present chapter.
191

These terms are introduced in the text between pages

59-101.
192

The Psychology of Imagination, 71.
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the lover's own self-alienation of his freedom.

193

The only

possible way the lover can hope to recapture his alienated
freedom is through the ontological flue vent of the Other,
since it is the Other that "possesses" this alienated freedom,
and it is the Other that makes this "possession" evident (in
the look} .

194

The dependency experienced in Sartrean love and addiction
is an ontological mirage: "There is no situation in which the
for-itself would be more free than in others.

11195

Of course,

for the addict to know this would be for the addict to "wake
up" to the project.

Therefore,

the addict as addict never

experiences this reality, but is left to struggle in the realm
of

imaginary

dependence,

consciousness.

but

relegates

Kierkegaard does
it

to

one's

not

relation

eschew

with

the

193

This occurs as the lover seeks objectivity before the
look of the beloved. See Being and Nothingness, 375.
194

This is why addictive love is only a degeneration on
the first level, since the "bartering" ("exchange"} is still
in kind (freedom for freedom - as an ideal} . Addictions which
do not involve two freedoms - noninterpersonal addictions such
as alcoholism, nicotine addiction, food addiction, cocaine
addiction, etc. - are degenerative addictions of the second
level, because they do not even seek in the object of addiction freedom as an unrealizable ideal.
Sartrean addictive
love is a failure in principle; noninterpersonal addictions
are double failures in principle, for, in the latter, addicts
have even given up hope of coopting free being, but instead
have directly sought the in-itself qua in-itself.
195

•
.
Being
and Nothingness,
549.
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196

Ground.

pendence.

Such dependence,

for Kierkegaard,

is true inde-

Independence, then, is only through the conduit of

another, but this other must be ontologically categorically
different from oneself.
de

Beauvoir's

197

ideal

of

love,

Sartrean ontological framework.,
not

198

from

within a

maintains that love should

involve the expropriation of

renunciation of all possession,

working

the Other:

"Love is

of all confusion.

11199

the
de

Beauvoir's ideal is in accord with those of Kierkegaard and
Sartre, but remains unrealizable within the Sartrean paradigm.
Love based on the telos of possession is rooted in confusion
and is addiction.

Either possession/confusion and addiction,

or love based on the absence of both possession and confusion.
An

attempt

to

imbibe/ingest

freedom/being

is

ipso

facto

addiction and precludes the possibility of love due to its
inherent

constellation

of

metastability/deception/self-

deception/expropriation.
In The Second Sex Simone de Beauvoir says that
Genuine love ought to be founded on mutual recognition of two liberties; the lovers would then experience themselves both as self and as other; nei196

Soren Kierkegaard, The Gospel of Suffering, trans. by
David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson (Minneapolis, MN:
Augsburg, 1948), 197.
197

viz., independence, for Kierkegaard, can never
achieved through a temporal love relation with another,
through a lack thereof.
.
At 1 east, accord'1ng to h er rec k on1ng.

198
199

The Ethics of Ambiguity, 67.

be
or
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ther would give up transcendence, neither would be
mutilated; together they would manifest values and
aims in the world. For the one and the other, love
would be a revelation of self
by the gift of self
200
and enrichment of the world.
Note the imperative/hypothetical/subjunctive voice.

For the

Sartrean addictive lover, love is not and cannot be founded on
the recognition of two liberties.
not experience

themselves both as

rather experience a
other.
dence

Therefore, the lovers do
self and as

other,

but

partialization and denial of self and

The lover and beloved feign the giving up of transceneven before

the

gaze

of

the

self.

If

they

could

manifest values and aims in the world, there would be telic
(not ontological) fusion.

Sartrean addictive love is predi-

cated upon ontological fusion.

It is neither a revelation of

self by the gift of self or an enrichment of the world, but an
ongoing impoverishment of the world through self-denial and
the attempted enslavement of the Other.

Since type two love

is made impossible by Sartrean ontology,

these conditions

obtain in every expression of Sartrean love.

What both Sartre

and de Beauvoir want, obviously, is the realization of type
two love.
ly.

Can one desire what one cannot have?

Most assured-

Can one be mistaken about that which is unrealizable?

This amounts to asking and answering the Kantian question
"What can one know?" in a specific manner.

200

Regardless, the

simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. and ed. H.M.
Parshley (New York: Vintage, 1974), 667. Underlining mine.

269
possibility of an affirmative answer exists, since it is ruled
out neither in fact or in theory.
At this point, it becomes necessary to look briefly at
the issue of the meaning and value of freedom in Sartre, since
Sartrean love and addiction both involve a flight from the
same.

It is commonly held by commentators that Sartre takes

freedom as the ultimate value, since he designates it as the
source of all value.
a

view of

counter

to

There is ample textual support for such

Sartre's writings.
this

very

ideal,

excoriation by Sartre himself.

Love as
and,

an addiction runs

therefore,

is

open

to

From the plethora of referenc-

es as to the meaning and value of freedom in Sartre, I wish to
replicate but a few, in concert with congruous references on
the same topic from the works of de Beauvoir (all underlining
mine) :
One ~y choose an¥o£hing if it is on the grounds of
free involvement.
I can take freedom as a goal only if I take that of
others as goal as well [not the case with Sartrean
love] .
As soon as there is involvement [concrete
relations with others] , I am
obliged [why is
this?] to want others to have freedom at the same
time that I want my own freedom [I 202
am obliged to
want the ideal unrealizable ideal?] .

201

Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions,
trans. by Hazel Barnes and Bernard Frechtman (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1956), 48.
On this ground, Sartrean
love and addiction are excluded from the set of legitimate
ends.
202E xistentia
.
, l'ism and Human Emotions,
.
46 .

270

The one thing that counts in ethics is knowing
whether the inventing was done in the name
203 of
freedom [contra addiction and Sartrean love] .
... human freedom is the ultimate, the unigue end to
which man should destine himself 20 [therefore, Sartrean addictive love is negated] .
An end is valid only by a

return to the freedom
which established it and which willed itself
through this end ... freedom is not to be engulfed in
any goal [freedom, however, is engulfed
205 in the
Sartrean projects· of love and addiction] .

To will oneself free is also to will others free
[Sartrean
2os love and addiction are therefore jettisoned] .
We have to respect freedom .Qilly when it is intended
for freedom. A freedom which is interested only in
denying freedom must be denied [On such grounds,
Sartre~n
7 love and addiction must again be denied] .
The supreme end at which man must aim is his freedom, which alone is capable of establishing the
value of
208 eve:r:y end [love/addiction are illegitimate
ends] .
Man 209
is free but he finds his law in his very freed om.

203 Ex1stent1a
.
. 1.ism and Human Emotions, 47.
204The Ethics of Ambiguity, 48, 49.
2osThe Ethics of Ambiguity, 70.
2osThe Ethics of Ambiguity, 73.
207The Ethics of Ambiguity, 90, 91.
2osThe Ethics of Ambiguity, 113.
2osThe Ethics of Ambiguity, 156.
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The unrealizable goal of both Sartrean love and addiction,

as

readily seen by

enslavement."

210

this

time,

is

"freedom's

self-

Since it has already been shown that addic-

tion and Sartrean love both involve a flight from freedom - in
fact,

that they are this flight,

we can utilize the above

passages to see clearly that even within the Sartrean ontological

framework,

211

addictive

love

is

still

illegitimate.

212

For if freedom is denied within the Sartrean framework. there
is no hope of constituting oneself as g valid project. since
freedom is the only possible source of validity.

213

Thus the

preservation and sanctification of freedom is crucial in the
Sartrean world.

This is also, of course, true for Kierkegaard

(but in a different sense) , for without freedom, there would
be no self and no God.

Freedom,

for Kierkegaard,

is an

essential ideal and value, yet not the only ideal or value,
nor

the

only

potential

source

of

value.

214

Kierkegaard

values freedom so highly that for him "Every human being's
essential destiny is to become free,

independent, to become

210

'
'
S ee a 1 so Th e Concept o f
Being
and Not h ingness,
4 0 4.
Anxiety and The Sickness Unto Death on this dynamic.
211

Not to mention that of Kierkegaard, who censors such
freedom negation in an even more categorical and forceful way.
212

Yet, as we have seen, it is the only ontologically
possible love-fare for Sartre.
213

validity =meaning, value, self-constitution, nonaddictedness.
214

What one means b y t h is
· d epend s on wh at one means b y
freedom.
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himself.

11215

Yet

all

is

not

decided within

a

vacuum of

freedom for "If the eternal is not, there is neither truth nor
freedom."

216

This is the same as saying that without

eternal there is no nonaddictive love.

the

For Kierkegaard, as

well as for Sartre and de Beauvoir, the in-itself-for-itself
is

the

necessary

precondition

nonaddictive love relation,

217

for

the

possibility

of

a

but for the latter two think-

ers, the in-itself-for-itself is an ideal unrealizable ideal.
Love and addiction, we have noted, are both for Sartre
unrealizable ideals.

218

The unrealizable ideal of love must

be separated from the concrete praxis of love, says Sartre:
"This unrealizable ideal which haunts my project of myself in
the presence of the Other is not to be identified with love

215

Works of Love, 259.

216

.
( d ra f t ) , 20 6 .
Th e Concept o f Anxiety

217

See also p. 207.

Jean Grenier succinctly expresses what I take to be the
Kierkegaardian view: " ... absolute freedom is the destruction
of all value [the Sartrean framework], absolute value suppresses all freedom [the Hegelian framework]." The quote is
found in Camus' The Rebel, 288. Kierkegaard's own position is
represented between the two
(Sartrean-Hegelian)
poles.
Nietzsche provides us with an interesting gloss of the issue,
quite applicable to the discussion: " ... Hence a philosopher
should claim the right to include willing within the sphere of
morals [axiology, values] ... the desire for 'freedom of the
will' INVOLVES NOTHING LESS THAN TO BE PRECISELY CAUSA SUI.
[Beyond Good and Evil, 27-28.] But from Nietzsche's perspective, Sartre is dead wrong.
For Nietzsche, "freedom as the
ultimate value" is a ridiculous perversion of the eternal
recurrence wherein freedom is an ephemeral illusion engulfed
in the necessity of all things. Kierkegaard would again fall
in between the two thinkers on this second, Sartrean-Nietzschean spectrum.
218

See Being and Nothingness, 365-366.
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insofar as love is an enterprise ... But it is the ideal of
1 ove.

11219

The enterprise of

Sartrean love

and addiction,

ostensibly, is exclusive of the god project, viz. its metaphysical underpinnings are not nonreflectively apprehensible
(visible) .

Sartre's statement merely highlights the irremedi-

able gulf between what I do in the love (addiction) relation
and what I think I do (on a number of levels, dependent upon
the depth of bad faith) .

His statement serves to underscore

the necessity of deception/self-deception in any Sartrean love
relation.

The concrete enterprise differs

from the ideal

enterprise because in the former there is no
consciousness of the unrealizable ideal.

(reflective)

220

Kierkegaard tells us that
All idealizing passion (Earthly passion tends to
prevent existence by transforming it into something
merely momentary) is anticipation of the Eternal in
existence
functioning so as to help the individual
•
221
to exist.
In saying this, Kierkegaard sets up a passion dichotomy that
could be linked to Sartre's conception of love.

Kierkegaard

delineates two kinds of passion: (A) The real ("earthly") and
(B) The ideal

219

("idealizing") .

(A)

could be said to be the

Being
'
and Not h'ingness, 36 6 .

220

cf. Being and Nothingness, 9 O. There is no consciousness of the unrealizable ideal prior to reduction/conversion,
which would entail the death of Sartrean type two love.
Therefore, for the Sartrean lover engaging in the enterprise
of loving, there is no consciousness of the unrealizable
ideal.
221

c one 1 u d ing
·

·
· f ic
·
·
211 .
Unscienti
Postscript,
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concrete enterprise of love in Sartre,

with its attendant

passion, whereas (B) would then be the unrealizable ideal of
the love project.

The Sartrean unrealizable ideal functions

as a constant ontological substratum, in relation to which the
concrete manifestation of love is only fleeting and contingent.

Such is likewise the case with the project to-be-

addicted,

which is identical in form to the Sartrean love

project but may or may not be identical in content.

Idealiz-

ing passion, says Kierkegaard, helps the individual to exist;
idealizing passion

in Sartre

simply helps

(addict) to flee existence toward being.

the

individual

Idealizing passion

linked to the Ideal does not volatize existence but rather
makes it possible.
cynicism and

the

The passionate Sartrean is relegated.to
abortion of

passion as

an

ideal.

The

passionate Kierkegaardian creates within the boundaries of a
formally

but

not

materially

constituted

universe.

The

passionate Sartrean creates with a backdrop of naught but the
abyss of freedom.

222

"The one thing that it is impossible to become is to
become necessary, because the necessary is always presupposed

222

Camus made a point quite relevant in this regard in The
Rebel: "Artistic creation is a demand for unity and a rejection of the world ... rebellion can be observed here in its pure
state." [p. 253.] The artist as the addict; the addict as the
rebel.
An attempt to create a universe in which there is
subject-object unity on some level.
The inexorable and
insatiable desire in the heart of the artist/rebel/addict for
this unity, experienced as an ontological necessity.
(Hence
the "necessary" tone of the contingent ontology espoused in
Being and Nothingness.)
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as

,
I 223
b eing. '

On

this

forever in agreement.

point,

Kierkegaard and

Sartre are

Yet, for Sartre, love is an enterprise

of becoming necessary for the Other, an enterprise of becoming
the Other's addictive object,
.
b eing
.
.
necessity
"sa 1 vat1on.

the goal of such impossible

11224

As Constantin Constantius

said of the young lover in Repetition, so we can say of the
Sartrean lover:

"I am completely convinced that he does not

know the girl at all ... she is the girl,

- period.

11225

For

the Sartrean lover, the beloved is merely of value as a symbol
(conduit, conductor, circuit, transformer) for the potential
recovery of being.

Therefore, "necessity," "salvation."

The

love object is the object of addiction for the lover, as the
lover seeks to become the object of addiction for the beloved.
"Salvation" predicated upon addiction is a necessary failure.
Since Sartre was tacitly well aware of this,

his thought

contains another, positive notion of salvation which negates
addiction and type one love.

This conception

of salvation is

already employed in Being and Nothingness when Sartre makes
clear that existential psychoanalysis, as he delineates it,
"may function as a means of deliverance and salvation.
This

type

of

salvation would

entail

223

cone 1 u d 1ng
·

224

'
c f . Being
an d Not h'1ngness, 3 71 .

225

Repet1t1on,
' '
185 .

226

Being
'
'
62 7 .
an d Not h 1ngness,

the

·
· f 1c
·
P ostscr1pt,
·
Unsc1ent1

mine.

dispensing

90.

11226

with

Underlining
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addictive love relations and would allow for type two love.
As de Beauvoir says:
An authentic love should assume the contingence of

the other;
tions, and
pretend to
does], but

that is to say his lacks, his limitahis basic gratuitousness.
It would not
be a mode of salvation [as 22
trpe one love
a basic human interaction.

This

of

type

love

relation

is

not

available

to

the

unconverted for-itself, and conversion is not possible in the
Sartrean world.

All love in the Sartrean world is a variation

on the basic theme of addiction, a bid for salvation, a bid
for necessity, a bid for cosmic significance, nonsuperfluity.
de Beauvoir writes of salvation in The Ethics of Ambiguity:
Existentialist ethics [made possible after the
reduction and conversion] appears [appears, yes,
and is, finally, only mere appearance] as the only
proposition of salvation which one can address to
men [viz. the only proposition of salvation is the
refusal of salvation] ... If it came to be that each
man did what he must [that is, give up the perfidious quest for salvation, made possible only after
reduction/conversion.
Each man must give this up
in order to be 9-. man] , existence would be saved
[but certainly not from contingency, or from the
possibly mistaken belief that existence could be
anything other than contingent] in each one without
there being any need of dreaming of a paradise
where all would be reconciled in death [a good
thing too, since the assumption of basic superfluousness is a condition for this type of salva'
] . 228
t ion
Sartre and de Beauvoir both want "salvation."

The ideal

unrealizable ideal would be salvation-as-ontological-justification.

227

228

Since

this

is

The Second Sex, 654.

not

possible

short

Underlining mine.

The Ethics of Ambiguity, 159.

of

reduc-

277

tion/conversion and reduction/conversion,

for them,

is not

possible, they chose an "inferior" (even by their own reckoning) form of salvation: salvation-as-the-repudiation-of-theattempt-at-ontological-justification, an inverse notion of the
preceding

account

of

salvation.

This,

of

course,

isn't

salvation at all in any traditional sense of the word, but an
acquiescence
existence.

229

in

the

face

of

a

superfluous,

meaningless

The problem is that even this inferior notion

of salvation cannot be possibilized in the Sartrean world
because the reduction/ conversion is not possible.

Because the

reduction/conversion is impossible, the for-itself's pursuit
of being is inexorable, inexpungable.

Therefore, salvation in

both senses is excluded from the Sartrean world.

One cannot

be an authentic lover in the Sartrean world, and one is either
a lover or an addict.
the addict.

The Sartrean for-itself, as such, is

The Sartrean for- itself will always be the addict

as long as, according to Sartre,
trop)

for

eternity, "

230

balks and chafes at this.
do,

and,

"being is superfluous

ontologically,

the

(de

for- itself

And this is all the for-itself can

for the for-itself is this balking and chafing at the

superfluity of being.

The essence of the for-itself is either

to-be-nauseated or to-be-(self)deceived

(or both).

In the

latter as in the former, the for-itself is being-addicted.

229

Thus, the greater the degree
greater the degree of "salvation."
230

•
.
Being
an d Not h.ingness, 1 xvi.

of

acquiescence,

the

278

There is no love in the Sartrean world, but only variations on the theme of addiction.
of

the absence of

the

reality of the latter.
analysis.

former

In fact, it is the reality
that

is

the genesis of

the

This is descriptive, phenomenological

Either love or addiction.

are ontological possibilities.

For Kierkegaard, both

For Sartre, addiction alone is

the grievous alpha and omega of ontological possibility.
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